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Welcome Snow

Sue Matheson

EDITORIAL

It is a bitter winter after December's ice storms and snow flurries arrived later than usual. This, *the quint's* eclectic fifty sixth issue, offers readers looking to escape chilly weather works by authors in Nigeria, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Canada. Ade Kunle Mamudu's "Woman's Inhumanity to Woman: The Pivotal Role of Women Entrepreneurs in Slave Prostitution in Three African Novels" begins our December offerings. Mamudu examines depictions of female investors in sexual slavery in Chika Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street,* Felix Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze*, and Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked* and points out how these novels transmit the sordid realities of Nigeria's flesh trade. Next, Olaniyi Banwo Adetoro traces the similarities and differences of Nigerian and Chinese gender stereotpes in "Gender Stereotypes and Traditional Connotations: (A Comparative Analysis of Selected Chinese and Igbo Women).Then, Christianah O. Ben-Akinduro's "The Legacy of Industrialization as the Fulcrum of the Japanese Development: 1868–1989" applies Walt Whitman Rostow's 1960 development model to the rapid economic development of post-World War II Japan, arguing that Japan's successes rest on its pre-war economic experiences and modernisation-by-imitation. Following, in "The implications of decolonization: An interpretation of Fanon's anti-Marxist consciousness as new ideology," Meriem Khmiri critiques Franz Fanon's rebuff of Marxism in *The Wretched of the Earth* and finds his followers' arguments ineffective. He asks, how can can we possibly erase an episode from our history and make a retrograde movement into primitiveness?

Then, Samuel O. Aghalino and Adeniyi Justus Aboyeji's "Beyond The Lure of

Oil: Alternatives for the Sustainable Economic Development of Nigeria" considers the drawbacks of Nigeria's oil-driven economy and examines the country's other resources that promise sustainable economic development. Following, Odeh Lemuel and Boniface Ifeanyi Orji's "Communal Conflicts In The North Central States And Food Insecurity In Nigeria: The Panacea Of The Chinese Example" finds grazing land scarcity and food inseciurity in the north-central states of Nassarawa, Benue, Kogi, Plateau of Nigeria are reasons for continuing conflict in those areas. They call for learning agenda that integrates food security more explicitly into conflict analysis to contribute important insights for future work. Completing the offerings of this issue's articles, Felix Onaiwu Osaigbovo's "The Development of Motion Pictures, Multi-media Graphics and a Short History of Nigeria's Film Industry" discusses technological innovation in the film industry and traces the the growth of Nigerian film.

the quint is happy to announce that film *and* book reviews are housed in this issue. Lydia Ayame Hiraide's film review, "Grounding Environmental Issues in the Social: A Short Response to *David Attenborough: A Life On Our Planet*" finds Attenborough's call for environmental action interesting and informative. Francis Mickus' "Fake Noses, Real Masks and One Big Headache: The Making of *The Other Side of the Wind*" contends that what *The Other Side of the Wind* (2018) presents as Orson Welles' life and situation is a red herring. Mickus discovers the film explains the devotion of all those around Welles. In "Spike Lee's *Four Little Girls*: Will History Be Repeated?," Douglas C. MacLeod points out that Lee reminds us of the importance of not forgetting how integration in the US was achieved and recognizes these four Black children as icons of the Civil Rights movement, while incorporating interviews from family members and movement leaders who discuss racism under Jim Crow. Daniel Brooke's "Licence to Thrill?: Documentary in the Service of Power in *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea*" is a fascinating and sophisticated story of infiltration and sanction-breaking in North Korea,but we learn nothing new about the country itself,and merely confirm existing prejudice and suspicions. *the quint* is also privileged to present two book reviews by John Butler. He finds Minae Mizumura's *Inheritance from Mother*, translated by. Juliet Winters Carpenter, counteracts stereotypes, being at once beautiful and compassionate while examining commonplace issues and complex characters in a combination of everyday and poetic language He then judges Tsering Döndrup's *The Handsome Monk and Other Stories*, translated by Christopher Peacock, an important and well-written collection of stories designed to disabuse readers of romantic notions about Tibet.

No issue of *the quint* can be complete without its creative component. We are honored to house a series of sensitive and beautifully crafted December poems by Karen Wall. In deference to Janus, I offer you images recording our winter in Northern Manitoba as you enter and exit this issue's text. As the North continues to self-isolate, here is good reading for your Christmas stockings. *the quint* returns in March, with more reading for the warmer days ahead.

Sue Matheson
Editor

December 9 Snowstorm

The white whale opened snowdrift jaws

throated bellows crossed the lawns

where we gasped in ribcage white, late warnings

ghostly boneshards, words of storm

Night dials spin insomniac glee

Highway 2 to Red Deer is closing

dervish wind tangles down the coned voices of jets

to an earth caught dumb in falling nets

Broadcasters meanwhile at the firestones

of a nervewracked igloo, lost boys smoking out songs

and I move to the ladder of the storehouse

flashlighting jarred meat, plotting heroic heat

—Karen Wall

Woman's Inhumanity to Woman: The Pivotal Role of Women Entrepreneurs in Slave Prostitution in Three African Novels

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Abstract

The booming industry of sex slave trade in Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked*, Chika Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street,* and Felix Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze* is generally controlled by women. This paper examines the irony of the dehumanizing activities of these entrepreneurs, the chief operators, cartel heads, sponsors, and tormentors as their quests for huge profits are carried out to the detriment of thei fellow women.

Keywords: Slave-prostitution, Cartel, Sex slave camp, Sex slave trade,Women win group

Introduction

The economic downturn of the 1990s that led to a massive devaluation of the naira in Nigeria made its citizens seek alternate ways of earning the American dollar and other foreign currencies. The dollar which was at a point in time at par with the naira, rose steadily to the alarming rate of N150.00 (one hundred and fifty naira). Nigeria sought to establish the true value of the naira by trading its national currency in the parallel market against the dollar, creating a great chase and scrabble for the stronger dollar and other currencies by local entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial Nigerians exported any commodity that could earn them the much coveted American dollar and European euro. It was discovered that the female body, with its alluring sexuality, was a much sought-after item in the West. Before long, trading in human flesh became a multi-billion dollar industry run by cartels and cabals. The government and the United Nations Organization (UNO) named it human trafficking—a euphemism for what it really is, sex slavery.There arose a set of African women in the driver's seat of this prostitution racket who were ruthless and merciless in their handling of their fellow African women as sex slaves.

According to the Women Win Organisation, a group committed to the fight against sex slavery,

> [t]he trafficking and sex slavery industry itself is a multi-billion dollar business that transports and enslaves hundreds of thousands of girls and women each year. Current statistics estimate that there are 4.5 million sex trafficking victims around the world: 98% of those are girls and women. Poverty and socio-economic inequalities create the ideal environment for trafficking and sex slavery to develop and flourish. With the exception of existing demand, which is fuelled by the vast amount of money that traffickers can earn, another key factor is poverty. Poverty, intended as a "lack of wellbeing," is composed of different aspects, such as: financial resources, health-related well-beingand accommodation, level of education, societal integration and family of origin.In some cases families will actually sell their daughters into sex slavery. In other cases the traffickers will lure girls from low economic settings with promises of employment in foreign countries. Once the girls are situated in the foreign country, instead of going to their respective promised jobs, they are sold. Throughout this entire process, girls and women are exposed to a wide range of emotional, physical and psychological abuse. (par1)

Information on the group's post also considers the various physical and psychological effects of sex slavery on the trafficked victim as well as the society. It outlines the effects of sex slavery as being STIs, pregnancy, infertility, infections or mutilations, chronic back pain, hearing loss, cardiovascular or respiratory problems, malnourishment, and serious dental problems. Others effects include infectious diseases like tuberculosis, undetected or untreated diseases, bruises, scars and other signs of physical abuse and torture, and substance abuse problems or addictions (par 6). The psychological effects of trafficking and sex slavery, outlined by the Women Win Organisation, include anxiety and stress disorder, attachment disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), developmental disorders, eating disorders, learning disorders, impulse control disorders, mood disorders, personality disorders, self-harming disorders, sleep disorders, and substance abuse disorders (par 4).

This paper considers female investors in sexual slavery in Chika Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street,* Felix Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze*, and Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked*, arguing that these novels transmit the realities of Nigeria's flesh trade. As Gina Wilkerson remarks,

> Social Realism took place in the twentieth century and around the globe. If we look at each word individually, we can figure out what Social Realism was about. The word 'social' refers to the people in society, and 'realism' refers to the way these people were portrayed in each medium. Artists, including photographers, painters, sculptors and printmakers created art that represented the everyday lives of common, working folks. Artists wanted to show how the world really was and not how artists of the past, including impressionists and abstract artists, made it out to be. Romantic, frivolous notions were discarded for the gritty, harsh characteristics that defined the world after the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression. Social Realism was a vehicle for artists to discuss the current social and economic situations in their countries. (par1)

Bernadine Evvaristo, in her review of Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street*, states that

> *On Black Sisters Street* is a probing and unsettling exploration of the many factors that lead African women into prostitution in Europe and it pulls no punches about the sordid nature of the job. Four naïve young women, Sisi. Joyce, Ama and Efe fall under the money making spell of pimp daddy "Senghor Dele" in Lagos. Rich vulgar, ruthless, he specializes in exporting girls to work in Belgium for a modest fee of 30000 euros. This they must pay back in monthly installments over many years of turning tricks ten hours a day. They don't all know that this is what lies in store but, fake passports withheld the consequences for those who try to escape are dire… Men in the novel are generally drunks, murderers, rapists, weak, cold-hearted, pathetic. (23)

Publishers Weekly comments that"Unigwe gives a powerful voice to women of the African Diaspora who are forced to use sex to survive. The author's raw voice, unflinching eye for detail, facility for creating a complex narrative, and affection for her characters make this a must read.

Asomwan Adagboyin commends the topicality and artistry of Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze* and predicts that Ogoanah is a writer empowered for greatness. He says,

> [l]ying within the lexico semantic geography of memory is the fact that literature never forgets. In the hands of a visionary creator and skilled craftsman, it is a good reminder. It is in the mould of literature as a reminder that I would like to cast Felix N. Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze*, a novel, which in my humble opinion, has the potentials of stamping its authority on the Nigerian Literary landscape sooner than later. This is not only because of its topicality, but also the sheer virtuoso and pathos with which events in the novel are woven.

Ikediugwu and Ugwu identify poverty, ignorance, and greed are Ogoanah's major concerns in his novel. In their joint essay, both critics devote ample space to the study

of these vices. *On Black Sister's Street, The Return of Ameze, and* Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked* also portray the activities of shrewd business women who invest heavily in the sex slave trade and are merciless in the way they handle their 'goods.' In this business only profit matters. Ironically and incidentally, female characters who enslave their fellow women are addressed with the title of 'Madam.' In *Trafficked*, they are Madam Dollar and Madam Gold, Madam V in T*he Return of Ameze* and simply Madam in *On Black Sisters' Street.* All are mean and violent. All are feared.

These entrepreneurs generally use a common technique to acquire their human goods: procuring them through deception. The potential sex slaves are promised decent jobs, with good salaries and retirement plans. Lured by non-existent jobs and their benefits, young, beautiful, and sexually attractive girls are taken abroad after they have sworn oaths with grave consequences should they flee from their madam-investors without paying back all that has been invested in them. Upon arrival, they realize that the promised jobs do not exist and that they must hit the streets, selling their bodies as cheap prostitutes. By then, it is late to back out. Each victim has been subjected to a binding contract during her initiation. Ogoanah gives an account of the oath-taking session:

> Before they finally left for Lagos, the girls called on the foremost native doctor beyond Ikpoba Hill to take an oath and undergo the final rituals. The oath was important to the traffickers because it kept the girls in check and ensured the investment on them yielded the expected returns. In this part of the country, most people lived in superstition; they believed strongly in the efficacy of juju and charms. The rituals involved a few strands of pubic hair, nails, underwear, a few hairs from the armpit and, at least, a drop of blood, which the 'doctor' took from their toes. He cut them slightly with the same razor blade and mixed the blood with a black substance. Then he rubbed the mixture on their foreheads. It was not clear what the juju man or the trafficker did with the remainder of these items. (214)

Providing verisimilitude to the story, this account is drawn largely from practices commonly enacted in Nigeria's flesh trade. This act of initiation is designed to stop the sex slaves from escaping from the female entrepreneurs whose investments must be guarded very closely to ensure huge profits and new recruits. Aptly, Adimora-Ezeigbo's account the sex slaves' recruitment and oath-taking exercise shares basic similarities with Ogoannah's. Narrating her experience, Efe, Nneoma's co-trafficked friend in *Trafficked* says,

> I responded to the advertisement without my cousin's knowledge. The office seemed perfectly normal. Quite a number of people were interviewed the same day. Some were rejected, but I was shocked. None of them who were interviewed was taken. That should have alerted me to danger. But I barely gave it a thought at the time. Anyway, before long, all the girls—ten of us—were given travel schedule. We took an oath to work for the agency until we had paid our debts. They claimed they had spent a lot of money getting our passports and tickets. Oh Lord, they always have the same story. Go on, Nneoma breathed. (99)

The cartel that drives the sex slave business employs the same methods of recruiting and obtaining contract agreements (by oath) from their victims. To obtain maximum returns on their investments, the women in charge are emotionless and harsh They

make their victims undergo harrowing, excruciating, and depraved experiences. An encounter between Madam and Sisi in *On Black Sisters' Street* illustrates the heartlessness and detachment of the madam-entrepreneur:

> Madam sat, cigarette in hand… Madam was a huge yellow sun with green combat boots under flared yellow trousers. Her yellowness clashed with the redness of the walls and Sisi thought the whole effect was rather obscene. Madam half closed her eyes, took a drag on her cigarette and slowly opened her eyes. She let them run over Sisi, slowly, thoughtfully. As if she was trying to size her up [as] a commodity for sale, a slab of meat at the local abattoir. Now, you belong to me, it cost us a lot of money to organize all this for you…'Now, until you have paid up every kobo, she pointed the cigarette at Sisi, every single cent of what you owe us, you will not have your passport back. Every month, we expect five hundred euros from you. That should be easy if you are dedicated. But I understand that sometimes you may not be able to, so we have set a minimum repayment of one hundred euros. Every month, you go to the Western Union and transfer the money to Dele. Any month you do not pay up...'(181-182)

Unigwe uses setting, its conflicting and loud colours of red and yellow and the military camouflage, to denote fear, while Madam reads the riot act to Sisi. As Madam says, Sisi must use her body to raise five hundred euros every month to defray the cost of the investment in her. If that fails, she must pay a minimum of a hundred euro monthly or face very dire consequences. Here Madam is presented as a tyrant, puffing away at her cigarette and belching out orders to her new recruit. When Sisi dies a death that Madam masterminds, the entrepeneur is unmoved. Everyone else is gloomy and shaken by the news of Sisi's death, but Madam carries on as if nothing has happened. She counts her loss of profits, not the human life entrusted to her care. Madam is emotionlessness as she eats

> a heavy breakfast; toast and egg chewed with heavy gusto and washed down with a heavy mug of tea, and thought her appetite, her calm, tactless. Joyce thinks: When she told them of the death she did not even have the decency to assume the sad face that the gravity of such news demanded. She did not try to soften the blow, did not couch the news in a long story about how death was a must…she just told of the discovery of the body…and she added, 'Another one bites the dust,' in a voice that she might have used to talk about the death of a dog or a cockroach—Joyce felt the urge to slap her. Or stuff her mouth with dust until she begged for mercy. (39)

Her girls consider her a heartless investor. After Sisi's death, the girls realize Madam's reaction to their own deaths would be the same as her reaction to Sisi's. They recognize they are mere commodities themselves, merchandise in Madam's hands. One of the girls in the flesh business attempts to explain Madam's aloofness and coldness as necessary to the survival and profitability of the enterprise. Whether this is true or false, Madam, bereft of feeling, degrades her fellow women.

In *Trafficked*, Adimora-Ezeigbo deploys two female entrepreneurs. Both of them—Madam Gold and Madam Dollar—possess the same negative attributes as Unigwe's Madam. They are emotionless, brutal, and shrewd in their business transactions. They are businesswomen who are only concerned with the profits they make and also lack fellow

"female" feelings for the trafficked girls. Although Madam Gold is briefly presented in the narrative, she is shown to be a merciless slave driver who works the girls very hard in order to get her profits quickly and bountifully. Efe, trafficked like Nneoma, says,

> Well to cut a long story short, we were taken to Italy and ended up in Palermo. It was terrible. I was sold to the woman called Madam Gold, a Nigerian. She was vicious. She used us shamelessly, made us walk the streets every night…Madam Gold sold me to a pimp—a white man—four years of working for her. I worked for my new 'owner' for two years before I escaped.(100)

Madam Gold operates from the same business manual as Unigwe's Madam. Both women abuse and exploit other women without any restraint in their bids to make as many profits as possible. They are entrepreneurs who sell their fellow women without any qualms in deference to the euro.

In *Trafficked*, Adimora-Ezeigbo also presents Madam Dollar as a shrewd business woman. Another investor in the sex slave trade, she capitalizes on Nneoma's beauty with a view to making huge profits. Madam Dollar parades the same negative qualities as Madam Gold and Madam as she treats her human cargo in the same humiliating and inhuman way. While speaking of her ordeal at the hands of Madam Dollar to her friend, Efe, Nneoma reveals what she is forced to put up with in Italy. Madam Dollar is ruthless in her interactions with her sex slaves. She deploys her body guard—Captain—to physically subdue any uncooperative worker. She is impatient with any girl who stands in the way of profit and threatens her investment. Adimora- Ezeigbo supplies details that drive home these women entrepreneurs as hardened business women who display their shrewdness in handling their commodities to ensure profit and good returns on their human cargo. Illuminating the character of Madam Dollar, Nneoma says,

> [i]n Italy, I discover I am trafficked. I have no say in the matter. There's a woman called Madam Dollar—nothing comes between her and money. She owns us and the man, whom we learn to call Captain, is her bodyguard. She keeps us prisoner in her flat. Life is hell in Rome—we are always walking the nights, selling sex to Italian men and foreigners. I hate Madam Dollar. As soon as we arrive, she sells my friend…I am completely devastated by the life I am forced to live, hit the night street, waiting for customers, winter, spring, summer and autumn; come back at dawn, wash, eat and sleep till it all begins again at nightfall. (128-129)

Nneoma talks about Madam Dollar only in negative terms. This is not unexpected as the girls are prisoners in her flat. Nneoma reveals her harrowing, every day experiences, when she says,

> I am often assaulted by Captain because I'm stubborn and bring the least amount of money home…I sometimes refuse to cooperate with the customers, especially when they demand positions I find despicable or when they refuse to use a condom or make one of the other nasty demand… when I am difficult, the men beat me and throw me out of their cars or kick me out of whatever they have taken me—sometimes a car park or field or public garden, When that happens, I go home with little or no money. Madam raves at me, and Captain beats me up, but he makes sure he does

not disfigure me, for this will mean loss of revenue for Madam Dollar. The less money you bring me, the longer you will have to stay with me, you know,' Madam Dollar says. You must pay me back every kobo I used to buy you.'

So I walk the streets of Rome for Madam Dollar for three years and still she claims I have not repaid my debt. There is no hope of escape. I do not speak Italian. I know no one in the city. I fear the police like a plague as I don't have valid documents. (130-131)

Ogoanah's Madam Vee is no different from Madam Dollar, Madam Gold and Madam. She shares their emotionlessness, rigidity, aloofness, self- importance, and their great desire for run-away profit. She sells her human cargo as if she were dealing ogs of wood. She is domineering and bereft of any act of kindness. She employs the services of a trusted native doctor in her business in the bid to ensure her successes and to ward off any evil. All her actions are guided by the native doctor who administers the oath of allegiance to the girls before they are trafficked.

It is also the doctor's duty to forecast the future, identifying which girls are likely to cause problems for her enterprise. He also gives Madam Vee charms to enable her to command whomever she chooses. This insurance, issued by the native doctor gives her great confidence and helps her economic projections. The native doctor is her business consultant as she ventures into nothing new without seeking approval from him.

Madam Vee also subjects the girls to dehumanizing and painful activities, most of which are despicable. In her bid to make huge profits from her business transactions, her human merchandise is dehumanized:

Madam Vee sat with them and the transactions began. They paid for seven girls on the spot. Four hundred and twenty thousand dollars.It was now about 8pm. The girls lined up for selection, while the two men walked around, as if inspecting a guard of honour. In the end, they picked seven. Ameze was the first choice. The girls were unaware of the transactions. They filed into the van with their luggage and disappeared into the dark night. (237)

This setting recalls accounts of the slave markets in Alabama, where slaves forcefully taken from Africa, were sold to buyers. Demoralized and demeaned, Ameze heart-wrenchingly fights to keep her dignity and vows to keep her chastity, but her resistance is soon broken by Madam Vee who sends her into a deep sleep and has her gang-raped. Madam Vee then proceeds to threaten and blackmail Ameze avagely. Ameze's painful experience begins when Madame Vee opens her handbag and brings out a white handkerchief:

[s]he placed it over Ameze's face, as if to wipe off her sweat or tears. Oh callous fate! Ameze went off. Madam Vee rushed to the parlour and beckoned to Alberto. 'Let them do it fast, before she wakes up.' She rushed to her car, promising to return the next day. Ameze woke up violated, blood everywhere, as she groaned in pain…As she cried in pain, it seemed she bled for all the maidens in her clan. (242)

The hideousness of Madam Vee's insatiable drive for money is fully revealed when

Ameze awakens and writhes in pain. An entrepreneur who will go to any length to ensure that she profits from her business Madam Vee dehumanizes and blackmails her fellow woman. She is quick to tell Ameze that

> [i]f you don't cooperate fully, I'll kill all of them—your father and your sisters. Perhaps I'll leave your mother, to suffer alone. She had power, money and influence. She could do virtually anything. 'As for you,' she continued, 'you're finished. Do you think you're still a virgin?' She laughed out wickedly. 'We're all the same now, you, me, Agnes, your mother…everybody.
> Madam Vee walked over to a cabinet at one end of the room and slotted the tape into a player. Ameze cringed and fainted. She was buck naked while three men took their turns on her. It was a very sordid sight… Now, get me right. If you try to be funny here, this tape will get to Nigeria before you do. I will make copies for all the people that knew you! Everybody, including your miserable parents and sisters, that is, if they are still alive. (244)

Conclusion

In Kachi Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked*, Chika Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street,* and Felix Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze*, women entrepreneurs in the sex slave business are despicable, heartless, money loving, brutal, and deadly. Trading in flesh, the 'Madams' betray the oneness of sisterhood in their acts of inhumanity. They also play a pivotal role in sustaining a business that loudly echoes the horrors of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade. Today in Africa and Euope, that which was abolished has resurfaced in what is, ironically, a more civilized and enlightened world. African entrepreneurs who have reinvented slavery profit by selling their fellow countrywomen. Chika Unigwe's *On Black Sister's Street,* Felix Ogoanah's *The Return of Ameze*, and Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo's *Trafficked* are important texts that examine sexual slavery in our time and condemn the actions of those who make this illicit trade possible.

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accident

West of the overpass: the steel mass

of rain scrawls over the drowning roadbed

you scream at me about things done with bodies

Yellow headlamps rein down the rodeo ramps

chrome bucking eastward, a sudden red flash

flicks comets off the ditch where the heart

of September was amber dust—we slow now

in clutching siren minutes

that drag through us as glaciers

and now we see the windows cindering into wind

your voice is finally warped among the woven limbs

—*Karen Wall*

Gender Stereotypes and Traditional Connotations: (A Comparative Analysis of Selected Chinese and Igbo Women)

Olaniyi Banwo Adetoro

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Abstract

Traditional societies often define the sexes according to their gender roles. Chinese behavior and attitudes are regulated by societal expectations that are based on sex or sexuality and promote the belief that women should be fostering, obliging, and well-mannered while men are thought audacious, belligerent, and tough. When these notions, enforced by society, are ignored, women are seen as rebels, outcasts, or perhaps untraditional. Considering gender stereotypes spread across the Chinese Han cultural group and the Igbo cultural group of Nigeria, this paper examines data obtained via typical case sampling and analyzed by content analysis. Three key elements were identified and examined during this research (stereotypes, discrimination, and inequality of sexes). This work concludes that people find it difficult to disengage from their traditional concepts and views. It recognizes that the society maintains belligerent prejudicial attitudes that are generational and create dogma and negative connotations regarding gender stereotypes. It suggests that gender stereotypes and traditional connotations that promote discrimination and the inequality of sexes be strongly or eradicated. It concludes that all human beings are equal and no form of discrimination or stereotype should exist in our societies.

Keywords: Gender, Stereotypes, Traditions, Connotations and Attitudes

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Introduction

From birth to death, people are embellished with stereotypes. Children are treated differently because of their sex; a female child is either given dolls or dressed in pink while a male child is given a truck or soldiers. Our social expectations further coat tham with characteristics: girls are expected to be delicate and soft, boys, strong and alert (Malszecki & Cavar, 2005). In traditional settings, assumptions like these are even more pronounced, because it is generally believed that women should remain pure, exhibit a high sense of morality, be interested in household chores, and most especially be able to raise children (Griffin, 1988). From traditional to modern times, women are expected to embody feminine traits, presented as physical, emotional, and mental weaknesses. As Benson and Griffin (1988) point out, the notion of femininity creates expectations that women have to live up to the standards of specific gender roles held by both sexes in their respective societies. Sherrow (2001) also finds feminine traits to be highly obvious in behavior and appearances. Certain jobs and attributes are not expected of women, and they are deterred from being assertive, grunting, and taking on difficult jobs. Women are

expected to be ladies, as the stereotype is defined by the society.

What then are stereotypes? Psychologists have offered numerous definitions. Stereotypes are seen as a collective knowledge of ideas, myths, religions, customs and sciences of a society. Knowledge or belief is often developed about a certain cluster and this group is regarded as a part of an individual's social knowledge. Invariably, social behavior is constructed, and its effectiveness is based on the individual's knowledge. Our culture influences the formation of stereotypes because of information absorption through secondary sources such as family members, friends, teachers and the mass media aid the formation of stereotypes (Griffin, 1988). People conform to these stereotypes, because they are psychologically ingrained and rooted in the fierce human desire for communal society. Lippmann (1922) introduces the term 'stereotype' to refer to the distinctive picture that comes to mind when thinking about a certain social group. Hilton and Von Hippel (1996) perceive stereotypes as cognitive schemas used by social perceivers to process information about others. Oakes and Turner (1990) observe stereotypes as not only reflecting beliefs about the traits characterizing typical group members but also containing information about other qualities, such as social roles, the degree to which members of the group share specific qualities (i.e., within-group homogeneity or variability), and influencing emotional reactions to group members. Stereotypes imply a substantial amount of information about people beyond their immediately apparent surface qualities and generate expectations about group members' anticipated behavior in new situations.

Stereotypes can be categorized under three broad approaches (the economic, the sociological and the social cognitive). The economic approach of Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) sees stereotypes as a manifestation of statistical discrimination: specifically,

rational formation of beliefs about a group member in terms of the aggregate beliefs about that group. The sociological approach to stereotyping pertains only to social groups. It views stereotypes as fundamentally incorrect and derogatory generalizations of group traits, which are reflective of the stereotype's underlying prejudices (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950). The third approach to stereotypes is the social cognition approach, rooted in social psychology. This approach gained ground in the past and views social stereotypes as special cases of cognitive schemas or theories (Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth, 1979). These theories are intuitive generalizations that individuals routinely use in their everyday life, and entail savings on cognitive resources. Hilton and Hippel (1996) stress that stereotypes are mental representations of the real differences between groups which allows them easier and more efficient processing of information. Stereotypes are selective, however, in the sense that they are localized around a group with features that are the most distinctive. Stereotyping provides the greatest differentiation between groups that show the least within-group variation." A related "kernel-of-truth hypothesis" holds that stereotypes are based on some empirical reality; as such, they are useful, but may entail exaggerations (Judd and Park, 1993).

Stereotypes exist to simplify, represent, and reveal the specific functions of an environment. This research focused on gender stereotypes, its aim to discern how traditional cultures influence and promote gender stereotypes and examine different stereotypes among the Chinese and the Igbo culture of Nigeria. Here it is important to noe that a gender stereotype consists of beliefs about the psychological traits and characteristics of, as well as the activities appropriate to, men or women. Gender roles are defined by behaviors, but gender stereotypes are beliefs and attitudes about masculinity and femininity. The concepts of gender roles and gender stereotypes tend to be related.

When people associate a pattern of behavior with either women or men, they may overlook individual variations and exceptions and come to believe that the behavior is inevitably associated with one gender but not the other. Therefore, gender roles furnish the material for gender stereotypes. Gender stereotypes are very influential; they affect conceptualizations of women and men and establish social categories for gender. These categories represent what people think, and even when beliefs vary from reality, the beliefs can be very powerful forces in judgments of self and others. Thus, the history, structure, and function of stereotypes are important topics in understanding the impact of gender on people's lives (Brannon, 2004).

Literature review

Cultural perceptions related to masculinity and feminist traits engineer specific roles for genders that are widely accepted by the societal institutions and establishments (Scott and Marshall, 2005). These specific roles can be economic ones, involving an established group of activities in which one is compelled to make a living, being often is a trade or a profession (Hogan, 2006). However, in some societies where women are permitted to work, we often discover they are usually found taking low status jobs with little or no recognition. Haralambos and Holborn (2004) divulge that most women in the twentieth century were not encouraged to take up paid employment because of their cultural traditions and customs. Witz (1992) argues that women lacked professional status, because their resources were not employed economically or politically. This dissuaded women from gaining any form of employment, and men ensured that women were always subservient to men through well-crafted ideologies or policies.

According to Ortner (1974), culture has placed women in a subordinate position to men. She remarks that nature has endowed men with status derived from their physical strength, and therefore they occupy a priveleged position over women. Ortner observes that these status roles and connotations are not biologically designed but are cultural constructs expressing what society should accept as the roles of men and women. Sociologists also argue that the rise of entrepreneurship or capitalism and the development of private property, mainly acquired by men, too are factors that led to the relegation of women in the society (Leacock, Abernethy, Bardhan, Berndt, Brown, Chiñas and Fennell, 1978).

Lorber (2010) in her research offers a broader view into the notion of gender stereotypes. She asserts that gender is seen as a social position, a legal description, and an individual identity. She claims that through the social processes of gendering we build gender divisions and their accompanying norms with role expectations into major social institutions of society. These expectations are evident in the economy, the family, the state, culture, religion, and the law. This is generally accepted as the gendered social order. Women and men, girls and boys are used when referring to gender. There is a broad consensus among feminists that while sex is biological, gender is constructed culturally and socially. Men's dominance and women's subordination is a social creation, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature which is described as feminine" (De Beauvoir, 1953).

Designed by a gendered social order, feminine identity is a social construct that is revealed in one's actions and interactions with others (West and Zimmerman, 1987). Every day, we produce and reproduce gender norms in our social conduct. Gender is associated not only with sex, but also with the multidimensional expectations related to one's sex. In the gendering process, people acquire gender-appropriate behaviors according to culturally well-known gender identification expectations and through

a combination of remuneration, chastisement, direct teaching, and modeling (Chan, Kara, Birgitte, Gianna and Williams, 2011). Every cultural and social setting has its own gender standards that indicate the suitable behaviors for women and men (Pulerwitz and Barker, 2008). Stereotypes stimulate discrimination by methodically influencing discernments, elucidations, and judgments, but they also arise from and are strengthened by discrimination, justifying incongruences between groups. In particular, people recognise the characteristics of groups because of the social roles they occupy (Hoffman and Hurst, 1990), and view members in groups with lower socioeconomic status as less experienced and/or less motivated than high-status group members. Minority group members are also socialized to adopt 'system-justifying ideologies, including stereotypic beliefs about their own group that rationalize the group's social position (Jost, Banaji and Nosek, 2004).

To sum up, gender stereotypes have being reinforced over the years in all social spheres. At work, the effect of culture is imminent because it assigns specific functions to men to the detriment of women. The effect of culture erodes women's status and makes them subordinates. Indeed, the notion of gender itself is a reason why we have stereotypes, for its clearly designated roles and expectations reinforce stereotypes.

Theoretical Framework

Because culture, gender, and stereotypes are all factors that have promoted and strengthened gender discrimination, this study adopted a blend of cultural theories, gender theories, and stereotype theories. Cultural theories reveal people often attribute the most culturally valued traits to the dominant groups in the societies (Ridgeway, 2001). The United Nations Development Program (2013) recognises that a nation's most valued trait is reflected in the national stereotypes of men, brcause men dominate politically

and economically in all nations of the worlds. Correll and Ridgeway (2003) also posit that by general consensus, personal traits and abilities trait are highly socially valued and are associated with status characteristics and expectations. Thus the dogmas that people uphold are often the existing form of social stratification. People legitimize existing systems of social stratification by accepting the most cultural value traits attributed to the dominant social group (Jost and Banaji, 1994). In short, cultural values moderate gender stereotypes.

Theories of gender difference and identity reveal that biological factors are essential in determining and categorizing us as male or female. Our sex depends on whether we are born with distinct male or female genitals and a genetic program that releases male or female hormones to stimulate the development of our reproductive systems. Gender involves masculine and feminine feelings, attitudes, and behaviors identification with a particular sex—biologically, psychologically, and socially. When we behave according to widely shared expectations about how males or females are supposed to act, we adopt a gender role (Shields, 2008).

Theories of stereotypes in this research work are augmented by concepts of social representation. This theory was first formulated by Serge Moscovici who asserted that social representations concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock of ideas that give coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas, and the connections we create as spontaneously as we breathe. They make it possible for us to classify persons and objects, to compare and explain behaviors and to objectify them as part of our social setting. While representations are often located in the minds of men and women, they can just as often be found "in the world", and as such examined separately (Moscovici, 1988).

Methodology

Data was collected from three major sources. Information relating to culture in regards to how it has reinforced gender roles and stereotypes were sourced from primary and secondary sources. Relevant information was sourced through typical case sampling method in which two distant societies were examined and discussed in this research work. Representative gender stereotypes featured in the data spread across the Chinese Han cultural group and the Igbo cultural group of Nigeria. Specific contents of the data were analyzed in regards to culture, gender and stereotypes.

This paper adopted the typical case sampling method and employed observation methods of selected cases, events and data through key informant interviews and focused group discussions. The aim was to understand the experiences of women in their different societies and examine the generalizations which have created stereotypes for them. The study areas for this research work in Nigeria were Delta and Ebonyi states and in China, Anhui province and Jinan province. The objective of choosing these selected states was that most of them still had traditional connotations and belief systems enshrined in their cultures. Women supported men in their daily activities, they played important roles in the family, and they were the custodians of child rearing and specific roles and duties were delegated to them. One observation from this sampling technique is that similar characteristics were detected. A minimum of ten questions were designed to be asked within the age groups of 25-50 using 100 correspondents.

The questionnaire observed and depicted the values and customs of the Chinese and the Igbo cultural group. Both groups hold strong convictions that their thoughts and actions are shaped by their traditional ideologies and notions. Both groups revealed that men are respected in their societies, and the women are expected to do the housework.

However, the Igbos believe that women are respected, and both sexes have equal status,. The Chinese respondents reported that women have no respect attributed to them and do not have equal status with men.

Discussion

Closely related to culture, gender is increasingly seen as a social construct, entrenched in the cultural, social, institutional dimensions of the society. Gender roles assigned to women and men are structurally and culturally defined in ways which create, reinforce, and perpetuate relationships of male dominance and female subordination (Njogu and Orchardson-Mazrui, 2008). Traditional Chinese society is largely influenced by Confucianism which clearly designed its roles and social status. It also emphasized a code of conduct based on a hierarchy in which the entity is governed by the ruler with the youngest daughter at the bottom (Granrose, 2007). Confucianism's social relations, which emphasize the harmonious maintenance of the social hierarchy, rather than the equality of its individuals, constitue the foundation for gender relations in Chinese society (Kinias and Kim, 2011).

Rooted in the superiority of men over women, Confucianism strongly advocates that men, responsible for carrying on the family name, should be regarded with reverence, and bestowed with privileges and a higher status than women. Women are seen as wives and should be subservient under their husbands; when this situation exists, a woman can be classified as a virtuous wife (Chan, Kara, Birgitte, Gianna and Williams, 2011). Confucian tradition asserts that a woman must act in accordance to these three rules: firstly, a woman must obey her father before marriage; second, she should obey her husband; third, she must obey her son after her husband's death (Granrose, 2007).

Another noticeable philosophy derived from Confucian traditions lies behind the communal practice of men working outside home and women inside home. According to Confucius, the harmonious balance between yin (female) and yang (male) categorizes the value of interdependence between women and men, and allocates them with separate spheres of influence, men over the exterior world and women over the domestic world (Guisso, 1982). In essence, we can say that the Chinese woman's journey over the last hundred years has been one from feudalism to emancipation. The history of gender equality in China is more multifaceted than it is often depicted.

From the above, patriarchy is one of the defining features of the traditional Chinese society. Confucianism imposed philosophical subjugation on Chinese women and dispossessed them of their rights in politics, the economy, society and family life. Parsimoniously dependent, women did not own property or have inheritance rights and possessed no independent source of revenue. Family succession and inheritance passed through the male line. They enjoyed no freedom in marriage, having to conform to the dictates of their parents, and were not allowed to remarry if their husbands died. A woman married out of her natal family and into her husband's household, often in a distant village, where she became subordinate to her mother-in-law as well as her male family members, and where domestic power came only gradually with age and the birth of sons. Male children were valued over girls.

In general, Chinese women were subjected to physical and mental torture, being harassed by systems of polygamy and prostitution. T the overwhelming majority of them were forced to bind their feet from childhood in the feudal patriarchal system. For centuries, "women with bound feet" was a synonym for the female gender in China. Women were called "neiren" or inside people, signifying that their roles were primarily and ideally within the realm of the household. However, poorer women of necessity participated actively in farming, manufacturing, and trade. Still, they were deprived of the right to receive an education and take part in social activities (World Bank, 2002).

Gender roles in China remain old-fashioned to a large degree because women's economic prospects are not treasured and young couples are expected to bear the burden or obligation of caring for children and aging parents (Yue and Ng, 1999). This duty of child rearing unquestionably falls on the woman's shoulder (Zhan and Montgomery, 2003). Though nowadays parents occasionally exert absolute control over their children's marriages, they continue to play a big role in their children's mate choices (Pimentel, 2000). It may be in the best interest of parents to have their sons marry a woman who can take on the familial responsibilities or to have their daughters find a husband with the best possible socioeconomic status. Given that familial ties are strong and most metropolitan young men and women are only children, parental impact continues to be powerful. In addition, a husband who takes on a more domestic role in the family is often frowned upon, while a wife's career ambitions and pecuniary contributions often generate family skirmishes (Zuo and Bian, 2001).

Nigeria has traits and attributes similar to China's in regards to gender relations and stereotypes. In fact, most African societies emit the same biases and prejudices. Traditionally, Nigeria is a male-dominated society in traditional times although the trend seems to be changing systematically. As Scott and Marshall (2005) point out, domination refers to rule by coercion or non-coercive compliance. African culture recommends the non-coercive compliance of female to the guidance of the male within the family circle. This guidance may be exercised by the husband or another elderly male member. Females are expected to be subservient and self-effacing to the male counterpart. This non-coercive

control permeates all aspects of social life including the woman's work performance in various occupational areas. Apart from domination which forms a major obstruction to gender relations, work roles and obligation are also fundamental gender barriers.

Ekpo (2008), on the other hand, observes that traditional African society is maintained in the contemporary grouping of occupations into “White and Blue Collar”, but class and gender distinctions are not evidenced because of the absence of clear cut divisions of labor, structural knowledge, and the disparity of roles. According to Ekpo (2008), Africans engage in subsistence occupation in which their yield is mainly for their own consumption, and a few are engaged in peasantry occupations where production is for consumption and income generation. Both men and women are involved in these occupational dimensions. Some scholars disagree with Ekpo, noting other factors influenced the discrimination of women. Sacks (1974), for example, probes the collective subordination of women and suggests that ethnographic and historical documents reinforce the capriciousness of women's status in the family. He discerns that since the modes of production were not general, places where production was established in kinship systems, women and men were likely to have the same relationship to the means of production. Although highlighting the inconsistency of women’s status in the family, he stated that most African connotative meanings of a wife differ greatly from when a woman is mentioned as a sister. A sister has more privilege in African societies than the wife. Sacks' work, in turn, has a shortcoming highlighted by scholars like Sudarkassa (1986) who points out that women in pre-colonial Africa were queen-mothers, queen-sisters, princesses, chiefs, and holders of other offices in towns and villages in pre-colonial Africa.

Traditional Igbo society practices a flexible gender system in the midst of sexual polarization. Men and women are assessed or evaluated in accordance with the role expectations ascribed to them by the society. Its concept of masculinity is grounded in the men’s duty to provide food for and protect their families. Igbo culture uses biological differences to discern gender relations. To them, women are weaker than men,and accordingly moral restrictions are placed on them. Women are expected to prepare for their roles as wives and mothers, while boys boys are seen belonging to a strong gender (Amadiume, 1987). In this culture, women must be domestically and morally inclined, play motherly roles, be caregivers, protect the children and support the household through farming, marketing, and trading. In fact, according to Chuku (2013), the woman exist only for two purposes in Igbo culture: marriage and procreation.

Some scholars disagree with Amadiume (1987) and Chuku (2013), who clearly stated that the status of women in Igbo land is that of wives and mothers. Nzegwu (2004) asserts that the women of Igbo land have multiple roles, and it would be a fallacy to attribute only one gender identity to them. She draws out inferences from lineages where specific girls from families attained a dominant position in the society rather than a subservient one. Lineage daughters to her had multiple functions, among them, keeping peace within the society and performing familial rites, funeral rites, and purification duties. She discards the notion that women in Igboland are considered inferior and subservient to their male counterparts. She argues that both men and women have equal status because it is generally believed that the society was designed around individual work performance, skills, abilities, and excellence.

The social status of the Igbo women has indeed generated controvery in the humanities, with scholars claiming the notion of an inferior status of the Igbo woman unacceptable and highly misleading. Igbo women have rights as equal as men because

they can be educated, are hardworking, and have been dedicated with economic power. They also share the same titles with men in the society, such as the Ogbuefi title (Acholonu, 1995). Igbo women are legal entities with full rights as men, Uchendu (1965) points out that women can own property and businesses of their own. They are not domestic instruments who are completely dependent on their men after the bride price has been paid. Amadiume (1987) debunks the gender schema theory in Igbo culture; to her, sex and gender cannot be used to determine how women are gendered in her society. Despite the sex of the female, she argues there are instances in which women can be given male identity. Women with economic powers, wealth, and unique abilities were often seen as or categorized as female husbands or male daughters.

Literature affirming the complementary role rather than the subservient role of Igbo women is easily obtained. Basden (1966) revises the domestic role of Igbo women to include economic ones grounded in agriculture, manufacturing, and trading. Ikpeze (2000) asserts that women fill a significant role in decision making and execution in the production process and the associated food processing activities. Despite the fact that men in traditional Igbo society perform the role of clearing and preparing the land for cultivation, planting of crops like yam and harvesting oil palm produce, women plant other crops like maize, cassava, cocoyam, beans, tomatoes, vegetables, pumpkins, and ,okra. Apart from this, women also engage in pre-harvest weeding. Traditionally, women also perform activities such as cotton-spinning and weaving, mat-making, basket weaving, pottery, and soap making, all of which are in the manufacturing sector. In the trading, women dominate the market place in traditional Igbo society where they sell agricultural products as well as handicraft and other manufactured goods. Men engage in long distance trading. Societal roles and functions within the Igbo society do not make

women subservient, because women have equal status with men and the the two sexes complement each other.

Findings

The first finding from this research is that the influence of traditional concepts and ideas imminent in both cultural societies. The questionnaire designed for this work reveals that cultural values, ideologies and perceptions have reinforced the notion of gender stereotypes in both societies. While the Chinese Han cultural group is influenced by Confucianism, the Igbo cultural group is influenced by traditional notions and beliefs. It is also deduced that both societies have a social hierarchy that places men on top of it, clearly above women and this is based on the assumed gender traits that they perceive belong to men. There are generally accepted norms in both culture that girls or women are expected to be polite, accommodating and nurturing, while men are expected to be strong, aggressive and bold.

However, according to the questionnaire used, women in the selected areas of Igbo land perceive themselves as having the same status as their men. Furthermore, it isinferred from the data of the questionnaire that both societies have clearly defined role expectations, although some of the Chinese Han group are similar with the expectations of the Igbo cultural group, the clear assumption is that women exist to rear and protect their children. Scholars have observed there are economic roles for women in the Igbo cultural group, but the Chinese Han group places women in a continually subservient role to men, according to Confucian traditions.

Additionally, there is also a convergence of ideas and concepts about the duties of women, as both cultural groups agree that women should do the domestic work and men should do the labor intensive jobs. The Chinese Han group also believes that their

men should participate in household chores and duties. Although data emanating from literatures on Igbo women disclose that women are also involved in labor intensive work such as farming, this in not present in Chinese societies.

Conclusion

The Han Chinese and the Igbo ethnic group of Nigeria provide a unique context to study gender relations, stereotypes, and traditional connotations. It is evident in the numerous literature, that gender stereotypes exist in both cultures, and it can be inferred that both cultures place men over womenbecause of traditional connotations, gender, and the inherent practices of their societies. Despite the fact that there are universally agreed upon connotations of gender roles and functions, the data from the Igbo cultural group provides a basis to debunk stereotypes about their women. Their gender roles demystify perceived accepted roles of women in public and private domains. While there are some universally accepted roles concerning the creation and the sustenance of the family, Igbo women include the production of goods for consumption or trade and income generating activities in their activities. Literature also reveals that Igbo women are given the opportunity to take cultural titles because of their economic power or through their lineage rights.

China and Nigeria are traditional societies that value their culture and transfer them over generations. Confucian belief is still very popular in China today, and it is the accepted way of life. The government itself promotes Chinese culture globally by establishing Confucius institutes where people can learn about Chinese values and traditions. The Igbo also has a firm deep-seated belief in their culture and values, most especially in the behavior of men and women in their society. Men are generally agreed to be adventurous, assertive, aggressive, independent and task-oriented, whereas women are thought to be gentle, sensitive, emotional, and family-oriented.

Questionnaire Questions

Questions	Agree	Disagree
1. Does tradition play an important role in the society?		
2. Does tradition play an unimportant role in the society?		
3. Are women respected in the society?		
4. Are men respected in the society?		
5. Are women expected to be only responsible for child bearing and the family?		
6. Are men expected to be only responsible for child rearing and the family?		
7. Do women have equal status with men in the society?		
8. Do men have equal status with women in the society?		
9. Men are expected to do the household chores.		
10. Women are expected to do the household chores.		

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Construction project

At dawn they run the hoses to the highway
Men push the engines out like rockets but
leave them throbbing in green ditches
wavery tart and vibrant as lime
A broken bone behind each handshake
those I left hovered in grass surround me,
seeking nails, homing for a solid bridge
and she who comes bearing all hammers
balances careless on the verge
From the coffee island I saw a bison as far
as the Strathcona county line, head of gravity
laden with teeth to turf
The lights glow on above the pumps
And the boys say take care how you burn the fuel
These roads are new to us all

—Karen Wall

The Legacy of Industrialization as the Fulcrum of the Japanese Development: 1868–1989

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Abstract

The Meiji reforms (1868–1912) used the outcome of the Western intrusion of 1853 to start Japan on its change from a feudal economy to the first industrialized country in East Asia. Topography had isolated Japan to being restricted within itself to coastal waters in internal travels and communication. This then became a policy extended to the outside world as *sakoku* or 'closed country'. It was an effort to protect a culture and system by the third Tokugawa shogun, Iemitsu. After Iemitsu's efforts, the foundation for socio-economic change was laid by the feudal Tokugawa shogunate, pushed by the incursion of Matthew C. Perry in 1853, then reformed during the Meiji period, and finally transformed after 1945 and built on foreign imperialism. The Yoshida Doctrine pushed modernisation as Ikeda's Income Doubling Plan in 1960 and encouraged Japan's rapid growth to qualify it as the second largest global economy in 1968 and the

third in the 1970s fulcrum on Western industrialisation. This study reveals how Japan systematically modelled industrialisation from the West and went on to perfect it in its advanced form. It begins in 1868, the Meiji start date when industrialisation became tangible, and terminates in 1989, the end of Showa period when the Japanese economy had stabilised. Employing Rostow's development theory (categorised into five stages of industrialisation), this study is made from a historical perspective and uses secondary data. First, Japan's development rested on internal integration; later, it swiveled on the legacy of Western industrialisation rooted in Great Britain.

Keywords: Development, Fulcrum, Industrialisation, Legacy, Prefectures.

Introduction

The blaze of industrialization, which started in Great Britain in the mid-eighteenth century ,became a wildfire spreading to Western Europe and to the United States, before catching in East Asia, especially in Japan. Modernisation and industrialisation in Japanese economic historiography covers the Meiji period (1868-1912), the Taisho period (1912-26), and the Showa period (1926-89); the Heisei period (1989-) continues in history. Diffusion of industrialisation or technological change as it happened in Japan was stimulated internally, provoked indirectly by British companies and entrepreneurs' dominance of the local economy and the host choosing to reject passivity.

The Japanese jumpstarted their industrialisation process, identifying as internal integration, when harassed by British imperialism. Autarkic-Japan had demonstrated elements of growth undoubtedly from the Edo period or the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868). Forced out of isolation in 1853, Japan, sworn to education, gradually and decisively embraced the advances of the West. The Meiji reforms promoted internal Westernisation in 1868–1912, liberalising feudalism by abolishing the neo-Confucian class structure and replacing landownership with prefectures, introducing railways, telegraph lines, and a universal education system (Beasley; Fairbank et.al.; Masahiro 3-18; About-Japan.com; Modern Japan; Japan Modern Timeline), in short, modernisation-by-imitation.

The rapid economic development that marked post-World War II Japan was built on its pre-war economic experience and modernisation-by-imitation. During the American protectionist-occupation in 1946-1952, Japan cleared the rubble of war, started a new economy, and utilised opportunities in trade, mainly exporting automobiles, industrial machinery, and computer accessories. Replicating its legacy of industrialisation from the West gave Japan's economy an explosion qualifying it as an advanced country to merit space within the G7.

Though industrialisation in Japan does not kowtow to Walt Whitman Rostow's development theory, it evidences its stages. This analysis is divided into three parts: the first discusses the identities of Western industrialisation; the second looks at the internal legacy aiding industrialisation in Japan; and the third considers the legacy of industrialization as the fulcrum of Japanese development from 1868–1989.

Theoretical Framework

Rostow's development model of 1960 discussed in Stages of Growth: 'A Non-Communist Manifesto' frames this study. This American economist thinker and government official, was motivated to assist lower income countries en the route to development and assert the United States' influence over that of communist Russia. According to Rostow, some places have progressed further than others in terms of economic development, while

countries with higher levels of gross national product (GNP) are in a later development sequence, (Rostow 173-180**).** Rostow presented this route as five stages through which all countries must pass in order to become developed:

> First is the traditional society, which lacks a scientific background, dependent on subsistence or agricultural economy, with intensive labour and low levels of trade. Second is the preconditions to take-off, as a manufacturing society with a global outlook. The third stage is the take-off, which marks a short period of intensive growth, in simple industrialization, where workers and institutions become concentrated around a new industry. The drive to maturity is the fourth stage, it occurs over a long period of time, as standards of living rise, use of technology increases, and the national economy grows and diversifies. The final stage is the age of high mass consumption.' This model asserts that all countries exist somewhere on this linear spectrum and climb upward through each stage in its development process characterized by mass production and consumerism. (Rostow 173-180)

Scholars and theorists have critiqued Rostow's bias towards a capitalist western model that is a 'top-down,' approach or a trickle-down effect as the only path towards development. Development does not always follow Rostow's five linear steps: some skip steps, while some define different paths. It has also been asserted Rostow disregards one of the most fundamental geographical principles, site and situation, as if all countries have an equal chance to develop, outside population size, natural resources, or location. (Debasish; Itagaki 1-17) In Rostow's defence, this study makes Japan his typology, as traditional-Japan though became self-sufficient through local efforts while climbing Rostow's linear ladder.

The push for Japan was British entrepreneurship and imperialism in the Meiji. This justifies Rostow's argument that increased exposure to modernization and Western society, will provoke changes in traditional culture and values, opening a place to development, (173-180). Japan suitably utilised all the forms of industrialisation identfied by Knox and Marston (2013), namely, the import substitution, the export led-growth that replaced the import-substitution paradigm, and the late developers' model. Japan, through great efforts made by the government, a cohesive ruling class, entrepreneurs, and Japanese citizens was able to become a substantial industrial power. As my research points out, Japan's working environment was the beast of burden for its industrialisation. Japan's primary burden bearer was its society's homemakers comprising of women, in its factories and its brothels. The institutional policies of 1890 and 1898 made unskilled labour into the underclass, the majority of which was women, through government propaganda bear the huge cost of industrialisation for Meiji-Japan, ("Industrialization"; Narayan 1-3; Mosk).

The Western Identities in Japanese Industrialization

The manifestations of industrialised nations have shown identical characteristics. Notwithstanding, each had peculiarities to industrial development. Originating from Britain, the Industrial Revolution was an age of great global transformation that following the modern age which took place from 1760 to the period of 1820-1840. The legacy of industrialization became an inheritance from which any country could share. The impetus for industrial development was the availability of resources such as labor, coal, cotton, and iron. Industrial technology started with machine power made available for the cotton production through the Spinning Jenny, increasing productivity and output.

This phenomenon penetrated and impacted the society in terms of transportation, communication, banking, and employment opportunities. Steam locomotives replaced horse-wagons; the first electrical telegraph and Stock Exchange developed; and government's interference bowed to private ownerships. Low per capita income changed to increased disposable income, facilitating the growth of a larger consumer goods market. Gender roles were changed from being a homemaker to being a part of the working class. Formal foreign relations developed through trade were encouraged by over-production in consumer goods. Notwithstanding, overseas markets enriched industrialized nations, militarized, and encouraged imperialism. Migration from the countryside boomed the growth of cities across the world, including Boston, London, Manchester, and Kantoi-Japan. Diseases and problems prevalent in societies by 1760 were gradually eradicated. However, accompanying urbanization were slums, health hazards from pollution, and new kinds of diseases. Suffering enfranchised workers led to the formation of trade unions. Lifestyles changed as well as the societal value system ("The Industrialization").

Industrialisation is defined as a revolution of the 'application of science to human activities boosting change in the quality of the political, social, economic and religious facets of the society.' The application of science to production brings about the 'economies of standardization and specialization in basic human activities,' ("Industrialization"). The effect transforms an agrarian economy of crude tools into an industrial economy of machineries at cheaper cost. Since the world became agrarian for survival, the revolution through industrialization adopted machines to push to another law of survival. Principles for this development then became a standard. Thus, there are parameters or push-factors that must be present for an industrial system and its success. The push-factors accompanying any industrial sector are: 'an available labour force, ready markets, raw materials, finance for investment, and access to technology.' It should be noted that the absence of any of the above was no limitations. Unavailability of raw materials does not restrict industrialisation. Japan soared despite this limit, where Tsars-Russia failed to harness its abundance in raw materials, and France constrained itself with domestic policy and resources in the nineteenth century. Japan, through the efforts of its government, a cohesive ruling class, entrepreneurs, and Japanese citizens was able to break the rules to become a substantial industrial power in the years between 1859 and 1910; and in post-war Japan also developed a structure of industry along Western patterns, ("The Industrialization").

Industrialism involves a massive transfer of labour from agriculture to industry. This often reduces in propensity when the industrial sector reached a degree of maturity and takes a downturn in gross national product (GNP). The only difference in these experiences would depend on tilt in the activity of the traditional craft industry. For instance, while Britain, Japan and the U.S. had a shift in labour from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector, it was more pronounced in the U.S. Again, while in Britain and Japan there was considerable presence in skilled trades and hand manufacturing, the U.S. was more agricultural, recording aggressive shifts from agriculture to industry. In addition, improved health and the availability of infrastructure, especially with increases in income per capita boosting the domestic market, often led to an increased population that supplied cheap labour. For instance, population growth in Japan moved from 34 million in 1872 to 52 million in 1915. High productivity encouraged by reduced per unit costs made Britain push beyond its frontiers for international markets, as Japan's experience in trade pushed for increased productivity but was clogged by the basis of exchange. Countries importing essentials and exporting products had relief by the 1914

gold standard arrangement, which displaced various bilateral and triangular trading systems from catalysed trade. Again, mass migration of labour in the international market meant a unit of monetary exchange must emerge. Therefore, a system of credit, stabilization of currency and rates of exchange, was invented, ("Industrialization"; "The Industrialization").

Finance is pivotal to industry—necessary for investment in technology and a livewire to industrial development. Factory construction in the early-Meiji was mainly achieved through public works or financed from domestic savings, private capital, or joint stock companies. Japan's industrial process avoided foreign direct investment except in sectors such as the auto or electrical machinery industries, limited to specific periods. Further, unlike other industrial nations, the price for advancement was not heaped on the low class. This is because opportunities available made it a choice to remain in the lower caste as part of the masses crossed with the daimyos in 1868 to become a zaibatsu. Meiji-Japan accumulated technology and capital equipment in large investment restoring tariff autonomy partially in 1899 and then completely in 1911 to finance the transformation of Japan's light industry to heavy industry. Technology requires coping mechanisms or adaptability because of the continuity in improvement that technology undergoes. Events that unravelled showed Japan as possessing the 'social capacity to adapt and absorb the tension' from foreign technology. Adaptability is also found in the dissemination and expansion in education for 'mass training, mass education and acquisition of expertise' continuously improved upon for continuous efficiency. Policies and laws usually come up to sustain technological growth that would hold some persons as culprits ("Industrialization"; "Narayan 1-3; Mosk; "The Industrialization"). Surprisingly, in Japan, gender carried the pain of technology as will be seen in the last part of this section. In other countries, the buck was usually on the underclass in general.

Accompanying every industrial technology is the explosion of factory system, out of which in turn spring mass migration and urbanisation, developing new sites. Unfortunately, mass migration and urbanisation often spiral health hazards and crime. The habitual culture of health hazards and crime associated with industrialization in Britain was evident in every other industrial economy. The industrial-revolution culture institutionalised the ethos of crime and violence in the mines in favour of systemic economic benefits. As a result, in Japan for instance, bad environmental policy was made by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) oblivious of environmental and health abuses by companies such as Chisso Factory. The discharge of heavy metals into the water source, which started in 1908, was only discovered in May 1956. Violence was an ethic instituted at the mines by the *komukakari*/ or an 'overseer of a questionable character' to ensure the employees stayed in order despite high rates of accidents and death prevalent in smaller/*chukokigyo* companies. Also, there were high incidences of organised crime within the mining industry. Coalminers in large/*daikigyo* companies had safer housing and better services. Industrialisation had become a culture in Japan in which even law enforcement agents chose to ignore organized crime and which frustrated the formation of democratic unions. Though Japan's standard of living dramatically increased post-World War II, it did so at the expense of social wellbeing, as the burden of cheap production in mines was borne by the mines' workers, (Funabashi; Harada; Allen).

Japan's massive growth was borne by society's homemakers, that is women, in the factories and the brothels. The development from light to the heavy industries needed much more unskilled labour occupied by the underclass, and women bore the huge cost of exploitation and abuse. Mechanised farming had freed up more of women labourers

from the farms for the industries, and some were lured through government propaganda. By 1913, approximatly 800,000 women workers employed in the textile industries received discriminated wages, earning lower than men. Many women were exposed to dismal treatment resulting into health problems such as tuberculosis (TB), beriberi, and cholera, till about the 1920s. Brothels became the second largest employer of women in Meiji-Japan as industrialisation exposed the disproportion in the ratio of men to women, and erotic needs at the prefectures increased prostitution. Although prostitution predates 1868—its icrease was a result of the gradual deterioration of values, Meiji restoration carved prostitution into nation building. In 1883, there were 3,156 registered prostitutes in about 400 red light districts, increasing to 4,747 in 1887 and 6,834 in 1909. The women's activism post-Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was truncated by the 'general will' for Western progress and institutional policies of 1890 and 1898. By 1904, there were 43,134 prostitutes in public brothels, increasing to 52,325 by 1924, and fatal to the extent of these abused women committing suicide. Sex slaves were exported to Manchuria, introduced to Korea, and taken to the 1939-World War. The age of gender equality in Japan was lost to history and replaced by a benevolent paternalism assumed by government and employers, ("The Industrialization"; Narayan; Tipton).

The Legacy of Internal Integration towards Japan's Industrialisation 1868-1926

In late half of the nineteenth century, Japan started its growth—sifting and grafting suitable possibilities to internally evolve while harnessing Westernization. Pre-1853 Japan was a feudal, internally agrarian and a nationally integrated market, open to improvement. The Edo-Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868) ran a *bakuhan* or confederacy of the powerful shogun, feudal warlords and the *daimyo or samurai* that assured stability against anarchy. Political stability transformed Japan into a strong pre-industrial technology. Japan developed an "educated elite, good road networks, financial and marketing systems, system of terraces and irrigation, proto-industrial or craft production and urbanization." Japan had explored 'Dutch learning' to imitate Western techniques. However, the 1853-Matthew C. Perry's incursion confronted Japan with Western advancement. The Meiji (1868-1912) armed with the Charter Oath returned power to the state, created ministries, restructured the fiefdoms into prefectures, and built an army with a universal conscription law by 1871. Completing Meiji political reconstruction was the introduction of a constitution in 1889 and a bicameral Parliament named the Diet in 1890. The system allowed an oligarchy of wealthy businessmen and former nobles to control political currents into the twentieth century. The Meiji financed modernization starting, off state-owned enterprises, and sold to Corporate Japanese zaibatsu that eventually eased out foreign experts and interests. By the 1890s, the government-developed private sector matured into an advanced capitalist economy with production in heavy industry building ships and railway carriages. Together, Japan's imperialism developed to get raw materials for industrialization and define its global identity during the Taisho period, (Beasley; Fairbank et.al; "Japan's Modern History"; "Modern Japan"; "About-Japan.com"; Mosk; "The Industrialization"; "Industrialization of Japan"; "Meiji Restoration"; "Japan - Modernization and Industrialization").

Edo-Japan had an integrated market founded on sea routes that connected its regions. This commercial activity birthed wealthy merchants, along with distributive and financial systems. It also earned the governments at both levels revenues-in-kind paid in rice and redirected for sale to consuming regions at Osaka, Kyoto, and the artificially created urban areas in Edo. Overtime, market transaction based on mutual trust

gradually evolved principles and practices. The 1853-incursion had increased demands for produce and equivalently increased earnings for traders and foreign exchange. Peace and stability allowed this agrarian economy to generate a surplus and develop commercial and handicraft businesses. Subsequently, a support system was developed by the Edo government: 'sea route policies, provision of highways, the alternate residence system forced on the daimyos, and the courier system.' Feudal-Japan was established in market economy having 'the different factors of production, increased production, commodity distributive system, adherence to the rules of market transaction, and the strict observance of business contracts.' In fact, autarky Japan was ripe in domestic commercial activities although limited in foreign trade, in education, and advancement. Consequently, the Meiji era (1868-1912) embraced the concept of a market economy, adopting British and North American forms of free entry capitalism until 1911 when protective tariff was re-introduced. A unified modern currency based on the yen, private banking, commercial and tax laws, stock exchanges, and a communications network all eased the market economy, (Mosk; "The Industrialization"; Narayan)

Finance was made available to industrialisation through traditional agricultural technology developed during the Tokugawa Period and the centralised government of the Meiji. Agrarian-Japan had designed a system of high productivity yield maximising its 12% arable land by which it has the world's highest levels of crop per unit area. Agriculture employed 65% of the people and gave 38% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1904. Rice served as a cash crop and as a commodity exchange. Consequently, huge capital accumulated through tax collection on land use, agricultural produce and domestic savings were invested in industries. Again, the diffusion of knowledge from the urban to the local areas generated earnings from different parts of Japan. Industrial goods in cotton, silk, and textiles even before full industrialisation competed favourably with British products in China, India, and Europe, earning foreign exchange. In 1872, the first railway line was laid, with about 40% of the State's investment. By 1893, the Silk industry had expanded as the largest exporting industry in Japan, earning about 42% (102 million pounds) of total export. Imperial-Japan's financial capacity also came from its possession of coal in China, sugarcane in the Philippines, petroleum and cotton in Burma and the Dutch East Indies, and tin and bauxite from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. These commodities generated a trade surplus during WWI. Development of the heavy industries of chemicals, iron, steel, and machinery received public and private corporate financing. For example, 83% of Japan's Development Bank's finances went toward these, (Narayan; Mosk; Masahiro).

Over time, Japan had been gravitating towards modernisation exploiting its social culture. Enlightenment that had slipped into autarky Japan was fertile enough to germinate a common sense of interest awakened by Perry's shock. Immediately Japan overcame the shock, and national goals assumed the centre stage as nationalism became a natural catalyst. The basis for shared goals is a *monotsukuri* (making things) and *Shokusan Kougyou* (industrial promotion), a legacy from the Edo Period through which the Japanese realized education as being key to discovery and improvement. This legacy prompted the urban and the rural population in spontaneous stimuli to Western industrialisation. The Japanese were aware that change sifts and opens opportunities to everyone, rendering status impermanent and non-static. Social juggling followed the opening of the ports in the Edo Period. Ability became the determinant of accomplishment and status change where the slogans were not just the goals of the government but the society. The *fukoku kyohei* or 'enrich the country, strengthen the army' aimed at advancing Japan within

the global imperial system through a modern navy and military. In the early years of Meiji, the high officials had three concerns. First was the *shokusan kougyou,* advocated and implemented by Toshimichi Okubo, devoted to studying Western technology and systems under the banner *Bunmei Kaika* or 'Civilization and Enlightenment.' The second was 'expansionist policy' whereby the leaders of imperial-Japan pursued political and economic growth seeking access to sea routes for raw materials. The third was having a constitutional government that was partially realised in 1889 ("The Industrialization"; "Meiji Restoration").

The Edo Period (1600-1868) propelled growth inspired by education even in a *sakoku* or 'closed country'. Being opened to the Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans had benefitted Japan in 'Dutch learning', by which it copied modernisation. This took place in road construction, the elimination of tolls on roads and bridges, the standardization of coinage, and notably increased literacy and numeracy. These impovements were achieved by studying Western sciences and techniques, including geography, medicine, natural sciences, astronomy, art, and languages. Studying helped Japan build its fleets of ships for war and trade. Again, adopting Western science recorded success in medical sciences and the first Institute for Infectious Diseases in 1893; subsequently, in 1913, a breakthrough proved the link between syphilis and paresis. The study of physical sciences in electrical and mechanical sciences led to the manufacture of Japanese clocks. From 1868, the Meiji leaders inaugurated a new Western-based education system for all young people and sent students to the U.S. and Europe, hiring over 3,000 Westerners to teach modern science, mathematics, technology, and foreign languages. These personnel imitated machineries and penetrated every branch of industry forming a pool of human resources that combined modern technology with traditional craft. Developments through awareness made the

Meiji annul neo-Confucian class structure replace aristocratic and private landownership with prefectures and and establish railways and telegraph lines. Art, culture, and the civilization of the West embodied in the Gregorian calendar, dress sense, hairstyles, and literature were embraced without injury to traditional Japan and continued to the Taisho period (1912-1926), (Mosk; "The Industrialization"; Narayan).

Japan also used the principle of 'comparative advantage' to industrialise. Although Japan's volcanic nature blessed it with mineral deposits such as gold, magnesium, and silver, low grade and difficulty in processing made it an importer of alumina, bauxite, coal, copper, and iron ore. Its deficit in minerals was essential to industrial growth. The nation therefore built up the manufacturing and processing industries to convert imported raw materials and its copper and silver to finished products for export in a comparative advantage. This is in addition to developing its agriculture and fishing. Again, availability of the labour force and equipment set Japanese companies ahead of the demand, assuring it of stable market share. By the late 1920s, manufacturing and mining contributed 23% of GDP, while agriculture contributed 21%; and 30% in the 1930s. This strategy in industrialisation necessitated the establishment of strong economic infrastructure and a support system in energy, transportation, communications, and technological know-how. Additionally, increasing output production leading to reduce per unit costs caused growth in total factor productivity, for instance, at the Tokaido industrial base between 1904 and the 1930s. Scale economies occur with geographic concentration where there are good roads, and consolidated electricity in 1904 and 1920s caused reduced cost per capita infrastructure and consequent growth in the output of individual companies and then growth of the national economy. Furthermore, the *zaibatsu* reproducing itself into new lines of activity presened comparative advantage as it needed not to pay for

information-gathering and transactions costs, (Mosk).

In 1853, new opportunities revealed dynamic entrepreneurship among the Japanese. The Meiji reforms sacked the status quo of wealthy merchants or samurai families, to embrace newcomers hitherto lacking a social hierarchy. Aristocratic landownership was restructured into prefectures, and the *zaibatsu* came to define business structure in Japan as the joint stock company system. The *zaibatsu* formed huge industrial family-owned combines that owned the means of production. These *zaibatsu*, among them, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, dominated Japan's industrialized economy in steel, banking, international trading, most of the prefectures' factories, machineries and various other key sectors of interlocking companies. Significantly, *zaibatsu* accelerated growth, introducing new industries, increasing productivity, and successfully setting up such industries in the new environment. Its dominance was assured by interlocking, government, preferential lower taxes, and huge funding. In addition, a *zaibatsu* had the ability to effectively reproduce itself into new lines of activity like electrical machinery manufacturing, production of scale economies reducing operation costs. The concentration of industrial control in the *zaibatsu* was a semi-feudal relationship; consequently, it efficiently held down wages, blocked the development of labour unions, and coordinated the *fukoku kyohei* agenda. Negatively, it obstructed the creation of firms by individual entrepreneurs and hindered the rise of a middle class in Japan. To a large extent, even in the 21st century, the *zaibatsu* is held responsible for the dilemma of start-ups. Despite, the *zaibatsu* built the economy for Japanese growth and imperialism as it diverted a large percentage of the factors of production to munitions and armaments, especially from 1926-1945, (Masahiro; Mosk; "The Industrialization"; Narayan).

The Legacy of Industrialization as the Fulcrum of Japanese Development: 1945-1989

The experience of 1853 introduced Japan to the realities of modernisation, Westernisation, and industrialisation. Notwithstanding, Japan had a developmental culture in process that coped with these realities especially during the Meiji Period. Situations in Japan pre-1945 had positioned it for industrialisation. However, economic advancement failed to be a mesh for political recognition when United States and Britain refused Japan the clause on racial equality in the Leagues covenant. Compounding this insult was the 1924 immigration rule in which the United States barred all Japanese from immigration. Subsequently, Japan considered full scale imperialism a political and economic necessity, to prevent its strangulation by foreign states. Japan's aggression consequent to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy led to World War II and to the destruction of its economy, defeat, and Occupation. But the past of Japan had developed to a height transcending the light industries by 1939. Therefore, despite the Occupation of 1945-1952, and the tendencies of the terms at San Francisco, Japan's past was a challenge to rebuilding, ("Japan's Modern History"). Its past gingered nationalism with the knowledge that advancement in soft power lies in industrialisation.

Industrialisation encouraged reconstruction of the socio-economic system of Japan. The Meiji had engaged in many reforms to raise Japan to the pedestal of the Western powers, but all these were destroyed during World War II. There was the need for total rebuilding. The foundation for post-war development in Japan had to be built on its pre-war economic experience and modernisation-by-imitation. Without these, the three major reform policies of the American forces which Japan used to clear the rubbles of war, start a new economy, and utilize opportunities to become an economic superpower

would have been impossible. The US-SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) Occupation under General Douglas MacArthur saw the breakup of the *zaibatsu*, land reform, and labour democratization lay the solid foundation for Japan's comeback as an industrial power. The Land reform laws ended the regime of the *zaibatsu* and the entry of the *kereitsu*—another breed of Japanese entrepreneurship. The SCAP policies brought objectivity into the class system. Landownership changed as farmers became owners through the democratization policy of land and improved farm tenancy for tenant-farmers. Consequently, by the beginning of 1950, land ownership by farmers had reached 90 percent. Land reform strengthened agriculture to absorb unemployment caused by demilitarisation; this led to increased output for coal and rice staples. The Occupation forces likewise enacted The Trade Union Law in 1945 that improved real wages and working conditions, (Masahiro; "About-Japan.com"; Mosk; "The Industrialization"; Narayam).

Social stratification was ended to bring Japan up to date with the Western culture that accompanies industrialisation. Social stratification made over 90% of the Japanese commoners. The rise of the prefects and the merchant class not predicated on status in 1868 unfortunately formed new class divisions. Although all the social classes were legally abolished at the start of the Meiji period, income inequality emerged, just as prejudice did for women. The great income disparities between the classes dissipated during and after World War II, eventually declining to levels that were among the lowest in the industrialized world. In addition, the basics of industrialisation changed gender inequality that evolved as an erosion of the Japanese value system. Beginning from 1946, 'social dualism' shifted from education making way for a universal education system as policies which had restricted university education in engineering and science for the elite was reformed, providing general access to middle school became compulsory, and national universities were established in each of Japan's forty-six prefectures. Social inequalities countered the fundamentals of Western culture that included democracy. Democratization of Japan's government and society meant going full hog, so a gradual return to gender equality began during the US occupation of 1945–1952. Japan's 1947 constitution guaranteed civil liberties, labour rights, and women's suffrage; this was followed by an equal employment law in 1986, (Masahiro; "About-Japan.com"; Mosk; "The Industrialization"; Narayan).

Industrialisation gave impetus to the Japanese 'Miracle Growth' of the late twentieth century defined by Carl Mosk as 'the completion of a protracted historical process,' involving 'building highly skilled and educated human capital, substantial investment capital, capital goods and manufacturing capacity; borrowing and perfecting foreign technology; and scale economies' (Mosk). The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (MITI) a tool used by the Yoshida cabinet in 1949 to counter SCAP's deflationary regulations, re-structured the Japanese economy for rapid post-war expansion. After unifying the government's production goals and economic interests by 1950, MITI coordinated the activities of *zaibatsu*-turned-*kereitsu* within industrial enterprises, integrating smaller enterprises into the *kereitsu* groups, sharpening industrial efficiency post-WWII. MITI activities earned Japan average growth rates of 10%, 5%, and 4% in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Japan became a major economy from 1978 until 2010. By 1990, income *per capita* in Japan equalled and surpassed that in most countries in the West. MITI established the Japan Development Bank to provide low-cost capital to targeted heavy industries important to international markets and economic growth for long-term growth, locking out foreign companies. MITI utilising industrial policy

shared technological secrets before allowing entry into the Japanese market, thereby developing subsidiaries and standardisation by 1952. Its diplomacy reduced the royalties on technology licenses (Mosk; Funabashi; Harada; Masahiro; Allen). After 1955, Japan became a global industrial powerhouse overtaking agriculture as the main employer of labour.

Socio-culture did not lose its relevance as Japan renewed its nationalism, starting with its tradition of deference to the emperor as a rallying point and the centre of national identity. Japan, in its second voyage in industrialisation, restructured the exploitation of slogans, using its nation building role of the Edo period to facilitate its state building post-1945. Examples are *nemawashi* and *Kaizen* introduced for the sole purpose of rebuilding Japan. *Nemawashi* or 'consensus building' is a Japanese culture that embraces communal consent of stakeholders in a project. *Kaizen* or "improvement" is a Japanese philosophy concerning perfection or standardisation through continuous improvement of all sections in a business. These two were implemented to tide the economy over constraints, among them, 'various types of control, monopolies, and exclusive cartels, excessive and unpredictable taxation' imposed by the government. It should be noted that these philosophies were as well used as unification and stabilisation tool during bad governance, a truth about the stability of Japan and what kept this nation out of a bloody revolution' ("Industrialisation of Japan").

Circumstances around the world stimulated Japan's industrialisation. International conflicts such as the Korean War (1950–53), the Second Indochina (1954–75), and the Cold War (1946-1990) became catalysts for Japan's growth. Just as World War I diverted the attention of Europe from Japan's high tariffs on industrial products in 1911, U.S. dissolution of the semi-feudal zaibatsu also helped Japan to reform the country. Agricultural land taken from landlords and redistributed to tenant farmers encouraged mechanized farming and collective bargaining. Attempts to circumvent SCAP's anti-monopoly laws by the Ikeda administration led to a re-emergence of conglomerate groups in *Keiretsu,*[27] being corporate groups mainly tied together through the cross-shareholding of stock in the aftermath of the Occupation (quoted in Carl Mosk, "Japanese Industrialisation and Economic Growth.") The activities of the *keiretsu* spurred horizontal and vertical integration sourcing heavy industries that effectively locked out foreign companies from Japanese industries. By the 1970s and 1980s, Japan had improved its industrial base through licensing from the US, patent purchases in current technologies, imitation, and improving on foreign inventions. The Occupation government transformed Japan , facilitating its reconstruction and growth to regain its lost industrial capacity. Technological improvements in Japan spiralled to influence the growth of many other industries. Alongside this, global bipolarity in geopolitics and ideological differences proved to be a market boom for Japan. The U.S. had to play along the Ikeda Administration and MITI line in 1953, sharing the knowledge of its technology not just to access the Japanese market but as an incentive against Soviet socialism. The outcome was an increase in the rate of 'fixed domestic capital formation, rise in investment proportion, rising savings rate and private household savings,' (Masahiro; "About-Japan.com"; Mosk).

The diversification of industrial production in the mid-1960s would not have been possible without Japan's Western legacy. A country and its people remobilised after the destruction of a large percentage of its economic growth. Structural economic changes helped Japan weather the storm of inflation from the oil crisis of 1973. The recession had resulted into unemployment problems, but high revenue from its industrial products helped Japan to stabilise its economy. Increased revenue was earned from exports of cars,

electronics, and other products that outweighed costs on oil importation. For example, the casing of parts improved the quality of Japan's automobile industry to increase its competitiveness in international automobile markets; and fermentation processes was introduced in food. Again, the oil shocks forced Japan to diversify on petroleum as a source of energy from 77.4% in 1973 to about 43.7% in 2010 increasing dependence on natural gas and nuclear power. As well, diversification was made into other energy sources which included coal, hydroelectricity, solar, and kerosene. Japan also shifted its industrial structure to conservation and alternative sources of industrial energy. Advances in microcircuitry and semiconductors in the late 1970s and 1980s led to new growth industries in consumer electronics and computers. Higher productivity was equally achieved in pre-established industries. The net result of these adjustments was to increase the energy efficiency of manufacturing and to expand knowledge-intensive industries, (Masahiro).

National and foreign effort cohabited in the Japanese political system to enact economic policies that sustained development. The cumulative effect of 'special government policies, revolutionary events, and the hard work of Japanese people' helped create rapid economic growth. Expediency had turned MacArthur's overture to restoring Japan's prewar status. The Cold War tensions in 1947-East Asia required that SCAP review its policies to speed economic recovery. Consequently, the Occupation sutured the reconstruction of Japan's economy, development, and an increasing internationalism. The Yoshida Shigeru Doctrine wisely utilised defence savings for economic reconstruction and development. What was more, the dollar income derived from excessive provisional U.S. military and personnel expenses in 1949, was used to expand production of key industries. Further, the 1948 Dodge Plan implemented three policies that controlled the currency in

circulation and stemmed inflation to stabilise Japan. As the Korean War boomed trade for Japanese products, the Dodge policies set the basis for recovery without American aid. Consequently, by 1955 the economy had regained its size of pre-war production. Again, Ikeda's 1960-1970 Income Doubling Plan increased investments by the central government to both private and public firms reviving the synergy of both sectors. The goal to increase foreign trade rekindled the dynamism of Japanese entrepreneurship to regain Japan's international relevance. Consequently, the Plan contributed to the country's rapid growth with an average rate of 10.8 percent in the late 1960s, driving the economy to be the second largest in the world by the year 1968 and the third largest in the 1970s, ("About-Japan.com"; Mosk: "The Industrialization"; Narayan; Masahiro; "Japan's Modern History").

Occupational restructuring also led to a changing economy and encouraged variations of industrialisation. Immediately after 1945, producers and labourers in post-war Japan relocated from agriculture and other preindustrial ventures into industrial and commercial employments. Responsible for this was the high productivity of the industries that yielded better pay and higher returns to the economy. Industrialization also expanded to generate various sectors and with these created the demand for a new range of unskilled and skilled or specialised labour, added to subsidiary services for the productive process or consumer goods. For instance, skills are required for the administrative, organisational, and managerial levels. This need upgrades occupational structures, because even the unskilled develop skill from mechanical operation. Occupational change resulted into a fall in the agricultural labour force from 40% in 1955, declining to 17% in 1970, reduced to 7.2% in 1990, and fewer than 5% in the 21st century, as small family farms disappeared, and Japan came to rely on food importation. By the 1980s, Japan had

been restructured into a service-oriented economy producing consumer goods to meet domestic demand for high-technology products such as electronics, human-social goods, and goods for a rapidly aging society. By 1987 and 1989, growth was strong in heavy industries like steel, chemicals, construction, machineries and in advanced technology at an average growth rate of 5%. Japan was ahead in major research on highly sophisticated Information Technology, which opened the way to the economic boom of the 1980s, ("Industrialization"; Masahiro; "Japan's Modern History"; Meiji Restoration).

Conclusion

Japan's legacy of industrialization has proven to be the fulcrum of the Japanese development between 1868 and 1989. The importance of modalities in place throughout the process that enabled industrialisation to proceed should be underestimated. Cognizant of the soft power of its industrialisation in 1853, Japan remobilised after the destruction of its economic growth in WWII, utilising its pre-war modernisation-by-imitation and industrial experience to evolve internally. Eagerness to rebuild spurred Japan above its historical peculiarities, conforming to the requirements of the Western culture that accompany industrialisation. Even the global coincidental circumstances around Japan helped it to prosper its industrial economy. Repeating itself, it was the attraction to industrialisation that stimulated Japan's return to its Western legacy.

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Precognition / forecast

Today the radio says watch out on the highway
The man from the county came along to check the lines
asked if that was my truck stuck in the ditch
and was I a Proch girl, probably known by his mother
who rode the schoolbus with my aunt twenty years ago
when I barely existed but someone wrote me down
I thought about evolution and creatures crawling out
Audrey Hepburn on tv catching lobsters on a beach
The tumble of green above the Spruce Grove intersection
where that icy accident after the wedding
Orion in the south bestrides our dark house
It's not a sword it's a pen floating in the sky
somebody somewhere is writing all this down

—Karen Wall

The implications of decolonization: An interpretation of Fanon's anti-Marxist consciousness as new ideology

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Abstract

Ideology keeps infiltrating history in terms of the conflict led by the embattled individual against his colonial past (on the one hand) and the pressing urgencies of his present (on the other). Postcolonial Africa evidences this dilemma in a disordering approach to Marxism, arguing for a new identity for a diaspora not infrequently at odds with its colonial legacy. Whether to discard Marxism as ideology or to appraise it as a revolutionary worldview was the concern of Frantz Fanon whose trial-like theory of decolonization is the repository of his wrath at imperialism which, in turn, is laced with anti-European ideology.

Key words: Ideology, Marxism, decolonization, history, rupture, violence

Literature Review

A number of Fanon's scholars have rallied in favor of their mentor, displaying his theory of decolonization as if it concords with Marxism. In so doing, they attempt to portray Fanon as a humanist who always fought for the underprivileged social substrata instead of being a thinker who would "modify [Marxism] where necessary to suit his own historical and geographical context" (Martin 1999, 87), Tony Martin's delighted lionization of his teacher, for instance, proves itself to be inconsistent with Fanon's proclaimed violence as his ultimate credo that should "surprise no one" (Fanon 1968, 310). The *lacunae* in the argument led by Fanon's disciples increases the distance between acculturation, as a futurist approach for the African nation wallowing in its post-colonization wreckage (on the one hand), and Fanon's call to his compatriots to create a *rupture* with their colonial past (on the other). Another entry to the Fanon world picture is *violence* which also deserves criticism or the constructive lesson we should draw from colonialism will crumble and the African nation (blue or white-collar) will be left in a lurch, also missing the forward movement of history. Demands such as the one made by Kwasi Wiredu, to return to pre-industrial primitiveness or the one made by Reiland Rabaka who risks all sense in complete surrender to a polarized standpoint (whether Fanon's method is dialectic or not) will be brought under close scrutiny to demonstrate that Fanon's inner conflict with Marxism is too obvious to be thrust aside.

Introduction

Notwithstanding the nationalistic zeal in his theory of decolonization, the reorientation of Marxism against history (western and *ipso facto* African) brings Fanon face to face with the charge of ideology. A common denominator between Fanon and his disciples is their raid on the nascent bourgeoisie (in the African context) whom they construe as the ally of neo-imperialism. And yet, the dream of achieving freedom, equality and most important, the dignity which is promised to the underprivileged and whose expedient, in the Fanon optic, is the rupture with the West wholesale, never pays off. Fanon's motley of the advocate of the poor proves an old-fashioned method which fails to cure the ills that have plagued Africa for long decades. Taking Marxism as a point of departure to arrive at a theory of decolonization does not resolve the extant socio-economic crisis of a postcolonial nation. Fanon utilizes Marxism towards a frustrating end which is to thrust aside the intellectuals from the middle-class which he sees a potential repository of colonial ideology. His alibi is that their intellectual privilege is nothing but a colonial legacy and consequently a neo-colonial menace to the rest of the community of the natives.

Fanon's antipathy to colonization (i.e., to a decisive chapter in the history of his nation) is another facet of his problem with Marxism. It gains more of an edge when he supports the return to the pre-industrialized episode of history as the safest pathway to pursue the moral codes of his nation. The organizing principle of decolonization for Fanon is physical violence legitimized by an overt abuse of history. Decolonization turns its action into an assault upon the past which is itself concomitant with a rupture, with any future cooperation with the West: aka *the colonizer*. This disjunction with history ridicules the very hypothesis made by some Fanon's scholars about decolonization being a dialectical method.

Fanon's unflinching aversion to the West within his idea of decolonization also

resurfaces in terms of his fixation on racism. His binding thought is that his native society has been infected by the same social stratification as in the West. Fanon's idea of a revolutionary freedom yields a strong irony when it stultifies the enthusiasm of the newly-emancipated African nation by the exclusive use of its native tongue for its indoor and outdoor affairs (as in Nkrumah's teachings to his people). Fanon's political commandment is seen in its disposition towards rupture, violence, and oblivion. The optimism that violence can be the prelude to a luminous phase in the biography of the racially colonized –"to reclaim her or his place on the stage of the miraculous drama of human existence and experience" (Rabaka 2009, 199)—is characteristic of those who are ignorant of the truth that rising to life from an imperialist past cannot be contingent on violence: verbal, physical, or even conceptual. This essay is an attempt to answer the following questions:

- To what extent does Fanon's revolutionary freedom brings to realization that he is anti-Marxist?
- How does Fanon's theory of decolonization reconcile its anti-Western method with the risk of xenophobia (on the one hand) and of a-historicity (on the other)?
- How can the appetite for violence cause Fanon's political education to become ideological?

Fiddling at will with Marxism under the heading of a humanism

In his article "Rescuing Fanon from the Critics", Tony Martin presents us with the assumption that Fanon arrived at an elaborate form of Marxism which revolves essentially around the African geo-political context:

> Fanon can be considered a Marxist. This is not to say that he adhered rigidly to every word that has come down to us from Marx's pen. He didn't. But he was Marxist in the sense that Lenin or Castro or Mao are Marxist. That is, he accepted Marx's basic analysis of society as given and proceeded from there to elaborate on that analysis and modify it where necessary to suit his own historical and geographical context. (Martin 1999, 87)

In contradistinction to Tony Martin, what I find arresting about Fanon is his assault upon Marxism with an eye towards anti-Western ideology. To Nigel C. Gibson's observation of a humanistic streak in Fanon's theory of decolonization, I am also reply in the negative:

> Fanon can be considered a Marxist-humanist, in the sense that he is not championing a static notion of human nature, but a human "potential" which can be "created by revolutionary beginnings," and where social relationships give meaning to life. (Gibson 1999, 117)

Nigel Gibson's review of Fanon is nothing of a stunner, because he is simply unable to give evidence about any trace of humanism in the discourse of Fanon. The reason again is in the theory of decolonization itself which fails to give credence to its antipathy to Marxism. Decolonization ends up straying off from the humanistic path that it purports to have intended for itself. Fanon bursts out that his theory of decolonization as nothing milder than a violent endeavor:

> "The argument the native chooses has been furnished by the settler …" That "the native" "chooses" violence as a means toward the end of "total liberation"

should surprise no one, and least of all colonialists, capitalists, and those associated with the ruling race, ruling gender, and ruling class(es) of the modern (neo)imperial "world-system." (Fanon 1968, 310)

Marx and Engels (1978) laid forth their idea of a revolution in *The Communist Manifesto*:

> The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official [bourgeoisie] society being exploded into the air. (Marx and Engels 1978, 482)

Ironically, it seems that all that Fanon imbibed from Marx was the firm stand against the bourgeoisie: which will reverberate in the African theorist's (together with his scholars') railing against the middle class as being what he construes a prolongation of the western rule on African territory in the postcolonial era. And yet, Tony Martin is among those who endorsed the hypothesis that Marxism was a springboard for Fanon to shout out to the lower classes (or the wretched of the earth). But this is not actually the case.

Finally, I am wondering if to "modify [a theory] where necessary to suit [one's] own historical and geographical context" (Martin 1999, 87) is the right review one can make of Fanon's decolonization in comparison to a trend of thought as confounding and awe-inspiring as Marxism.

Rabaka's idea of decolonization: the confusing pathway

In his book: *Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition*, Rabaka stands up for Fanon's concept of decolonization in its built-in antagonism to Marxism. The result is an aporia which surrenders to sentimentalism. Fanon's theory drives deep into disjunction and lack of purpose:

> Marxists […] have consistently neglected to factor capitalism's interconnections with racism and colonialism into their analyses. That is why Fanon […] challenged the anticolonial intellectual-activist to not only be anticolonial, but also anticapitalist and antiracist." (Rabaka 2009, 177)

Rabaka purports to follow the lead of Nigel Gibson who first came up with the idea that the knowledge wielded by the native thinkers is contaminated by imperialist ideology and has *ipso facto* to be challenged if decolonization is ever to come into being as a full-fledged process. Decolonization, for Fanon's disciples, has designed for itself a path which begins with a search into the mind of the native intellectual (supposedly a bourgeois) which is a search also not in the least uneasy about its potential hazard for knowledge in general:

> "Rather than applying an *a priori*, a crucial task for the Fanonian intellectual was to confront the intellectual's internalization of colonial ideology that had become mentally debilitating. The native intellectual, therefore […] has to challenge the underdeveloped and Manichean ways of thinking produced by colonial rule." (Gibson 1999, 114)

Nigel Gibson refers to the ways of thinking implemented by colonial rule as "Manichean" because they dissociate (according to Gibson) the manual from the intellectual 'labor' of the colonized individual (Gibson 1999, 120). As a first step towards healing this rift between mind and muscle, Gibson suggests that the native ex-colonized

ought to begin by "confronting" his own "internalization of colonial ideology" (Gibson 1999, 114). It seems that Gibson's proposal is too healthy to be discarded. One problem, however, lies in how Rabaka comments on Gibson while substituting "rupture" for remedy:

> "Colonialism inherently gives colonized intellectuals an intellectual inferiority complex. In order to initiate the process of decolonization, the anticolonial (on-the-path-to-becoming-a-truly-*postcolonial*) intellectual must radically rupture their relationship with their (neo)colonial (mis) education and practice critical conceptual generation, putting forward dialectical theory and praxis." (Rabaka 2009, 177)

Notice the striking paradox unfolding from the above statement by Rabaka. On the one hand, he calls forth the necessity to "radically rupture" the connection with the colonizer, and on the other, he invites for a "dialectical" method in theory and practice. The issue here is obviously one of logic. Here, I can revisit Gibson's hypothesis by adducing that dialectics should occur not only at the intersection of the mental and the manual but also (and more importantly) between the past and the present: for there are always lessons to be learnt from the past, albeit colonial.

A distinctive feature about decolonization—precisely in the mind of Rabaka—is how it finds meaning for itself while it stages a war between Fanonian intellectuals, on the one hand, and their native non-Fanonian (what Fanon considers pro-colonial) counterparts, on the other. This belligerent tendency which purports to show the worth of a postcolonial reform surprises me with the negativity with which it supplies an assault only upon the Other (here the cultured native) instead of offering a futurist approach as

the answer needed to deliver itself from its depressing colonial past.

Fanon's disciple: Rabaka's self-contradictory design of decolonization

A pressing question is: Why was Fanon's anticolonial attention centered on the cultural (racial) rather than the capitalist crisis ensuing from colonization? Isn't Fanon's invocation to his disciples in *The Wretched of the Earth*—

> "Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe" (*Wretched* 9)

—the expression of a racially-informed inferiority complex that resists remedy on acculturation basis? In other words, doesn't Fanon's invocation deepen the plight of his compatriots rather than promise to mend it? It seems that the critical Fanonist—while focusing more on his racial predicament than on the anti-capitalist aspect of Marxism—betrays his deep-seated anxiety about his own racial identity: which (in my opinion) is even more problematic. In so doing, the Fanonist critics are missing a precious opportunity to demolish their race-informed inferiority complex, which is ironically another mirror-image of their own internalization of colonial ideology.

As a Fanonist faithful, Rabaka acknowledges that colonized intellectuals suffer from the indelible inferiority complex generated in them by their colonizer. He then suggests that the historical struggle towards decolonization should traverse a phase of "rupture" with the colonial legacy in order to heal the scars left by racism. However, there is a paradox between the natives' awareness of racism as a major part of the colonizer's manipulative map (on the one hand) and what is conceived by Rabaka as the need for

a rupture with racism (on the other). It is as if the colonized self-sabotage their own awareness of their status as victims of racism: an oddity which is far from bringing forth a remedy to their oppressive past. Examined under Rabaka's lens, the colonized emerge as the authors of a lie to themselves. Rather than decolonizing their minds, they're ironically doing the opposite (consciously or unconsciously, it matters very little).

Rabaka spots a point of justice in Fanon's somewhat elastic approach to Marxism that is not as obsessed with capitalism as it is with racism as a subtle (yet perennial) danger to the natives (Rabaka 2009, 177). However, it is within Fanon's polarizing focus on racism that the obsession with racism outperforms the humanistic prerogative he seems to attribute to himself. By setting out to rupture the legacy of colonization wholesale, Fanon's so-called revolutionary plan has proven to be dissonant with any challenge of the "Manichean ways of thinking produced by colonial rule", in the way Nigel Gibson for example, has considered and reinforced it (Gibson 1999, 114). Another shrieking paradox appears in Rabaka's argument in his incessant counseling to the colonized intellectuals to cut away with their past legacy: which is *per definitionem* antithetical to his former catechism about dialectical thinking (Rabaka 2009, 177), because a dialectical modality of thought cannot be one-directional.

An aggravation of Fanon's decolonization as rupture: Kwasi Wiredu's preliterate nostalgia

> "It seems to be a fact about human beings generally that technical progress is apt to outstrip moral insight […] the philosophical thought of a traditional (i.e., preliterate and non-industrialized) society may hold some lessons of moral significance for a more industrialized society." (Wiredu 1991, 98)

Wiredu spells out his nostalgic longing to restitute the African communal heritage: a restitution that (according to him) will level up the hitherto lost moral standards and also compensate for the havoc wrecked by industrialization. What I find ambiguous here is this hypothesis by Wiredu demands the return to primitiveness as an expedient to remold the psycho-behavioral map for the Africans on purely moral basis. A possible interpretation suggests that technology can be inscribed within the Marxist condemnation of capitalism as a danger to morality. I maintain that rupturing the connection to technical progress is itself an absurdity because how can we possibly erase an episode from our history and make a retrograde movement into primitiveness? Besides, who can be said to have the exclusive right to set the terms for a moral (in opposition to an immoral or amoral) idea or behavior?

The problem with Wiredu's account is that it links up with Fanon's argument but in a more perilous way: one which reveals the former's problem with history is twofold. First, there is the absurdism accompanying the fantasy of making a backward movement in pursuit of the local mores of his native ancestors. Second, there is the ensuing disconnection from the stakes of the now-point of the present. Wiredu's controlling awareness turns our attention miles away from the issue of colonization into the murkiness of non-historicity, and, therefore into sheer nothingness.

Calling into question the very forward movement of history through what Wiredu demands is the denial of industrialization (all the while not bearing in mind that the industrialization of the world is history itself) is another instance of a logic completely gone wrong in the mind of Fanon's disciples.

Decolonization: from ethnocentrism to xenophobia

Rabaka says that the Fanonist intellectual activists are against Marxism because it hardly looks away from the internal concerns of Europe as its ultimate precedent. However, disclaiming Marxism because it was generated by European thinkers does not offer an ultimatum to the labyrinthine looseness accompanying the *souci* of how to ascribe meaning to decolonization. Actually, downgrading Marxism because it is Eurocentric is beside the point. Fanon's inattention to the material component of Marxism while being fixated on European identity as a cause for racism and how to revive his indigenous culture, in consequence, ends up being another form of reductionism:

> "[S]ome Europeans were found to urge the European workers to shatter this narcissism and to break with this unreality. But in general, the workers of Europe have not replied to these calls; for the workers believe, too, that they are part of the prodigious adventure of the European spirit." (Fanon, 1968, 313)

Decolonization shows a pattern of fulfilling the socio-economic needs of the African diaspora, while it employs the leitmotif of a cultural community to exercise its obsessive tendencies and raison d'être. The claim for a decolonization theory has not granted liberation as much as it has misled the African diaspora away from affirmation. My grasp of how Rabaka addresses the issue of decolonization was also aided by the following words:

> [T]hough Marxism […] may have much to offer black radicalism and Africana revolutionary praxis, European schools of thought, European history and culture, European religion, and European conceptions of science and civilization cannot and should never be used as the paradigms and theoretical points of departure for decolonization (Rabaka 2009, 182)

Starting with an acknowledgement of the illuminating potential of Marxism and then quickly switching to denying it is the telltale sign of the hysteria taking possession of ex-colonized African intellectuals. Notice the radicalism perspiring from the frame of reference of a Fanonian activist who seems never to reply to the call of logic when it comes to the postcolonial Africa he has in mind. Testifying to this lacuna in the Fanon consciousness, Rabaka employs a generalization about Marx: saying that a number of "limitations and deficiencies" (Rabaka 2009, 183) are typical of Marx's social theory and that Fanon built on the basics of Marxism only to embrace the higher good of the African diaspora. Notice also the sentimentalism—inextricable from a religious background "heaven help us" (Rabaka 2009, 183)—in Rabaka's thematic purpose while appropriating Fanon's ethnocentrism.

In contradistinction to Tony Martin, Rabaka is not conflicted in his remark about Fanon as being hardly a Marxist:

> "How could Fanon have "accepted Marx's basic analysis of society as given" (Martin 1999, 87) when he consistently emphasized that racial oppression and colonial exploitation, that racism and colonialism, if you will, are equally as oppressive, exploitative, and alienating as the evils of capitalism?" (Rabaka2009, 183)

My point is to illumunate the nature of Rabaka's own radicalism. He occludes

Fanon's permeability being interpreted as Marxist. In reproaching Fanon and the African Marxists by pointing out that "they cannot downplay and diminish the tragic historic fact that colonialism and neocolonialism have negatively impacted Africa […] *more than*, capitalism" (Rabaka 2009, 185), he corroborates my interpretation of his work as self-contradictory. In other words, there is no cutting edge to be interposed between the present and the past (therefore no room for Fanon's idea of a rupture with Africa's colonial past) because history is a forward movement where none of its landmarks can be ignored. I am suggesting is that the bygone phases of suffering in a nation's history are to be reviewed rather than treated with the hysteria of Fanon who calls for the unknotting of all ties with Europe as if the latter had never stepped on African soil. Notice in this exclusive quality of Fanon's discourse there is a hint about the limitations of his arguments which veer more towards sentimentalism than logic. Finally, I have to assume that Fanon and his disciples are actually fooled (I would even say *plagued*) by literality. What I mean is that their logical flaw is the outgrowth of their misreading of Marx whose words from *The German Ideology* are the telltale leavings of a universal hoot against the past "on a mass scale" (Marx 1983, 187). *The German Ideology* does not congratulate itself on its European identity:

> "[T]he class overthrowing [the ruling class] can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew." (Ibid)

At the opening of his book, Fanon makes a clear statement of purpose: "I do not come with timeless truths" (Fanon 1967, 7): this is a promise he fails to keep while also denying the charge of overgeneralization he himself makes. Part of the problem is that Fanon does not offer any alternative to his concept of revolution other than fighting. The same plan for action is shared by Rabaka who asserts that the wretched of the earth "either come to the conclusion that they are, or have been, forced to fight, or they succumb and sink back, deeper and deeper, into their present state(s) of dehumanization and neocolonization" (Rabaka 2009, 186). The sense of decolonization common to both intellectuals lacks the idea of potential while it constrains human thought to war—disregarding the sanity of the vision of the world that values the merits (as much as the flaws) of its past and seeks to build on them rather than soaking into negativity and –very probably—into criminality.

Fanon's Marxist sympathy as an instance of metaphysics of presence

For all its Marxist impressions, Fanon's theory of decolonization is a silent rebuff of Marxism. How? Fanon maintains that the stratification of the social texture is still the same even after the declaration of independence from the colonizer. This, in my opinion, is evidence that Fanon is diametrically opposed to Marxism. Look how Fanon's words ultimately reveal his deep aversion to Marxism while canvassing his postcolonial African world picture:

> "there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of re-adaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time […] [I]n its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country." (Fanon 1968, 147-49)

Rabaka adopts Fanon's very extreme standpoint concerning the position of the ex-colonized after the independence. Here is Rabaka, fuming:

> The "neo-colonial option" encourages the racially colonized to choose between the lesser of two evils: racial colonialism or racist capitalism. However, capitalism, white supremacist or otherwise, is utterly inextricable from racial colonialism. (Rabaka 2009, 187)

While Rabaka insists on absolving Fanon from the charge of extremism, I find Fanon's idea of postcolonialism neither "open-ended" nor "radically dialectical" (Rabaka 2009, 187) but rather antipathetic to Marxism in a way that verges on doubting the authenticity of the natives' war for independence because it takes Marxism as the principal *raison d'être* of its struggle. What appears to Fanon to be an eccentric philosophical premise behind the revolution against the colonizer is what induces him to jeopardize the idea of revolution pell-mell and consequently the idea of independence to satisfy his idiosyncratic resistance to Marxism. Suspicion also transpires from Fanon's words in the quote above as he assimilates the struggle of his nation to a narcissistic fervor which makes this struggle (according to Fanon) nothing but a hysterical plan to reshape the postcolonial society to the very norms of the west.

Fanon invalidates a Marxist interpretation of the independence of the African ex-colonies because of what he construes as the survival of postcolonial bourgeoisie, a class he excoriates as a replica of its western oppressive counterpart and also, and more alarmingly, as its accomplice in aggravating the misery of the wretched. Following Fanon's logic, the Africans' emancipation from the colonizer has no significance unless it is a follow-up to their former history of groveling dependency. Seen through his eyes, the national bourgeoisie is inhabited with more criminality than one can imagine:

> "The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner. But this same lucrative role, this cheap-Jack's function, this meanness of outlook and this absence of all ambition symbolize the incapability of the national middle class to fulfill its historic role of bourgeoisie." (Fanon 1968, 152-153)

Fanon's postcolonial world picture is oriented towards negation, because his impassioned decolonization is a hypothesis which lacks the scientific edge of theory. This is probably why he resorts to hurling such extremist value judgments as "decadence" (Fanon 1968, 153) on the native bourgeoisie to amplify his discourse about decolonization into a mora lstatement. In so doing, he not only misses historical materialism as the scientific method necessary to explaining the evolution of ex-colonies but also sweeps groundless incriminations on his entire discussion. The worth of a nation's freedom is much more than the mutilated portrait drawn for it by Fanon.

The insolubility of decolonization: Rabaka's false shift into moderation appearing real

It was somewhat auspicious for me to stumble on Rabaka's graceful reaction towards Amilcar Cabral's acknowledgment of the contribution of Western culture to the postcolonial outlook of African ex-colonies:

> I return to Cabral's caveat, ongoing "without underestimating the importance of positive contributions from the oppressor's culture and other

> cultures," which the wretched of the earth could (and, I honestly believe, *should*) appropriate and adapt as "they return to the upwards paths of their own culture." (Rabaka 2009, 189)

Rabaka opens the fifth chapter of his book: *Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition* with a discomforting note about the inherently elusive parameters of decolonization. He joins Fanon who equally admits to decolonization as what often exceeds our ken: "reason hesitates and refuses to say which is a true decolonization" (Fanon 1968, 58-59). Recognizing the complexity of decolonization by Fanon and Rabaka alike is very telling about the challenges initially encountered by Fanon while he attempted to lay the groundwork for his theory of *decolonization*. Being at a loss about "the means and tactics to employ" (Fanon, ibid) in the process of decolonization provides a moment of great interest about Fanon's lack of insight in how to materialize his ideas in the postcolonial 3D reality. Fanonian decolonization shrinks into nonsense while still a plan.

However, it does not take too many lines down (still in chapter five from *Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition*) for Rabaka to bounce back to his former extremist note about decolonizationin even more rigid terms:

> "The wretched of the earth's revolutionary intellectual-activists, therefore, not only have to decolonize the world the colonizers made […] but also, the world the begrudging racially colonized bourgeoisie deeply wishes and desperately wants to make." (Rabaka 2009, 191)

It seems that Rabaka's moderation of his former rigidity was only transitory. Not only did it take him two lines to rethink decolonization. but he also re-captured his initial reluctance to accept the West as a full-fledged entity within the past history of the African ex-colonies. I noticed also how Rabaka's suspicion grows even deeper when he discredits "decolonization" as "another name for Eurocentric imperial *recolonization*" (Rabaka 2009, 190). Ultimately, Fanon and Rabaka seem to gravitate synchronically towards total distrust of decolonization: sidetracking from the hypothesis they both set out to test.

Decolonization as a cultural-cum-linguistic complex veering towards trans-ethnic violence

Rabaka offers a *caveat* that decolonization risks degenerating unless an alternative is offered to Marxism with a view to grant more racial security to the colonized, especially the wretched. To give credence to his *caveat*, Rabaka quotes one of Fanon's closest friends and disciples, the first president of the Republic of Ghana (1964-1966), Kwame Nkrumah:

> "[I]t is no longer necessary to consult the classical Marxist writers," because the "classical Marxist writers," (Nkrumah, 1965, xvii) in all their prescience and ranting and raving of revolution and social transformation, never fully figured, nor felt they needed to critically figure into their analyses, the "classical" or contemporary situations and circumstances of the racialized and colonized world. (Rabaka 2009, 193)

In my opinion, controlling class struggle in Africa is oxymoronic to Rabaka's pervasive minimization of Marxism. More than that, what has been laid forth by Fanon and his disciples as anticolonialism has grown somewhat more radical than colonialism itself.

Anticolonialism has the distinction of implanting transethnic animosity among Africans, because it deflects attention from the material needs of a nation in its postcolonial

phase in a groundless rancor towards colonialism (now an elapsed historical episode). Contrary to the futurism it ascribes to itself, I find Fanon's postcolonial map a retrograde movement towards a perverted kind of consciousness about the negative (instead of the positive) aspects of colonialism.

Fanon's fog in the mind (what I aptly call *schizophrenia*) acquires a sharp edge in instances as when he fails to give an alternative to the culture of the colonizer still evident in the African world. As a result, we make sense of Fanon's problem of *praxis* when his purported plan for action is caught in the haze of abstractionism, as in the following:

> "You will not be able to do all this [i.e., decolonize and attain and maintain revolutionary freedom] unless you give the people some political education" (Fanon 1968, 180)

The question arises: in what language is the national government going to design education for its people? Is it in the French or the English language? Or is it in the native tongue of African tribes? In the last mentioned case, how would the newly emancipated nation manage its foreign affairs? Would the native language be sufficient to represent a country fresh from colonization on an international level? All things considered, how can we pin down Fanon's idea of "revolutionary freedom" in practice?

By obfuscating the possibility of a Marxist socio-economic reading of the strategic map of decolonization, I think Fanon was far from placing "a new praxis-promoting critical theory, radical politics" (Rabaka 2009, 194). Fanon's so-called revolutionary decolonization, in my opinion, hardly exceeds its discursive status into anything that can be put into action.

The wobbliness of a worldview predicated on violence

Fanon justifies anticolonial violence as a necessary reactionary response to the violence of the colonizer:

> The native who decides to put the program [of decolonization] into practice, and to become its moving force, is ready for violence at all times. From birth it is clear to him that this narrow world, strewn with prohibitions, can only be called in question by absolute violence." (Fanon 1968, 37)

That decolonization should be motivated by violence as the only expedient to its materialization is highly problematic. What it actually intensifies is the colonized's inferiority complex, while the solution is in other punitive-yet-pacifist means of resistance, like boycott. Fanon's perverted lesson about anti-colonialism as "absolute violence" (ibid) dispels with real consequence Rabaka's formerly hypothesized "dialectics" with regard to decolonization. Fear and perplexity are the formal results of violence which –contrary to Rabaka's expectations—plucks the possibility of dialectics out by the roots. What iviolence generates is insecurity rather than peace or progress. In reply to Fanon's plan for action in *The Wretched of the Earth*—

> [t]o wreck the colonial world is henceforward a mental picture of action which is very clear, very easy to understand and which may be assumed by each one of the individuals which constitute the colonized people. (Fanon 1968, 40–41)

—I comfort myself with the belief that nothing about investing in "absolute violence" will resonate with the ennobling quest for freedom or with the essence of being human

stricto sensu. If this plan for action is "very easy to understand" (to borrow Fanon's words in the above quote), then it will not challenge the mind –nor uplift the soul—of a nation resetting for its postcolonial "communal becoming" (Serequeberhan 1994, 69).

President Nkrumah who called for a rupture of diplomatic ties with Britain was ultimately plagued by violence even when the issue was the internal security of Ghana. An instance of his obsession with violence is that he chose to oust many of the senior generals in the army as soon as he ascended to power. This incident alone instigated much rancor towards him, hence the *coup* led by the police-army (later to christian itself *The National Liberation Council*) while he was in China in 1966. Another hallmark during that period, Nkrumah headed for China with the intent to intervene against the American-Vietnamese War: an intervention that was as unwelcome to the Americans as as it was to Nkrumah's own counselors. Acting as a (uninvited) mediator while also being a nation of the commonwealth (i.e., as an ex-colony) created another ambiguity. Was the Ghanian nation under Nkrumah was fully independent or still a country with allegiances to Britain? Here, Ghana's example invigorates my former statement about the equivocal nature of decolonization which labors under an espousal of violence in a postcolonial context where a quest for unity is a more generative commitment for self and society.

Conclusion

In contradistinction to Lewis Gordon who finds "Fanon was more in line with Marxist-Leninism" and "more as an innovator, not a disciple" (Gordon 1995, 93), I maintain that Fanon was at best equivocal, whether he took Marxism as a frame of reference to discuss the issue of class struggle in Africa or whether he actually contributed to Marxism as an innovator. Certainly, Fanon began by interpreting some of the Marxist claims for social equality only to debunk them on grounds of their invalidity (for him) within the African context. I can also say that Fanon wended his way through with a discourse fully informed with anti-European violence until the charge of ideology became too imminent to be overlooked. Developing cautions against a theory as universal as Marxism on grounds of its European nascence ironically helped Fanon rise greatly in popularity. Decolonization came into common knowledge as a project of national rebirth which confers on the postcolonial individual the benefit of being autonomous in isolation from the imperial world. Fanon's anti-European zeal reveals the uncertainty accompanying a theory as extreme as decolonization as it stages for itself a virtual existence outside the stakes of history in the present and the past.

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December 7 rehydration

Handtwist garlands yearning down, collected
in a glance, an easy anthem elegance
of hedgerows long before
the spiked white grass in winter's keeping
brambles like castles that fell in autumn
Beaten to the breath I'll hail the decanter
in the man-dark door, sulphur lantern steady
luring stiff stitched bones into the steam
of sanguine berries we have stirred
with all our soft stained hands
Fire swells skins to heavy treasure
Red bright eyes, highstrung and hunted
supplicants shriveled through wineskins
scanning echoes on my tongue for exiles
from humming summer

—Karen Wall

Beyond the Lure of Oil: Alternatives for the Sustainable Economic Development of Nigeria

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Abstract

Free fall in the price of oil and attendant reduction in revenue accruing to the government of Nigeria has created the need to look beyond the lure of oil and re-energise other sectors of the Nigerian economy. Developments in other parts of the world and vagaries in international economic system have shown the futility of relying on one primary product. In this paper, we wager that Nigeria can harness its potentials and diversify her economy. When other oil-rich countries such as Kuwait heededWatts' "Capture oil rents and sow the oil reserves" (2012, p. 1), by using the petrodollars to develop and boost other sectors, Nigeria simply abandoned the lands/farms for the creeks. We recommend

that government should revisit agriculture, industrialisation, entertainment ,and tourism in order to maximise the potentials of these sectors. It is imperative to diversify to avert the imminent collapse of Nigeria's economy.

Keywords: Oil and Gas, Sustainable development, Diversification, Resource Curse, oil wealth.

Introduction

The Nigerian oil-driven economy is in crisis. In the late 1980s, Chief Obafemi Awolowo warned that Nigeria was heading straight for the rocks. As usual, his counsel was dismissed by the government in power as the ranting of a bad loser (FMI 1991). Before the discovery of crude oil and its attendant exploitation and export as the foreign exchange earner for Nigeria, the fledgling economy was predicated on agriculture. Primary products and cash crops were major drivers of economic change. When oil became a revenue spinner for Nigeria in the early Seventies, there was a crass negligence of other sectors of the economy. The revenue inflow from the export of crude oil was so overwhelming that government was at sea as what to do with the money realised. Not recognising that oil as a depleting asset, Nigeria basked in the dangerous habit of depending on oil as the basis of economic growth and development. Now the bubble has burst. The basket price of oil has nose-dived, and potential alternatives to crude oil are in the offing.

Conclusive studies that have shown that the performances of most nations that hinged their economic development only on the sale of oil and gas have been poor (Aghalino 2014).To compete effectively with other nations, Nigeria must diversify her economy. This can be achieved by investing the current revenue derived from the sale of oil in sustainable economic development.

From the Farms to the Creeks

Prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960, other economic sectors were active and viable, particularly agriculture. This included food and cash crops such as cotton, millet, maize, sorghum, cassava, cocoa, oil palm, rubber, groundnuts, rice and beans. In those days, each of the regions used what it had to sustain and develop itself (Alabi 2014). As a result, the country topped the world in groundnut production from the Northern Region, and in rubber, palm oil, and palm kernel in the East. Globally, Nigeria was second only to Ghana in cocoa exports, which were derived from the thriving cocoa farming in the Western Region. Each region was able to carve out a place for itself through policies suited its particular situation. At that time, proceeds from the agricultural sector were used to develop a virile and viable economy. Each region developed at its own pace. The regions, under the 1963 Federal Constitution framework, controlled their resources, retained a good deal of 50 per cent of the income generated, contributed 30 per cent to the Federal Government, and 20 per cent to the common pool, which all the existing regions shared (Ibrahim 2015). This diversified economic model, however, changed with the discovery of crude oil.

Oil prospecting in Nigeria began around 1903. In that year, the 'Nigerian Bitumen Corporation,' a German company, started exploration in the Araromi area of Ondo State. Four years before Nigeria gained her independent status, oil was discovered in commercial quantities at Oloibiri River State in 1956. By 1958, the production capacity for export stood at 5,100 barrels per day. By 1966, this had grown to 450,000 barrels per day; 2.0 million and 2.4 million barrels per day in 1972 and 1979 respectively. By this

time, Nigeria had been ranked as the sixth petroleum exporting country globally and second in Africa (Akpan-Idiok 1999). Clarke (2008) reveals that not less than forty sub-Saharan African states are oil producers. Nigeria has risen over the years to her present status as the largest producer and exporter of oil in Africa and is among the ten largest producers of both crude oil and gas in the world (Akinwale 2012). As of March 2016, Nigeria's current crude oil production capacity said to hover around 2.1 and 2.2 million barrels per day. This situation, it must be said, is facilitated by the success of the amnesty programme for the militants in the Niger Delta.

Nigeria's vast coastal landmass is the custodian of her oil wealth. This extends from Ondo to Edo, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo, Akwa-Ibom, and the Bakassi peninsula in Cross Rivers, which were ceded to Akwa-Ibom after boundary adjustment (www.nairaland.com/2708477/oil-producing-states-nigeria-facts). Production quota, per state, as at March, 2016 is as indicated in the following table:

Table 1: Oil Producing States and Barrel per Day (bpd) Production Quota

	State	Barrel per Day (bpd) Oil Production	%
1.	Akwa-Ibom	504, 000	31.4
2.	Delta	346, 000	21.5
3.	Rivers	344, 000	21.4
4.	Bayelsa	290, 000	18.1
5.	Ondo	60,000	3.7
6.	Edo	33,000	2.1
7.	Imo	17, 000	1.1
8.	Abia	11, 000	0.7
	TOTAL	**1, 605, 000**	**100**

The same is illustrated below:



Source: www.nairaland.com/2708477/oil-producing-states-nigeria-facts Retrieved 11/03/2016

With the final investment decision about the exploration of the Aje Field offshore Lagos, by the joint venture partners, Lagos State was said to be on line to join the league of oil producing states by the end of the year 2015. The first phase planned to hit a target of 10, 000 barrels of oil per day. A mid-case reserve of 32.4 million barrels was also being envisaged (The Punch 2014). With the eventual discovery of crude oil, there was a mad rush from the farms to the creeks. Ever since, the discovery of oil has brought about the neglect of agriculture, and the oil fortune had been seen as a national cake to be shared by all (Alabi 2014). The following table clearly depicts the sharp decline in the contribution of the agricultural sector to the Nigerian economy, vis-à-vis the oil sector.

Table 2: Decline in the Contribution of the Agricultural Sector to the Nigerian Economy, 1958-1992

YEAR	AGRIC % CONTRIBUTION	PETROLEUM % CONTRIBUTION	OTHER % CONTRIBUTION
1958	66	22	12
1960	33	57	8
1966	10	83	7
1978	8	86	6
1982	8	86	6
1988	5	88	7
1992	3	87	10

Source: Akpan-Idiok, A. (1999) "Petroleum Wealth and its Revenue Sharing in Nigeria" in *Nigeria: Citizenship Education* Ozumba, G.O., Eteng, F.O. & Okom, M. (Eds.) AAU Vitalis Book Company, Nigeria, p. 237.

According to Akinwale (2012), the economy has been almost exclusively dependent on the oil and gas sector, which accounts for 95% of Nigeria's export revenue and 76% of government revenue. Government efforts to improve the contributions from the non-oil sector to the national income have not yet yielded any significant results. Nigeria has been engaged in substantial oil and gas production over the past fifty years, and the current oil reserve is estimated to about 35 billion barrels while her proven recoverable natural gas reserve is put at 187 trillion cubic feet. However, these have not been translated into any sustainable economic development for Nigerians. Instead, there has been a gradual decline in petroleum production, for example, dropping from 2.3 million barrels per day in 1973, to 1.62 million barrels in 1977 (FMI 1990). Nigeria lost her position among the comity of fifty richest countries in the world in the 1970s and now dines and wines among the top poorest and debtor nations in the world in the current dispensation. Under the Obasanjo regime, Nigeria has even begged for debt pardon.

Today, unfortunately, Oloibiri is in shambles, having been denuded, devastated, and abandoned as oil yield from Well No. 1 has declined. Oloibiri was milked dry, sucked and discarded like a one-time juicy orange. Drawing from the benefits of history, which invite hindsight, the fate of Oloibiri may well soon be replicated all over Nigeria, if action is not taken to rescue the nation's economy from oil-led development (Aghalino 2014).

Negative Development and Resource Curse Concepts

As mentioned earlier in this paper, oil did not assume its significant status in the national economy until the early 1970s. The end of the Cicil War, it seems, symbolised the end of trauma as the country transitioned gradually from gloom to boom, beginning from the 1970/71 financial year, the same year Nigeria joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil embargo imposed by the West on the Arab oil-producing countries during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 proved to be another blessing for Nigeria. Replacing some of the Arab countries by exporting oil, Nigeria became the largest oil exporter to the United States of America. Indeed, Nigeria was producing 2.3 million barrels of oil per day by 1973 and by the 1975/76 financial year, sales of oil had escalated, contributing 99.05 per cent of the nation's total revenue accruals. Nigeria had seemed to have victoriously stepped out of the hell of a Civil War and triumphantly marched into a paradise of plenty.

However, by the mid-1970s, the picture of the nation's wealth had changed significantly. The brightness of the boom had burst and become gloom once again. Budget deficits, scarcity of common goods, and austerity measures overshadowed the gains of the boom's years. Today, whether Nigeria's oil is a blessing or curse remains a question. Some political analysts have recalled with nostalgia Nigerians' expectations of

an *Eldorado* from Nigeria's oil. Paradoxically, poverty, hunger, deprivation, corruption, nepotism, and greed amidst plenty are what they have experienced (Adams 2015). The squandermania characteristic of the oil boom has constituted an economic malaise. Ogbogbo (2014) has decried how Nigeria and most other oil exporting states in the developing world depend heavily on oil revenue for foreign exchange earnings and for the government budget—in most cases, such dependence totals ninety per cent or more.

The term, 'resource curse' was coined to depict the negative growth and development outcomes that attend mineral and oil-led development. Unfortunately, Nigeria has calibrated her developmental initiatives on revenue derived from sale of crude oil (Aghalino 2014). Drawing from extant and comparative studies, it is evident that to free its economy from the tantalising incubus of the "resource curse", the Federal Government should embrace the *Beyond Oil* initiatives, with a concomitant radical implementation of economic diversification.

Diversification from Oil-led Development

In 2013, Sylvester Monye remarked,

> Today, we still depend on oil for over 70% of our revenue...Today, the main market for our oil, the United States, on an annual basis, is demanding less and less of our oil. They have found an alternative and, in fact, it is projected that by 2020, the United States itself will be a net exporter..., everyday, the demand for Nigerian crude is dropping in the market while the supply is increasing because it may affect other sources being discovered even in other African countries....

Aghalino (2014) concurs, finding a review of the US imports of crude oil and petroleum products from Nigeria demonstrates the US import from Nigeria has been declining since January 2011. Considering developments in the international market, he also provides evidence for the urgency of diversification. Major traditional importers of Nigeria's crude oil, such as China and the Unites States, he remarks, are backing out of the deal for cheaper energy sources and sourcing for other viable alternatives. Since 2014, the US and Canada have been considering halting a total halt of crude oil importation from West Africa. Also worsening matters for Nigeria has been the global proliferation of oil discoveries in African countries such as Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

Alternative sources of revenue, particularly internally generated revenue must be explored, and the economy diversified. Nigeria is a country with abundant mineral resources, most of which have not yet been tapped and/or fully utilised. Akpan-Idiok (1999) classifies solid minerals into two broad groups: metallic and non-metallic. These are then subdivided as follows: metallic minerals include precious metals, such as Gold, Silver and Platinium; non-ferrous metals such as Tin, Lead, and Zinc; iron and ferro-alloy metals consisting of Iron, Molybdenum tungsten, and Welfram; Radioactive minerals such as Uranium, Monazite, Thorite, and Zircon. Non-Metallic include ceramic minerals such as Clay, Feldspar, Talc and Sand; structural and building materials such as Sand, Gravel, Stone, Aggregate limestone, Marble, Shale, Clay, and Laterite; Metallurgical and refractory minerals such as Limestone, Dolomite, and Zircon; Industrial and manufacturing materials such as various types of limestone, phosphate, glass, sand, and kaoline; Chemical materials such as salt and brines; Gemstones such as Topaz, Emerald, Beryl, Ruby, Diamond, and Sapphire; Energy minerals such as Coal, Pitchblende, and Uranite. A summary of some solid minerals in Nigeria is shown in the following table:

Table 3: Some Solid Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Location, Quantity and Uses

S/N	Mineral	Location	Quantity	Uses
1	Tin	Plateau	Large: over 350,000, 000 MT	Making cans, roofing sheets, petrol tanks, utensils and ornaments; tin foil as wrapping materials.
2		Bauchi, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Osun, Plateau, Kano	Substantial: About 2,380,044 MT	Manufacturing of heat resisting and chemical resisting steel in gas turbine and jet engine for aircraft.
3	Tantalite	Abuja FCT, Kano, Kogi, Kwara, Oyo	Moderate: 427,480 MT	Because of its resistance to acid corrosion, it is used in chemical equipment, in surgery for skull plate, in tool steel.
4	Iron-ore	Anambra, Benue, Delta, Edo, Kogi, Kwara,Nassarawa, Plateau	Large, over 2,030,149,645 MT	Production of iron and steel for chemical, constructional, electrical industries; for ship building, making of rails, automobiles, aircraft, bridges.
5	Lead & Zinc	Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Benue, Cross River, Ebonyi, Enugu, Gombe, Imo, Kano, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba	Small: 209,601 MT	Soldering, bearings, as lead foils, ammunition and ornament string, plate for storing batteries, roofing, chemical and construction industries, as a protective covering in galvanized structural steel product; zinc oxides in rubber industry; production of sulphuric acid.
6	Gold	Abia, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Kwara, Niger, Osun, Oyo, Sokoto, Zamfara	Small	International standard for monetary system and a medium of exchange in trade; valued as an ornament and jewellery, dental appliances.
7	Uranium	Cross River	Small	Curing of thyroid disorder and cancer; sterilization; production of nuclear energy. Destroy cells causing anaemia and induces mutation.
8	Limestone	Abia, Adamawa, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Nassarawa, Ogun, Ondo, Sokoto, Yobe	Large: 2,245,088,506	Production of cement; liming materials to reduce soil acidity, fluxing agent in tin smelting.
9	Marble	Abuja FCT, Benue, Delta, , Edo, Katsina, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, Rivers	Large: 121,774,284	Production of cement; liming materials to reduce soil acidity, production of local snuff.
10	Industrial Rocks, Granite & Gravels	Widespread	Abundant	Ceramic materials, as building and construction materials.
11	Clay/Shale	Widespread	Abundant	Ceramic materials for production of shale.
12	Kaoline	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Delta,Ekiti, Kaduna, Katsina, Kogi, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba	Large: 462,490,650	Making bricks, drain tile and sewery pipe; manufacture of China and pottery, filler in paper, rubber industry.
13	Feldspar	Ekiti, Kaduna, Kogi, Nassarawa, Ondo	Moderate/Low	Manufacture of porcelain, glass, as ornamental material.
14	Salt	Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Benue, Cross River, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Katsina, Nassarawa, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba	Sizeable salt: brines: 3,191,400MT	Seasoning food and stain removing agent

15	Coal	Abia, Anambra, Benue, Edo, Enugu, Gombe, Kogi, Ondo, Plateau, Zamfara	Substantial: 1,384,181,661 MT	Being high calorific materials, it is used in driving trains; by chemical industries, in cooking.
16	Talc	Abuja FCT, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Osun, Oyo	Moderate : 32,652 MT	
17	Lignite	Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo,	Substantial	For domestic heating, generating thermal electricity and in the chemical industry
18	Bitumen	Edo, Lagos, Ondo	Substantial: 10,200,000,000 MT	Serve as local requirements for road construction

Source: Adapted from the "Memorandum Submitted by the People and Government of Delta State to the National Conference", Abuja, Nigeria, 2014, pp. 16-22.

A comprehensive study has revealed that there are almost 34 commercially viable types of solid minerals in Nigeria. This once vibrant economic sector contributed substantially to the Nigerian economy prior to the mid-1970s, with the mining of tin in Jos and coal in Enugu, for instance. This sector that is a money-spinner has been neglected by successive governments in Nigeria, robbing the country an estimated annual income of over ₦4 trillion annually (Latinwo 2005). Mining, it must be stressed, has provided economic sustenance to successful countries such as Australia, South Africa and Canada. In addition, there is a compelling need to exploit the abundant bitumen deposits in the country for revenue generation. Nigeria is said to have a projected reserve of bitumen of 10,200,000,000 Metric Tonnes (Memorandum, 2014) or 42.74 million metric tonnes of bitumen deposits, the second largest deposit in the world after Canada 's (The Punch 2015[B]). These bitumen deposits, by estimation, double the amount of existing reserve of crude petroleum deposits. This is capable of meeting local requirements for road construction and becoming a source of foreign revenue for the country when fully harnessed.

The Federal Government's diversification agenda should include a focus on agriculture as a way of saving the nation from falling global oil prices. Since the oil boom, has been the hardest sector of Nigeria's economy even though the greatest resource we have is the fertility of our land. The vast arable land across different vegetation belts and ecological zones, which were the Nigerian's source of sustenance prior to the oil boom, should be strengthened and re-vitalised. Diverse and fertile, Nigeria's vegetation zones have great capacities to sustain food, cash, and industrial crop productions such as tuber, oil palm, palm kernel, and timber. Government should also encourage investors to put in their money into these critical sectors. Efforts at Small-, Micro- and Medium-scale enterprises, some agro-allied, could build strong businesses.The transformation of an agrarian economy into a productive one can bring about the desired re-vitalisation of the economy.

Nigeria also cannot afford to be continually import-dependent, as this may negatively impact her currency and economy in general. Massive importation of products that ordinarily could be produced in Nigeria have engendered capital flight and unemployment. Given an enabling environment, government must make efforts toward industrialisation. The *Nigerian Industrial Revolution Plan*'s (NIRP 2014) vision for industry in Nigeria could make it the dominant job creator and income generator. The plan seeks to ensure that Nigeria becomes:

i. the preferred manufacturing hub in West Africa,

ii. one of the top two manufacturing hubs in West Africa, and
iii. the preferred source for supplying low and medium-technology consumer and industrial goods domestically and regionally.

At the global level, Nigeria hopes to become one of the top ten players in at least ten key manufacturing categories within the next five to ten years. The national policy objective also has plans to encourage the capacity for expansions within existing Nigerian manufacturers, hasten their growth, and also bring in new investors into the country. To move beyond oil and gas, the Federal government must embark upon heavy exploitation of other solid minerals and agricultural resources alongside opening up industries along such lines.

Efforts should also be marshalled towards and intensified along the lines of agro-allied industries. . Previous approaches and models followed by Korea, China, India and Japan should be understudied to enable us come up with one that best suits our local cultures and Nigeria's level of maturity (Ogbogbo 2014). This is because, as Aboyeji (2004) put it, there is

> the component of Universalist and Environmentalist nature of technology. This is to say that technology has a universal as well as environmental application. In the area of Environmentalism, every technological invention has its dialectical relationship with the environment in which it was invented. Accordingly, American technological inventions such as the aeroplanes, military hardware and software, and hardware computers have a close affinity with the American environment. Mechanical equipments such as tractor or plough were also designed to cope with the environment where they exist.

Local industry should not be left out as it has a significant role to play as partners in progress. Nigerians, both at home and abroad, industrialists and members of the academia alike, should be among the people who will form high-tech industry. Besides agro-allied, metal and solid minerals industries, government should also turn its attention to Education as a starting-point for re-vitalising the country's economy. Fareed Zakari, following an international survey, gives two important pieces of advice:

> One is to diversify your economy. The second is to let a thousand flowers blossom. Universities...should have to compete for customers. A sophisticated economy needs a wide variety of Universities pursuing a wide variety of missions. More importantly, Universities are among the most important engines of the knowledge economy. Not only do they produce the brain workers who man it, they also provide much of its backbone, from laboratories to brains, computer networks, etc. (Ogbogbo 2014, p. 92).

Nigeria has always suffered from poor economic husbandry. The enormous human resources of Nigeria, which is said to be almost half of West Africa's population and one-fifth of Africa's, has made Nigeria the envy of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Haastrup and Lucia, 2014). With a young and fast-growing population, a large reserve of human resources, and with one of the highest rates of urbanisation globally, it is imperative that the populace should not be unguided (Bach 2007). However, lamenting

the deplorable condition of Nigerian Universities prior to his demise, t Professor Shehu Jimoh (2011, p. 11), remarked:

> They refer to tertiary institutions, especially Universities as 'Ivory Towers' but I must say, with what is going on in these institutions of learning today, it would appear that the Ivory has oozed out of the towers.

He challenged his listeners to join the crusade to restore the ivory to the dilapidating towers. To move away from the lure of oil, we need to capture all our economic potential as alternative revenue sources.

Today, tourism which is directly linked with the cultural, economic, and intellectual potential of a country, is a gold mine. It is one of the most profitable and rapidly developing industries worldwide. Saudi Arabia and Israel have particularly tapped into their tourism potentials and made the sector a revenue spinner, bringing money to cities and providing jobs for the locals (Aghalino 2014). Dubai, a former fishing village has also been transformed into an important tourist destination and port. Nigeria's tourism potentialities are simply gargantuan. Closely related to tourism is the entertainment industry. Entertainment, which consists of dance, music, reality TV shows, print and electronic media, cinematography, comedy and acting, has been growing in leaps and bounds over the last ten years (Ogbogbo 2014). In revenue outlay, Nollywood, which releases an average of fifty films weekly and earns an estimated whooping annual revenue of $590 million comes third, following Hollywood and Bollywood worldwide. The entertainment industry is job-rich and the second highest job-giver, after agriculture (Aghalino 2014). A large pool of talented Nigerians are succeeding in the entertainment industries. The renowned stand-up comedian, Atunyota Akporobome, popularly known as Ali Baba admits that today he earns between ₦3 million and ₦5 million to feature in an event either as a master of ceremonies or stand-up comedian, compared with a paltry ₦1, 500 over a decade ago (The Punch 2015). The sports industry is also a viable area that, if well exploited can deliver impressive results.

Conclusion

Nigeria, the largest oil producer in Africa and twelfth in the world, heavily and almost solely relies (up to 95%) on crude oil export to finance the budgets of all tiers of its government. The perils of its wanton monolithic economy are amplified by most of Nigeria's states owing backlogs of unpaid salaries and pensions, up to eight months or more in some cases. Some of these states have monthly wage bills that outweigh their monthly receipts from the Federation Account Allocation Committee. Before the 2015 General Elections, Nigeria's economy was thought to have rescinded to its lowest ebb to the extent that it became difficult to fund the 2015 budget, and government had to resort to borrowing to pay salaries (The Punch 2015[A]). Until 2020/2021 the Federal Government precariously owed its workers, such as the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) for six months upwards, purportedly owing to the Nine-month long FG-ASUU industrial relations breakdown. Recently, 27 of the 36 states had to rely on a ₦713.7 billion bailout fund from the Federal Government. Indeed, only a few states, such as Lagos, appear to be viable and self-sustainable. As finances progressively dwindle, we need no crystal ball to discern that before long, some states might become so strapped for funds that their governance will shut down (Ibrahim 2015). Sectors like agriculture, tourism, entertainment and outright industrialisation are the possibilities to explore if we are serious about the comity of nations. Above all, the need to re-invest

money made from oil fortunes on human capital development must be emphasised. The creation of well-educated and well-trained human resources should be government's highest priority. If these goals are pursued and achieved, they may just be the beginning of the long-awaited 'change' that Nigerians are all hoping for and new dawn for the country beyond the lure of oil.

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December 8 abandoned cemetery

The highways running sundown home
unravel, splinter hallowed ground, graves
between two roads, one coming
one going, and now we peel away
from the silkworm snowfall churning out
frail crosses from calcium mist
Scripted filaments lock on crumbled ground
between the speeding of dark streams
West toward Edmonton the headlights
coil faster, insect suites detaching from earth
toward the web of lamps and hearth
and radiant the highwires beat
into the braided city as to a mirage
hardworked spirits high above the sounds
of departure, swirling, nothing more

—Karen Wall

Communal Conflicts in the North Central States and Food Insecurity in Nigeria:

The Panacea of the Chinese Example

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Abstract

Nigeria is richly endowed with vast natural resources and an estimated population of about 140 million people who need food for their daily survival. The favorable climatic and topographical conditions of the North central states of Benue, Nassarawa and Plateau place them in a good position to provide food for the entire country. Perceived poverty and food insecurity in Nigeria is not only as the result of cumulative consequences of the general failure of agricultural policies and implementation over time, but also incessant communal conflicts and clashes mostly between the Fulani herdsmen and the host communities. This paper focuses on the challenges that these conflicts pose while considering downward trends in agricultural production in Nigeria and how the Chinese example may act as a panacea.

Keywords: Food, Food insecurity, Conflicts, Communal clashes.

Introduction

An indispensible means of production, land is always at the core of most communal conflicts in Nigeria. Land holds both cultural and material significances for the people in most African communities. Grazing land scarcity in the north-central states of Nassarawa, Benue, Kogi, Plateau of Nigeria is the reason for conflict on so many occasions. There are two major agricultural practitioners in north-central Nigeria; farmers who produce farm crops and pastoralists who carry out livestock production. Recently ,hese groups have been finding themselves in deadly conflicts because of competition for access to farmland and grazing land.[1] The incessant resource conflicts witnessed in the tropics that have resulted in loss of lives, properties and environmental degradation are also occuring in North-central Nigeria. Because the production potential of grasslands and livestock in the arid and semi-arid regions is constrained by low and variable rainfall,[2] grazing needs access to pasture resources across regions to ensure food security for the Nigerian population. Pastures, woody vegetation, water resources and land are considered to be common property as reported by Berger.[3] However, the complex land-use system that has changed markedly over time has created tension and conflicts between herdsmen and

host communities. Crops, livestock, water resources, and other vegetal resources play key roles in the development, maintenance, and projection of socio-economic strength of a society.[4] The Fulani herdsmen's livelihood strategies have not only resulted in conflicts over the destruction of crops and farmlands, but also environmental degradation perceived to be contributing to the deterioration of ecosystem services to various communities. The region under review has witnessed enough violent conflicts to attract both State and National attention. This paper explores these land disputes and their threats discussing the nexus between grazing land scarcity and food security; examining communal clashes as they affect farmers and pastoralists, especially the famers-pastoralists conflicts in northern Nigeria and considers the Chinese experience as a panacea for Nigeria situation.

The Nexus between Grazing Land and Food Security

According to The World Food Summit of 1996, food security is defined as existing "when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life".[5] Food security is also considered to include physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences. Individual who are food secure do not live in hunger of fear of starvation. Food insecurity on the other hand, is a situation of limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable food in socially acceptable ways according to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)[6]

In many countries, health problems related to dietary excess or insufficiency are an ever increasing threat. For example, malnutrition and food-borne diarrhea have become a double burden that is related to the ongoing unavailability of food. Concerns over food security have existed throughout history. As the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) remarks, food security "exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. *Chronic* food insecurity is a persistent lack of "sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life," and is generally caused by extreme poverty.[7] *Acute* food insecurity refers to temporary gaps in the access to food, and can result from a variety of factors ranging from high prices to disruptions in delivery systems, recessions, natural disasters and extreme weather events, political turmoil, and violent conflict. The WHO states that there are three pillars that determine food security: food availability, food access, and food use.

Food Availability

Food availability relates to the supply of food through production, distribution and exchange. Food production is determined by a variety of factors, including land ownership and use; soil management; crop selection, breeding, and management; livestock breeding and management; and harvesting. Nations do not have to have the natural resources required to produce crops in order to achieve food security, as seen in the examples put forward by Japan and Singapore. Because food consumers outnumber producers in every country, food must be distributed to different regions or nations. Food distribution involves the storage, processing, transport, packaging, and marketing of food. Poor transport infrastructure can increase the price of supplying water and fertilizer as well as the price of moving food to national and global markets. Around the world, few individuals or households are continuously self-reliant for food. This creates

the need for a bartering, exchange, or cash economy to acquire food. The exchange of food requires efficient trading systems and market institutions, which can have an impact on food security.

Food Acessibility

This refers to the affordability and allocation of food, as well as the preferences of individuals and households. The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights noted that the causes of hunger and malnutrition are often not a scarcity of food but an inability to access available food, usually due to poverty.[8] Poverty can limit access to food, and can also increase how vulnerable an individual or household is to food price spikes. Access depends on whether the household has enough income to purchase food at prevailing prices or has sufficient land and other resources to grow its own food. Households with enough resources can overcome unstable harvests and local food shortages and maintain their access to food. Access to food must be available in socially acceptable ways, without, for example, resorting to emergency food supplies, scavenging, stealing, or other coping strategies. There are two distinct types of access to food: direct access in which a household produces food using human and material resources; and economic access in which a household purchase food produces elsewhere.

Food Use

Appropriate food use is based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation. It refers to the metabolism of food by individuals. Once food is obtained by a household, a variety of factors impact the quantity and quality of food that reaches members of the household. In order to achieve food security, the food ingested must be safe and must be adequate to meet the physiological requirements of each individual.

Food security is a complex sustainable development issue, linked to health through malnutrition, but also to sustainable economic development, environment, and trade. There is a great deal of debate around food security with some arguing that:

- There is enough food in the world to feed everyone adequately; the problem is distribution.
- Future food needs can - or cannot - be met by current levels of production.
- National food security is paramount - or no longer necessary because of global trade.
- Globalization may - or may not - lead to the persistence of food insecurity and poverty in rural communities.

Issues such as whether households or communities get enough food, how it is distributed within the household or communities and whether that food fulfils the nutrition needs of all members of the household/community, show that food security is clearly linked to health. Household food security exists when all the household's members, at all times, have access to enough food for an active, healthy life. The United Nations (UN) recognized the Right to food in the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and has since observed that this right is vital for the enjoyment of all other rights.[9]

Food insecurity, on the other hand, is a situation of "limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequate and safe foods or limited or uncertain ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways," according to the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA).[1]

Food Utilization

This refers to the metabolism of food by individuals. Once food is obtained by a household, a variety of factors impact the quality and quantity of food that reaches member of the household. In order to achieve food security, the food ingested must be safe and must be enough to meet the physiological requirement of each individual. Food safety impacts food utilization.

Northern Nigeria is known as a region that has been involved in various types of crises. Fasona and Omojola[11] carried out a study of conflicts and other forms of unrest in the northern region between 1991 and 2005 and found that farmers-pastoralists conflicts accounted for 35% of the major clashes reported. Casualties of such confrontations usually went beyond the farmers and pastoralists. For example, in July 2012 some 200 people including a Nigerian Senator were attacked and killed during a funeral held for people killed by suspected Fulani herdsmen. Conflicts between farmers and Fulani pastoralists in Benue State, left two soldiers, some 50 men, women, and children dead.[12] Binniyat reported clashes between Fulani herders and local farmers in some communities in Kaduna which left some dead and many others fleeing[13]. In Benue and Nasarawa States, at least 5,000 people fled villages following clashes between nomadic Fulani cattle herders and sedentary farmers.[14] In another encounter, attacks on local farmers led to the expulsion of about 700 pastoralists from Borno state in 2009 and another 2,000 from Plateau State in the same year. Suspected reprisal attacks by the pastoralists were claimed to have resulted in the killing of eight people in four villages of Plateau State[15].

In the conflict prone areas of the north-central states, palpable fear and anxiety have enveloped the residents as conflicts resulted in the destruction of life and property; Fulani herdsmen lost an estimated number of 3.5 million heads of cattle, while the farmers also lost houses, and crops worth millions of naira. According to Bello, "the conflicts have demonstrated high potential to exacerbate the insecurity and food crisis particularly in rural communities where most of the conflicts are localized, with reverberating repercussions nationwide".[16] Homer-Dixon remarked that "increasing scarcity of resources is expected not only to provoke internal or interstate conflicts, but also to induce large population movements which will feed group identity conflicts.[17]" In another instance, he added that the inability to address and solve those problems may increase grievances and the level of violence.

How Conflict Affects Food Security

There is substantial empirical evidence that conflict has a negative impact on food security. The impact may be minor, as when spontaneous protest demonstrations over rising food prices take place in or around food markets and disrupt or close down vendors' operations. At the other extreme, there is food war—"a concept which includes the use of hunger as a weapon in active conflict and the food insecurity that accompanies and follows as a consequence," according to Ellen Messer et al.[18] The pastoralists and the farmers are engaged in a food war because of intense and recurring droughts[19], especially in the

Benue Valley zone between the north-central states. Periodic droughts take a heavy toll on livestock which die from thirst, hunger, and exhaustion.[20]

Murray records opinion leaders also point out that the encroaching desert is also a threat to the farmers in the region. Recent findings show that approximately 3,500 square kilometers of Nigerian land turns to desert each year, forcing both farmers and herdsmen to abandon their lands.[21] This was corroborated by Oyetade,[22] who reported that in 10 northern states of Nigeria, the desert advances another 600 meters further south each year. According to Oyetade, this encroachment has displaced thousands of both farmers and pastoralists from their communities.

Causes of Communal Conflicts in Various States

Increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists may be also attributed to other key factors, among them, the irrigation schemes instituted by the government. Blench[23] is of the view that competition for access to the water offered by irrigation increases conflict. The schemes allow farmers to take water and more of the river banks for dry season farming. They come into conflict with the other users, especially the cattle herders who have been using same location for many years as grazing and water points. In their field work,[24] Olabode and Olajide highlight the following as causes of farmers-pastoralists conflict:

i. Water scarcity: The only source of water for the cattle during dry season is often a low-land area. Farmers, during this period, often engage in nursing their crops at the same water points because of the dryness in the upland areas.

ii. Control over scarce resources: To guarantee self or group survival, pastoralists for example, move away from locations that lack sufficient pasture to more favorable locations. The most frequent cause of conflict between farmers and herdsmen in the study area is the destruction of crops by cattle. This is often the result of herdsmen leaving cattle unattended, and they to wander to cultivated fields.

iii. Incompatible values: The crops grown by the farmers are also in the feeding path or stock route of the cattle; this causes the interference of cattle eating crops, especially those nutritious to cattle. In most cases, this results into crop destruction and engenders conflict.

iv. Search for Grazing Land: Cattle herders look for where there is sufficient grass or crop residues for their animals to eat. In a situation where leftover crops get eaten, this can conflict with the farmer.

v. Proximity to Stock Routes: Farmers who have their farms very close to roads or animal paths are liable to have their crops destroyed whenever there is loose control over the cattle. Close proximity to roads or animal paths often leads to real threats on farming systems.

Kimani sees as key factors population pressure and competition over resources especially during droughts, in the vicious cycles of settling of scores in attacks, during counter-attacks, and because of poor dialogue between the different over range resources, principally water and pastures.[25] According to him, the pastoralists regard the survival and well-being of their livestock as paramount because the animals are not only economic

assets but are also social, cultural and spiritual assets that define their social identity. One Fulani herder was quoted by Abbass as saying: "Our herd is our life, because to every nomad life is worthless without his cattle. What do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened? The encroachment of grazing fields and routes by farmers is a call to war."[26]

Some examples of communal conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in north-central Nigeria have assumed a regular pattern in terms of frequency over the last ten years.

Table 1. Some Farmers-Pastoralists Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

December 2012	Clashes between Gbagyi farmers and Fulani nomads near Abuja left two people dead, five injured, and over 1,500 people displaced from about 27 settlements that were wrecked.
July 2012	About 200 persons, including a serving federal senator, Gyang Dantong, were killed in Matse and Kakuru villages during a funeral for some people killed earlier by suspected Fulani herdsmen in Plateau state.
June 2012	At least six people were killed, houses burnt, and several farmlands were destroyed in Ngandum Village, Adamawa State, as pastoralists and farmers engaged in a fierce battle. These incidents occurred after herdsmen led their cattle into rice fields which resulted in the death of a farmer.
May 2012	A clash between farmers and herders in Gwer West area in Benue State left five people dead and many others displaced.
April 2012	One person was killed and several others were injured in a Fulani-Hausa clash in Sokoto.
March 2012	Sixteen people were reported killed in a clash between Tiv farmers and Fulani herdsmen in Kadarko community, Giza Local Council of Nasarawa State. About 5,000 residents fled the community to safer areas in nearby towns.
March 2012	Conflict between Fulani pastoralists and sedentary farmers in Gwer West Local Government Area of Benue State left over 30 people dead.
November 2011	Fulani/ farmers clash in Kirikasamma Local Government area of Borno State left one person was killed and over 17 people from the farmers' side seriously injured. The clash was triggered when farmers in the area took measures to protect the perennial destruction of their yet-to-be-harvested farm produce and incessant attacks on them by the Fulani pastoralists. Conflicts between farmers and Fulani pastoralists in Benue State, left two soldiers and some 50 men, women, and children dead.
March 2010	Fulani herders invaded three villages of Dogo Na Hauwa, Ratsat, and Jeji in Jos South Local Government Area of Plateau State killing many people, mostly children and women in a barbaric manner.
December 2009	Thirty two people were killed, scores of houses burned, and several farms destroyed, following clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Nassarawa State. About 700 pastoralists were expelled from Borno State and another 2,000 from Plateau State after attacks on local farmers.

February 2005	Dozens of people were killed in Adamawa state when Fulani herdsmen alleged to come from Chad and Niger attacked farming communities in a dispute over grazing land.
February 2004	Forty nine farmers were killed as they fled nomad attacks by nomads in the farming town of Yelwa, Plateau State.
May 2003	Cattle herders attacked and burned 34 farming villages in Adamawa and Gombe States which resulted in 63 dead and over 500 injured. The attackers, thought to be nomadic herdsmen, from neighbouring Chad had, attacked the rural town.
February 2003	About 100 people were killed in clashes between Fulani and the Yungar ethnic groups in Adamawa State.
January 2002	Conflict in the Mambilla plateau in Taraba State between Fulani herders and farming communities which resulted in dozens of deaths and forced more than 25,000 Fulani herdsmen to flee across the border to Cameroon. At least 30 people were killed in clashes between farmers and pastoralists over grazing land in BarkinLadi local council area of Plateau State

Compiled by Audu, S.D. (2013).

The Link Between Food Security and Conflict

"Hunger anywhere threatens peace everywhere."

Poverty and deprivation are seen as underlying causes of endemic conflict and civil violence. Persistent poverty and oppression can lead to helplessness and despair. When governments fail to meet the most basic needs of people, these failed states can become places of terror. The drivers of violence include a wide range of factors, such as, political, economic, social, and environmental issues. In many cases, it is difficult to define clear causes, because the roles of different factors are often interrelated. Socio-economic inequalities, perceived or real injustice, the lack of jobs, conflict over natural resources and the distribution of their benefits, human rights abuses, political exclusion, and grievances over corruption can morph into one another and chang3over time..

As the 2011 *World Development Report* notes, conflict comes in many forms. While the traditional security paradigm has focused attention on interstate and major civil wars, other forms of political violence – such as rioting, communal conflict, and violence linked to organized crime – pose threats to human security and diminish government capacity to respond to protracted crises.[27] While we eschew simplistic explanations of conflict (because the parsing of the drivers of conflict is difficult, as most conflicts have multiple causes), acute food insecurity can be a major motivation for popular mobilization and a risk multiplier. A nuanced relationship between food insecurity and violence emerges: while (increases in) food insecurity can be a source of grievances that motivate participation in rebellion, acute and severe food insecurity has a dampening effect on conflict behavior. Communal conflicts tend to occur against a backdrop of chronic food insecurity, and the effects of rapid changes in food access are less predictable

Regarding urban unrest, the picture is somewhat more straightforward: higher consumer prices, particularly for food and fuel, are associated with increases in urban protest and rioting, which adversely affect institutions and influence policy decisions that affect the whole country. The most food-insecure do not riot, rather those with

comparatively better access, partly because of interactions with other variables, such as political regimes (which affects the likelihood that demonstrations or riots are repressed) and incentives for the government to shield consumers from higher international prices. Equally important is the role of weak institutions, whose presence implies that there are few mechanisms through which conflict can be managed. Lower costs to collective action faced by urban populations can also play a part in accelerating conflict. The resulting instability of conflict can itself cause further price increases, contributing to a vicious cycle and protracted crisis.

If food insecurity is a threat multiplier for conflict, improving food security can reduce tensions and contribute to more stable environments. However, food security interventions – both in the form of national level programmes and international efforts to address acute insecurity via emergency assistance or chronic insecurity through support programmes – can also become a source of conflict and, if they are not designed and implemented correctly, further distort food markets and suppress local production. Nonetheless, a vicious cycle of food insecurity and conflict can be transformed into a virtuous cycle of food security and stability that provides peace dividends, reduces conflict drivers (such as horizontal inequalities[28]), enhances social cohesion, rebuilds social trust, and builds the legitimacy and capacity of government. In many cases, these results are generated through the process of interventions themselves, for example, by the inclusion of various groups in community-driven programmes.

Food insecurity as the result of communal clashes in the north-central states has motivated participation in armed civil conflict at the individual's level. Local militia

organizations, rebel and warring factions recruit fighters via ideological/political appeals, material incentives, and coercion. The lure of food and shelter (and protection from both rebel and state violence) is often perceived as a cause for joining violent groups.

Communal Conflicts: The Chinese Experience

China with a population of over one billion is largely homogeneous with 91.9% of the population being Han Chinese, other ethnicities are Mongols, Zhuang, Miao, Hui, Tibetans, Uyghurs and Koreans.[29] Some ethnic groups are more distinguishable due to their physical appearance and relatively low intermarriage rates. Many others have intermarried with Han Chinese, and have similar appearances. They are therefore less distinguishable from Han Chinese people, especially because a growing number of ethnic minorities are fluent at a native level in Mandarin Chinese. In addition, children often adopt "ethnic minority status" at birth if one of their parents is an ethnic minority, even though their ancestry is overwhelmingly Han Chinese. There is a growing number of Europeans, South Asians, and Africans living in large Chinese cities. Although relatively few acquire Chinese citizenship, the number of immigrants belonging to different racial groups has markedly increased recently because of China's economic success.

Like Nigeria, China had had her own share of communal and ethnic clashes, but the Chinese are still united despite their huge population. A look into Chinese history shows that pejorative statements about non-Han Chinese can be found in some ancient Chinese texts. For example, a 7th-century commentary to the Hanshu by Yan Shigu concerning the Wusun people likens "barbarians who have green eyes and red hair" to macaque monkeys.[30] Some conflicts between different races and ethnicities in China have

resulted in genocide. Ran Min, a Han Chinese leader during the Wei–Jie war, massacred non-Chinese Wu Hu peoples around 350 A.D. in retaliation for abuses against the Chinese population and in which the Jie people were particularly affected[31].

Rebels have also slaughtered many Arabs and Persian merchants in the Yangzhou massacre (760). The Arab historian Abu Zayd Hasan of Siraf reports when the rebel Huang Chao captured Guang Prefecture, his army killed a large number of foreign merchants resident there: Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Parsees were slaughtered in the Guangzhou massacre[32]. Foreign Arab and Persians residing in Quanzhou were massacred in the Ispah Rebellion.

In the 20th century, the social and cultural critic Lu Xun commented that, "throughout the ages, Chinese have had only two ways of looking at foreigners, either up to them as superior beings or down on them as wild animals.[33] Partner merchants and non-Mongol overseers were usually either immigrants or local ethnic groups. In China there were Turkestani and Persian Muslims, and Christians. Foreigners from outside the Mongol Empire entirely, such as the Polo family, were welcomed everywhere. Despite the high position given to Muslims, the Yuan Mongols discriminated against them severely, restricting Halal slaughter and other Islamic practices like circumcision, as well as Kosher butchering for Jews, forcing them to eat food the Mongol way. Genghis Khan directly called Muslims "slaves".[34] Corruption and persecution became so severe that Muslim Generals joined the Han Chinese in rebelling against the Mongols. The Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang had Muslim Generals including Lan Yu who rebelled against the Mongols and defeated them in combat. Some Muslim communities had the name

which in Chinese means "baracks" or "thanks". Many Hui Muslims claim it is because they played an important role in overthrowing the Mongols and thanked in this way by the Han Chinese[35]. The Muslims in the *semu* class also revolted against the Yuan dynasty in the Ispah Rebellion, but the rebellion was crushed, and the Muslims were massacred by the Yuan loyalist commander Chen Youding.

Uyghurs have also exhibited racism as well. The Uyghur leader Sabit Damulla Abdulbaki made the following proclamation about Han Chinese and Tungans (Hui Muslims): "The Tungans, more than the Han, are the enemy of our people. Today our people are already free from the oppression of the Han, but still continue under Tungan subjugation. We must still fear the Han, but cannot fear the Tungans also. The reason we must be careful to guard against the Tungans, we must intensely oppose, cannot afford to be polite. Since the Tungans have compelled us, we must be this way. Yellow Han people have not the slightest thing to do with Eastern Turkestan. Black Tungans also do not have this connection. Eastern Turkestan belongs to the people of Eastern Turkestan. There is no need for foreigners to come be our fathers and mothers...From now on we do not need to use foreigners language, or their names, their customs, habits, attitudes, written language, etc. We must also overthrow and drive foreigners from our boundaries forever. The colors yellow and black are foul. They have dirtied our land for too long. So now it is absolutely necessary to clean out this filth. Take down the yellow and black barbarians! Long live Eastern Turkestan!"[36]

American telegrams have reported that certain Uyghur mobs in parts of Xinjiang were calling for White Russians to be expelled from Xinjiang during the Ili Rebellion,

along with Han Chinese. They were reported to have said, "We freed ourselves from the yellow men, now we must destroy the white". The telegram also reported that "Serious native attacks on people of other races frequent. White Russians in terror of uprising".[37]

During the late 19th century, around Qinghai tensions exploded between different Muslim sects and ethnic groups, with enmity and division rising between Hui Muslims and Salar Muslims, and all tensions escalating between Muslims, Tibetans, and Han.[38] The "Encyclopædia of religion and ethics, Volume 8" states that the Dungan and Panthay revolts by the Muslims were set off by racial antagonism and class warfare, rather than the mistaken assumption that the conflict was due to Islam and religion that the rebellions broke out[39]. The lesson that Nigeria needs to draw that despite its huge population and many ethnic groups, China has been able to overcome the ugly challenges of ethnic clashes, and its peoples continue live together.

Conclusion

In the north-central states of Nigeria, the fight against social insecurity calls for determined action against food insecurity, poverty, inequality, and injustice. Being hungry, insecure about today's and tomorrow's food is the most extreme and most dependence-inducing form of poverty. Access to land is a major cause of conflict in this region. The State needs to review existing laws as they relate to accessibility to land by the members of this region's communities. Such action is key to resource sustainability in Nigeria as majority of its citizens require land for farming and grazing as equity and accessibility to arable and grazing land could be assured.

There are genuine concerns by Nigerians about the need to review the existing constitution of the country. Issues such as indigeneship and settlers rights in communities call for reviews of the land use acts which have been abused largely by the upper class es. These issues should be in the front burner in the constitution review process. This paper concludes that it is in the interest of the State to end the rhetoric about the demarcation of grazing land and take concrete steps to address the genuine needs of herdsmen concerning its availability in order to resolve the re-occurring conflicts in the agricultural sector which currently provides employment to over 80 % of the country's population.

Peace is cherished but has not been enjoyed by many people for decades. Millions of people have been deprived of peace for much of their lives while an even greater number – possibly all humankind – feel the threat of being peace and stability being removed—if not for themselves, for their children. Good in itself, peace – true, lasting peace – is a symptom of well-being, a sign of people living in harmony with themselves and others. Without food security, peace is elusive, an appearance maintained through repressed violence, undermined by the sense of frustration and impotence, and eventually be threatened by revolt.

Recommendations

A learning agenda that integrates food security more explicitly into conflict analysis would contribute important insights for future work. A deeper understanding of linkage between conflict and food security would help to build a better foundation for interventions aimed at both conflict prevention and recovery. Policies need to be put in place to promote food security's growth and distribute its benefits broadly across society. Agricultural development, as part of economic and social changes that give the

poor greater power over the productive resources and the social factors that shape their livelihoods, is indispensable to the food security of the rural population and to a more peaceful and stable environment. Equitable growth and pro-poor policies are neededl not only to prevent the outbreak of conflicts but also in immediate post-conflict situations.

We suggest that the following be adopted:

1. Identification of flashpoints of possible conflict;

2. Demarcation of grazing reserves for Fulani herds men on their various grazing tracks;

3. Provision of water through either boreholes or wells along the tracks;

4. Participation of all stakeholders at all levels of conflict resolution and Resource management;

5. Government be firm and fair in its resolution and implementation of decisions.

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December 15 winter errand

strafing chips of the pole
carve spinal frost down long dense
and clenching streets of town
The arctic wife darts lightly wooled
whitehaired roses choking stores
beyond the valley, pale teeth gouge
the river's green bone to its core
Those waiting at home make lists without hope
for provisions already gone from the shelves
weighting the iceboats fleeing the market
before the final calls can start
she snaps crisp
hands around brown paper and
the last of what there is is all

`—Karen Wall

The Development of Motion Pictures, Multi-media Graphics and a Short History of Nigeria's Film Industry

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Abstract

The invention of the computer has simplified life. This paper examines how the present-day motion pictures and multi-media graphics began and reviews the development of the film industry in Nigeria.

Keywords: Multi-Media, Interpolation, Post-production, Editing, Techniques, Animation.

Introduction

People enjoy perfectly edited motion pictures with appropriate effects, well balanced colours and adequately tweaked voice-overs, in the same way children enjoy good and interesting animations be them 2D or 3D. These perfectly finished movies are the

handiwork of professionals. The *Nollywood* movie industry in Nigeria in the beginning produced poorly finished movies; most times, the synchronization was poorly done that it became very obvious to the ordinary person that it is either that the picture is faster than the sound or vice-versa. In the basics of movie production editing, two variables are involved – the sound and the picture; the hallmark of good editing is perfect synchronization where the sound matches the picture perfectly. These two variables are placed on the timeline of editing and a good editor knows exactly where to place the graphics, the effects, the pictures, and the sound.

In the beginning also, most films were produced using unnecessary sound and graphic effects, and in most cases, these effects were placed in the wrong positions. The reason for these flaws is not farfetched, these editors were either not very conversant with the appropriate software or they simply dabbled into menus that are not necessary and as a matter of fact, there are always quacks in every profession and vocation. Therefore if the appropriate software are employed and well mastered, if the synchronizations are perfectly done and the appropriate effects are well placed with good colour balance, an movie is sure.

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Key Words

Animation is special effect whereby progressive still images displayed in rapid succession creates the illusion of movement.

Editing is the process of selectively recording video and audio on finished videotapes or disc. It involves reviewing raw footage and transferring desired segments from master tapes onto new tape in a predetermined sequence.

Interpolation is defined by the Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia (2009) as "inserting something into something else, to add an item between the existing parts of something else". It is to insert, intercalate and interject, to fill in as an intermediate term of a series. In computer graphics according to Stinson (2004), interpolation is the creation of new values that lie between known values, for example when objects are *rasterized* into two-dimensional images from their corner points (vertices), all the pixels between those points are filled in by an interpolation algorithm, which determines their colour and other attributes.

Multi-media is the combined use of several media such as sound and full-motion video in computer applications, it comprises the usage of sound and picture on computer programming software and hardware capable of using wide variety of media such as film, video and music as well as text and numbers.

Post Production refers to video production activity following initial recording, typically involves editing, voiceovers, sound effects, titles, and or various electronic visual effect culminating in complete production.

Technique, according to Sobowale (2005), is as the procedure, skill, expertise or the knack in performing a specific task; technique in this context includes the sequential placements of various elements on the timeline of editing.

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A Short History of Motion Pictures

What we experience as sophisticated video technology has a robust history. In the beginning was analog. In 1877 when Eadweard Muybridge (1830-1904), an Englishman-turned-

American needed to settle a bet about whether a galloping horse had all four feet off the ground at the same time. The galloping hooves moved too fast for the eyes to see or, depending on one's belief, just fast enough so one could see what he wanted to. Definitive proof was needed and to settle this argument, Muybridge hired a photographer to set up twenty-four cameras along a race track to snap still pictures in rapid sequence as a horse galloped by. When the pictures were developed, it was found that the horse did indeed had all four feet off the ground during brief moments, thus settling the question. However, during this process the pictures were viewed in rapid succession, an illusion was created, giving the impression of motion can be seen in figures 3 and 4. To give credence to this motion images, Muybridge, according to Scharf (1979), took rapid and sequential photographs of a female figure in a sitting position, snapped from various angles at eleven frames per second, of her lifting a towel from the ground to wipe her body. When the photographs were juxtaposed, an illusion of motion was also established.

Fig 1. Muybridge, 1887, Female lifting a towel, wiping herself

These works of Muybridge can be likened to those of Edgar Degas (1834-1917). As Major (2001) observes, the way in which Degas presented a kind of cinematic progression, particularly in his compositions of dancers, had seldom before been tried in painting. Such juxtapositions of like subjects and in some cases the same subject to simulate the

appearance of a single, animated figure recorded in more or less consecutive phases of its movemen antedate the photographs of Eadweard Muybridge. Degas represents, literally, one figure, not in sequential positions but in the same one, or two as it would be seen from different viewpoints (see Fig.2 below) as one would see it by reading a Muybridge plate vertically instead of horizontally. It may be worth noting that Muybridge sometimes organized his photographs in this way.

Fig. 2: Degas 1899 (Dancers in sequential poses.)

Fig 3. Muybridge, 1887, Annie G. in Canter from "Animal Locomotion"

Fig 4. Muybridge, 1887, Consecutive series photographs

Showing phases of movement in a horse's trot and gallop.

It was also discovered that if this sequence of still pictures was presented at a rate of about sixteen or more frames per second (16 (f) /second), these individual pictures

then appear to blend together, giving the impression of a continuous, uninterrupted motion of the image. In this case, of course, the individual pictures vary slightly to reflect changes over time. The illusion of motion was created when the pictures were presented in an uninterrupted sequence. Early "silent" films used a basic frame or picture rate of sixteen (16) and eighteen (18) frames per second. When sound was introduced, this rate was increased to 24 frames per second. It seems that this rate increase occured to meet the quality needs of the sound track. Unlike the demands of broadcast television which necessitate frame rates of 25 and 30 per second depending on the country in which its programming airs, films have maintained a worldwide 24 frame per second standard for decades (Lemn, 2004).

Analog and Digital Signals

Electronic signals as they originate in microphones and cameras are analog (also spelt Analogue) in form. This means that the equipment detects signals in terms of continuing variations in relative strength or amplitude. In audio, this translates into audio volume or loudness and in video; it is the brightness component of the picture.



Fig 5. Electronic Analog and Digital wave signals

Source: www.learnsparkfun.com

As illustrated above, these analog signals can be changed into digital data (computer 0s and 1s) before progressing through subsequent electronic equipment. The top part of the above illustration shows how an analog signal can rise and fall over time to reflect changes in the original audio or video source. (This is the same as the grey wave form represented at the left of the above diagram).



Fig 6. Electronic Analog and Digital wave signals converted into number equivalent.

Source:www.learnsparkfun.com

The top of the illustration above shows how an analog signal can rise and fall over time to reflect changes in the original audio or video source. This is the same as the gray waveform represented at the left of the above illustration.

Lemm (2012) remarks that in order to change an analog signal to digital, the wave pattern is sampled at a high rate of speed and the amplitude at each of those sampled moments (shown in the gray on the right) is converted into a number equivalent. These numbers are simply the combinations of the Zeros (0) and Ones (1) used in computer language. Since we are dealing with numerical quantities, we can do some interesting things (generally, special effects) by adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing the

numbers. The faster this is done, the better the audio and video quality will be but also the more space (bandwidth) that is required to record or transmit the signal. Thus, we are frequently dealing with the difference between high-quality equipment that can handle ultra-high speed data rates and lower level (less expensive) consumer equipment that relies on a lower sampling rate.

Compared to the digital signal, Nulph (2009) notes that an analog signal would seem to be the most accurate and ideal representation of the original signal. While this may initially be true, the problem arises in the need for constant amplification and re-amplification of the signal throughout every stage of the audio and video process.

The Evolution of Television

According to Ronat (2010), when broadcasting started, it was taking too long to process film for broadcast and news reporting was becoming late, so another type of film camera called "Optical Reversal" was developed. This camera could record picture and sound at the same time, but this proved to be still not fast enough, and the idea of video cameras for television was developed. Thus television camera is *Video* while the celluloid, cinema, optical, motion picture camera is used for *Film.*

Modern Trends – Video Camera's Imaging Device

The lens of the television camera forms an image on a light sensitive target inside a video camera in the same way a motion picture camera forms an image on film; but instead of Film, Television cameras commonly use a devise such as a solid-state, light-sensitive receptor called CCD (Charged-Coupled device) or a CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor). Both are commonly referred to as "chips," and they are able to detect brightness differences at different points throughout the image area. The target

area of a chip (the small rectangular area near the center this image Fig. 5 contains some hundreds of thousands to millions of pixels (picture element) point, each of which can electrically respond to the amount of light focused on its surface.



Fig 7. Computer Chips Source: https://www.computeraccessories.com

Broadcast Television Standards

Different countries of the world have their broadcast standards; this means that programing produced in one country may not be automatically viewed in another country without converting it to the appropriate technical standard.

The first consideration is the NTSC Broadcast Standard. The National Television Systems (NTSC) 525 lines, 30 frames per second system is shared primarily by the United States of America, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, Cuba, Panama, Japan, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and most of South America. According to Ronat (2012), the NTSC standard was first developed for black and white (Monochrome) television in 1941. He continued that in 1953, the colour standard was established. The NTSC system of television is referred to as a 525 lines, 60-field system because the 30 frames consist of 60 fields. The NTSC's 60-field system originally based its timing cycle on the 60Hz (Cycle) electrical system used in these countries. Since other countries in the world use a 50Hz electrical system, it was logical for them to develop systems of television based on 50 fields per second.

For the PAL and SECAM Television Systems, more than half of the countries of the world use one of two 625 lines, 25 frame systems: the SECAM (Sequential Colour and Memory) or PAL (Phase Alternating Line) system. Ronat (2012) observes that SECAM was originally developed in France as a non-compatible system designed to protect the country's manufacturing industries from foreign electronic imports. Because SECAM is incompatible with other television systems, the Communist countries, to prevent their people from viewing television programmes from non-communist countries, adopted it. Technically, SECAM is the simplest television system in the world.

On the other hand, Bosko (1999) argues that the PAL system was a modified and somewhat improved version of NTSC. It was developed in Germany and used in Britain and most of Western European countries except Brazil; all of the PAL systems have 625 lines. The extra 100 lines in the SECAM and PAL systems add significant detail and clarity to the video picture, but the 50 fields per second (compared to 60 fields in the NTSC system) means that a slight flicker can sometimes be noticed. Even so, the 25 frames per second (fps) standard is very close to the international film standard of 24 fps therefore the 24 fps film standard is easily converted to the PAL and SECAM video systems, slightly speeding up film to 25 fps is hard to notice.

By converting the original analog signal into digital form, the noise build-up can be virtually eliminated even though it is amplified or copied many times. Because digital signals are limited to the form of zeros and ones (0s and 1s or by binary computed code), no in-between or false noise can creep in to degrade the signal.

Today's digital audio and video equipment have borrowed heavily from developments

in computer technology, so much so that the two areas seem to be merging. Progressive radio and television stations have already switched over to digital signal processing and very possibly, we regularly listen to music recorded on shirt-pocket sized device that is capable of storing several hours of digitized music and videos.

The Nigerian Film Industry

The Nigerian film industry has become a force to reckon with, a rallying point in entertainment sub-cultures. Its patronage cuts across all strata of Nigerian society. Its home video industry, also known as *Nollywood,* is a huge foreign exchange earner. Digitized home video has also become a very influential and accepted medium of communication in Nigeria. However, not many know that the technically sophisticated film industry in Nigeria can be traced to Nigeria's pre- and early independence years. The first film was exhibited in August 1903 at the Clover Memorial Hall in Lagos. Opubor and Nwuneli (1972) observe that

> [t]he medium of film was itself new in those days, and still technically in its infancy. Content was largely documentary. The first showings in Lagos, according to the Lagos Standard, included scenes of a steamer moving through water, shown with the vividness of life, and scenes of the coronation of King Edward VII in 1904.

Ekwuazi (2001) remarks that colonialism was a major catalyst for the documentary film, because they fulfilled the politico-economic function of encouraging cohesion within the colonial structure. He adds that in early films, local indigenes acted only minor roles and colonial cinema failed to accomplish any meaningful technology transfer. Opubor and Nwueli (1979) report that in 1947 a Federal Film Unit was established by the colonial

administration, and most of the films imported then were supplied by the central office of information in London. The Nigerian unit produced only documentaries and news, and the colonial office of information made sure that documentaries produced by the Post Office unit in London were given adequate distribution through the British Council and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in Nigeria. Opubor and Nwueli (1979) observe that schoools, village halls, open spaces, and civic centers were useful spaces for the screening of these films; there were also the mobile film units, where vans, mounted with a 16mm projector, a reel of 16mm and a collapsible screen moved from place to place, either sensitizing people to government policies or being used for entertainment purposes.

These documentary films did not last long. As Ekwuazi (200) recalls, with Independence, the sources and genres of Nigerian films were diversified, with feature films dominating. With this development, documentaries were almost neglected in the broadcast scheme. Opubor and Nwueli (1979) also state that some of the early films produced in Nigeria included *Moral Disarmament* (1957) and *Bound for Lagos* (1962) filmed for the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1962. They add that Shell-BP of Nigeria Limited, an oil company also released a full length feature film, *Culture in Transition*, in 1963. They also noted that *Kongi's Harvest* (1970) was among the important films that were made by private film makers. *Kongi's Harvest* was a play written by Professor Wole Soyinka and produced by Francis Oladele and then directed by an African American by the name of Ossie Davis. The film is about power, politics, preventive detention. and optics.

According to Opubor and Nwueli (1979), in April 1975, history was made in

Nigeria cinema when the first feature film in a Nigerian Ibo language was produced by Ola Balogun of Afrocult Foundation Limited. *Amadi* (1975) was accepted by Igbos and non-Igbos alike. Before independence, distribution and exhibition of films were entirely in the hands of Nigeria's colonial masters. After independence, the federal government of Nigeria opened television's distribution channels to private Nigerians while nominally remaining the sole producer, distributor, and exhibitor.

Ogunsuyi (2007) has identified three schools of film in Nigeria. He remarks that the Yoruba film school emerged from the integration of indigenous theatre terminology and the Yoruba traveling theatre traditions into film. *Ija Ominira* (1997), *Aiye* (1979), *Jaiyesinmi* (1980), *Ayanmo, Orun Mooru* (1985) are some of the early Yoruba films in celluloid forms and pioneered by Hubert Ogunde (1916-1990) Yoruba theatre troupes were known for travelling the length and width of the Nigerian states to showcase these movies. Ogunsuyi also observes that the Yoruba traveling theatre moved onto the screen in stages, first in television, then in cinema, and later in video, noting that at this time, the Nigerian film industry experienced ethnocentric divides. The Yoruba film school was a combination of the features of both the narrative and dramatic texts. Ossai (2006), remarks that Yoruba film evolved from the theatre like most popular cinemas the world over. He also notes that prominent theatre practitioners like Hubert Ogunde, Kola Ogunmola, Duro Ladipo, Moses Olaiya, Oyin Adejobi and Ade Afolayan, introduced film production into the Yoruba axis. According to Ossai, Ogunde modified his stage plays into celluloid films with the same actors, commitment, and devotion. Asobele (2003) opines that in Yoruba films, the subjects may vary ,but they all project the rich cultural life of that ethnic group.

The Hausa film school followed after the example of the Yoruba school. Kofoworola cited by Hyginus Ekwuazi (1996) states that East Indian film culture massively influenced the productions of Hausa films because of similarities betwwen the two cultures. This can seen in the songs and the dance styles. Ogunsuyi (2007) observes the production of indigenous films in the north did not start until the mid-1970s. He notes that during the pre-independence era, documentaries films were only the ones produced in the north, even though they were substandard. Ekwuazi (1996) submits what became known as Hausa films are post-independence feature films and some documentaries about the Hausa culture in northern Nigeria in the Hausa language. He adds that whether the themes of these films are social, political or economic, their diverse narratives tend to marry Islamic ethics and indigenous African ethics. Ogunsuyi (2007) finds that with the production and release of *Shehu Limar* (1977) by Alhaji Adamu Halilu (who also made *Kania of Kebbi),* the true Hausa feature film came into being as the film was an adaptation of a book of the same title by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the late Nigerian Prime Minister. Other books and plays adapted into films have become so popular that most Hausa writers want their books to be adapted into movies.

According to Ogunsuyi (2007), the third, the Igbo school arrived on the scene very recently. Apart from *Amadi* (1975) by Ola Balogun, there existed no Igbo feature film in the first decade of Nigerian film making history. Ogunsuyi (2007) says that today the Igbo video films are many and represent a proportionate percentage of indigenous films in the country with films like *Living in Bondage* (1992) *Circle of Doom* (1992) and *Taboo* (1993). He states neither of these films can be said to be particularly folklorist, because they present, at the very best, a mixture of the characteristic elements of the institutionalized cinema, experimentation, and aspects of Igbo culture to stress their

individuality.

Apart from these three ethnic film industries in Nigeria, other groups, like the Benin, Efik, and Tiv, are now producing their own films. Commenting on the emergence of the Nigerian home video and its acceptability, Tunde Kelani (b.1948), a foremost Nigerian cinematographer and producer. observes that the advent of video has brought some respite to a few film makers, because the film industry is gradually dying.

Conclusion

Responding to our new age of electronic circuitry in a revolution comparable to that which ushered in the nineteenth century's machine age. graphic arts that were restricted to analog's pen and ink and paper has advanced to multi-media digital audio and video. As Osaigbovo (2019) notes, 7D high-tech cinema has evolved to make viewers feel as if they are part and parcel of a movie's transmission process. Who knows what will happen next in Nigerian films? In the future, even more sophisticated motion pictures will be produced. Twenty years ago who would have thought that today there would be virtual conferencing where thousands of people from various parts of the world could attend and participate via electronic manipulation.

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December 20 from the plane

Black scissors close the day and meet
through birdhemmed gold over the hills
the bellied summer in the sheaves
and Orion in the pricked south signing
behind a red tail and cheshire winglights
his pulse thickened with airplane fuel
The derricks below they follow patterns
over the tugging, rising snakes of oil
pumps diminish grey to herons on horizons
their beaks grown cold with rain, visions
blurred with braille storms, mumbled blindness
exonerating us against the slow catastrophe

—Karen Wall

FILM REVIEW:

Grounding Environmental Issues in the Social: A Short Response to *David Attenborough: A Life On Our Planet*

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David Attenborough's first feature film *David Attenborough: A Life On Our Planet* (2020) takes a reflective look back at the director's long life.[1] The film uses this period of a near century as a means to bringing attention to the increasing devastation and destruction that characterizes the climate/environmental crisis as we know it today. The Netflix production has garnered a considerable amount of mainstream attention, partly owing to Attenborough's status as an already established personality within the British public consciousness. The film, which Attenborough describes as his "witness statement," has a clear normative goal. He describes the devastating effects of human induced climate/environmental change and lays out a hopeful vision of a world in which these issues are sufficiently tackled. The work clearly exists with the goal of informing and persuading audiences to take action. The film was produced for screening to mass audiences, having recently premiered in cinemas across the UK whilst joining the streaming catalogue on Netflix. This mass reach aspect of the film makes it an interesting piece of work to engage with. It potentially holds the possibility to provide us with some top-level indications as to the types of discourses and strategies which are currently taking precedence in mainstream discussions surrounding climate and environmental issues.

This short response locates Attenborough's film within a wider spectrum of environmentalist politics whilst critically meditating on some of the visual and discursive strategies at play throughout the documentary. It examines Attenborough's push towards grounding environmentalist solutions within social issues of inequality whilst contemplating the moments in which the film appears to tend towards a light touch approach to proposing social solutions which obscures key structural historical factors of these issues.

Whilst we can observe a tendency for mainstream press and media outlets to refer to environmentalist movements as a singular organism, scholars of environmentalism identify a wide range of diverse approaches within environmentalist thought and action. According to Catherine Larrère, there exist at least two types of environmentalism:

1. David Attenborough is an English broadcaster, writer, and natural historian whose career has spanned over 70 years. Throughout his career, he has worked closely with the BBC, producing more than nine documentary series on natural history. Some notable works include the *Life* series (1979–2005), *The Blue Planet* series (2001), the two *Planet Earth* series (2006–16) and *Dynasties* (2018).

> a dominant environmentalism (mainstream environmentalism) which works towards the protection of natural spaces and is characteristic of white occidental elites as well as of privileged classes in non-occidental countries. The second is an environmentalism which is concerned with pollution and concentrates on its victims, and where there are vulnerable populations, this environmentalism is that of the less privileged social classes and dominated cultural minorities amongst which women are the most mobilized. (118-19)

Larrère's useful distinction between a "dominant" "mainstream" environmentalism centered on "nature" and a more socially oriented environmentalism which frames the key issues through a social lens provides us with an entry point to consider the strategies and tools of information and persuasion identifiable throughout Attenborough's work. We can think about the film as vacillating between Larrère's two environmentalisms though noticeably erring on the side of the former. The construction of "nature" as a primary lens through which to critique human induced climate and environmental change is very present throughout the documentary as, in Attenborough's familiar style, it focuses largely on "nature" and "the wild." This aspect of the film might place it within the environmentalisms that tend to extricate human experiences from that of the non-human and thus envisions our roles and duties as to "protect" "nature." This conceptualization somewhat echoes the Christian notion of man's (in both gendered and universal senses) dominion over land which has been located by post and decolonial scholars in histories of driving and legitimizing colonialism. From this view, then, such philosophies of environmentalism carry colonial connotations and wider historical roots than may appear present at first glance. It would be a gross misrepresentation, however, to suggest that the entirety of this specific film is rooted exclusively in such a mode of thinking given that, as will shortly be discussed, the film does make an effort to situate human sociality within the context of environmental crisis. What is interesting about reflecting on the type of environmentalism espoused here are the questions that emerge from thinking about how the mode of environmentalism affects the way in which environmentalist messages are delivered. In particular, it is important to ask what the implications of talking about climate and environmental issues primarily through the lens of "nature" and the "natural world" are. This is because by framing "problems in social or natural terms, representational strategies partially define the limits of human responsibility and ethical obligation" (Feldman and Hsu 206).

Some parts of the film work towards framing climate issues through the lens of the social. At one point, Attenborough explicitly states that ensuring access to education for girls is a necessary solution to some of the issues presented, but it is never made clear how or why this is important in the context of addressing climate/environmental issues. In the same segment, Attenborough advocates for the eradication or at least the reduction of poverty. He describes the move to "raising standards of living" as the "trick" to resolving climate and environmental issues. Using Japan as an example, he presents population peaks as a natural next phase which goes some way to neutralizing any potential "issues" which surround the charged topics of migration and human reproduction. Discussions on migration and human reproduction in environmental/ist contexts are fraught with gender and racialization, especially given that "[e]nvironmental studies, led by countries of the Global North, have a tendency to render Global South countries, and especially women, responsible for a surplus of population which would be the principle cause of the environmental crisis" (Larrère 116). In this context, then, Attenborough's move

to neutralization misses an opportunity to radically address at least two things. Firstly, this move does not centre the criticality of the social and social structures within environmentalist debates as well as the wider environmental impacts from which these debates are derived. Secondly, the move to neutralization risks reinforcing heavily gendered and racialized environmentalist rhetoric by refusing to proffer alternative narratives which ground the environmental crisis in structural and historical inequality. It is true that Attenborough discusses a variety of social issues in the film, but these acknowledgements fall short of being fully radical propositions.

We note that the film avoids explicitly depicting any visual representations of the issues he touches upon in a way that might be deemed unpalatable. This visual choice is significant, given that the film does not shy away from showing images of non-human animals and other life forms suffering pain and destruction[2] at the hands of humans. These visuals, in fact, form a substantial majority of the film's entirety. In this sense, the film takes a very light touch approach when it comes to discussing social issues as critically relevant to the climate/environmental crisis. Somewhat contradictorily, in the proposed solutions explicitly set out by Attenborough in the film, those of a social and economic nature are practically the only ones articulated. Throughout the film, then, we are encouraged to think about the historical magnitude of the "natural" world; a world which is repeatedly constructed as an environment which precedes our own existence as a species. We are not, however, invited to examine human history as a key component of this longue durée

2. For example, as Attenborough narrates the effects of destructive fishing practices, we are shown deliberately unpleasant images in which fish carcasses are lined up in factories. Throughout the film, we also see starving polar bears, walruses falling to their deaths from impressive heights, as well as skeletal coral reefs and burning forests. Interestingly, at one point, we even see a human audience watching these very images and responding emotionally with tears, suggesting an invitation for us, as the audience of the film, to share this sympathy towards the suffering of life forms other than humans.

of "life on our planet." The film's near absence of human bodies in image might speak to some of the dilemmas which arise from reflecting on anthropocentrism. Is this absence an attempt to push back against what has been named anthropocentrism? Or is it an attempt to move towards neutralizing the charged nature of understanding environmental issues through more socioeconomic lenses thus encroaching onto territories traditionally seen to be reserved for a separate sphere of formal politics? Questions on how to navigate issues of anthropocentrism or anthropogenic configurations of environmentalism remain ones of great complexity.

Whilst anthropocentrism has been identified as a problematic mode of analysis in its near complete erasure and disregard for other existing life forms such as plants and non-human animals, some of the types of anti-anthropocentric critiques which have emerged as a corollary are equally problematic. In naming the Anthropocene as such and critically rejecting it, we can risk either erasing the human subject or homogenizing humans as a singular category. Some North American indigenous scholars have pointed out the very concept of the Anthropocene as a sticky one given the unequal contribution of certain communities to environmental degradation and the consequent disproportionate burden placed on others to live and survive the ensuing conditions of destruction and devastation. Language becomes a critical terrain, and in particular the use of terms such as "Anthropogenic climate change" or "the Anthropocene" which "are not precise enough terms for many Indigenous peoples, because they sound like all humans are implicated in and affected by colonialism, capitalism and industrialization in the same ways" (Whyte 159). The inequalities that Whyte notes also generate questions which remain unanswered by Attenborough around the complexities of duties and obligations derived

from climate/environment crises. Do we all have the same obligations considering that we do not all share the same historical contributions to the direct causing of the issues? Ultimately, if we are not "concerned with excavating the past in the present" (Baldwin 631) from both a human and more-than-human point of view, such a question can ultimately be side stepped. Hence, when Attenborough reflects on the North/South divide in terms of the uneven distribution of burdens as well as the disparity of energy and resource consumption without making the necessary historical link, the key role of historically rooted structures as manifested in contemporary crises are effectively erased. As such, a historicized view becomes necessary in order to think back into histories of colonial domination and hierarchy as an ongoing structure and not an event (Wolfe) which continues to frame today's climate/environmental crisis as a crisis which is neither novel nor equally experienced. Without this historical view, then, it becomes increasingly difficult to articulate the climate crisis in social terms, namely as "both a gendered form of colonially imposed environmental change, and another intensified episode of colonialism" (Whyte 156).

Despite some of its shortcomings, we can begin to think about some of Attenborough's narration of the environmental crisis as one which lightly echoes some core ecosocialist/ecofeminist values albeit with heavy editing for a palatability that might appease broader audiences. In the spirit of these critical modes of thinking, Banerjee and Bell argue that "we cannot rid ourselves of the ideology of dominating nature until we rid ourselves of hierarchical structures in human society—including not only sexism, racism, and classism but also economic exploitation, unequal resource distribution, and the negative effects of capitalism" (Banerjee and Bell 13). As the screening moves into the post-film Q&A section, one could identify a marked shift in Attenborough's discursive strategies which bear some relationship to this quote. This is the moment in which he starts to think overtly about combating the insularity of nationalism as a factor which impeaches international cooperation on climate and environmental issues. He calls for the divestment of pension funds, inviting us to collectively reject their investment in fossil fuels. These observations widely form an effort to expose the unsustainability of exponential industrial growth and consumerism. As such, Attenborough takes the step towards thinking about capitalism as an unsustainable and therefore undesirable structure of organization without ever naming it in as many words. But we might ask whether it is necessary to expose and name these structures of hierarchy, as Banerjee and Bell do, in order to be able to sufficiently address and transform them. The film cites these structural social issues as embedded in environmental issues in rather muted ways, resulting in its creation and subsequent abandoning of the critical pretext from which to take up a radical social-historical view on the matters at stake.

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December 31 foggy new year's eve

St Seraphim in conversation spoke
of strangling in the eyes of someone buried
in the sun—the dazzled hold he felt but could not see
hot along his skull, anyway dwindling to relic
Today our day would not show its heart
but sent grey nets knotting in the guts
of trees, along the farmdull shores of the fields
it beat its limbs and would not burst
guarding withered limbs and harvest twigs
pulled the pond skin, ruffled threads and when it shrank
to black we climbed with pearlnumb hands
up through a tower full of buried summer wheat
we couldn't even see, but remnant heat
was rendering fog to mist and then to stars
turned to hymns and hot hymns to waltz

—Karen Wall

FILM REVIEW:

Fake Noses, Real Masks and One Big Headache:

The Making of *The Other Side of the Wind*

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When Netflix accepted to step in and invest in the completion of Welles' unfinished film, they felt that at the very least, they would get a documentary on Welles' failure to complete the film. Documenting Welles' failures is a popular sport. In some ways, it is not all that surprising: measuring his achievements is a far more daunting task. Where to begin? Where to end? One forgets that by the time he shot *Citizen Kane*, he already had nine years' experience as an actor, five as a theater director/manager and three as actor/director/producer on the radio. Welles' first love was Shakespeare and he was driven by a desire to popularize the Bard. All other endeavors were to back that main project.

All this is to point out that Welles' earliest interests were not in film. He would not truly focus on film making until the 1960s—the decade when he shot *The Trial*, *Chimes at Midnight* and a television production *An Immortal Story*. Welles disliked the modern world in its desire for conformity and predictability, and he liked to think that Shakespeare disliked his modern world as well. Welles loved innovations, however. When arriving in Hollywood, he considered the studios the greatest train-set a boy could ever want, and with all the youthful enthusiasm and childish whimsy of a twenty-five-year-old boy (and the help of such creative masters as Gregg Toland—whom he never ceased to praise) he brought all his dreams to the making of his maiden film. Welles was never allowed to make another such film within the confines of the Hollywood film industry. Hollywood carefully destroyed his reputation and maintained the fiction that he was impossible to work with until the day he died.

After he died, he was canonized. Welles himself joked about it, saying, "They'll love me when I'm dead." Which is the title to the feature-length documentary on the making of *The Other Side of the Wind* and the concurrent unmaking of Welles. Welles had intended the project to be his Hollywood comeback film. The documentary presents the project as his ultimate downfall. Director Morgan Neville's basic conclusion was that Welles was essentially crushed by the towering achievement of *Citizen Kane*, and that he could never escape from its shadow. It is an interesting, albeit disingenuous, theory, for it patently ignores the fourteen other films he was responsible for (twelve as director and two as producer, one uncredited), many of which are classics in their own right, not to mention his work on radio, a television series as well as a pilot for another. For any other film maker, it would be an enviable résumé.

An interesting counter-narrative is the other documentary on the completion of *Wind*, *A Final Cut for Orson*, which was also produced by Netflix, but can be seen on YouTube. Ryan Suffern's film pays tribute to a group called VISTOW, or *Volunteers In Service To Orson Welles*. In so doing, it points to an opposite trend, one could almost say a counter-culture, underscoring an entire group of people dating back to Welles' early years, who went above and beyond the call of duty to achieve Welles' vision. At one time or another, one could add to the list names like John Houseman, Gregg Toland, George Schaeffer, Micheál Mac Liammóir, Akim Tamiroff, Jeanne Moreau, as well the casts and crews of the Mercury Theater. During the shooting of *Wind*, the core of that group were Oja Kodar, cinematographer Gary Graver (both worked with Welles until his death), Peter Bogdonavitch and producer Frank Marshall. It shows the mesmerizing quality of Welles' leadership and the loyalty he inspired even when working his people to exhaustion. The website Wellesnet shows how such a group is still thriving today. One could say that the one weakness of the group is their inability to help one another. If anyone deserved an award for their work on *The Other Side of the Wind*, it would have to be cinematographer Gary Graver, who at times with little more than hope and a prayer, brought to life the visual dreams of the last Welles. It is a shame that it never occurred to producer Frank Marshall (or to any of the young directors gravitating around Welles in the 1970s) to offer Graver a serious job as cinematographer, for he really proved his mettle in *The Other Side of the Wind*.

When setting aside the problems with Welles, both documentaries explore an awesome quality in the making of Welles' film: it covers the entire spectrum of film making, demanding the utmost in film technique and technology, but also working at

an almost ad-hoc, home-movie level. Frank Marshall fondly remembers the student-film atmosphere, where everyone pitched in to do whatever was needed to move things along. At the other end, the film explored the very qualities of the film images. Editor Bob Murawaski—who wanted to complete the film more for Gary Graver's sake than for Welles'—noted how the film needed a technology that had yet to be invented: computer editing. If Welles had had an avid editing board, he would have had all his rushes at his fingertips; the variety of film stocks would have ceased to be the unsurmountable problem it had apparently become. But even in the final run, the film demanded innovations from post-production facilities in the daunting task of lining up film cuts with the original negative. Fifty years after the film's inception and thirty-eight years after Welles' death, the film remains at the forefront of film making.

They'll Love Me When I'm Dead visually becomes a sly companion piece to *Wind*, stringing together excerpts of Welles' films and clips from various interviews to illustrate the reasoning behind the project. A film by Orson Welles is something of a Rube Goldberg cartoon: an extremely elaborate mechanism to achieve an extremely simple task. In that sense *A Final Cut for Orson* is about the young crew setting up the Golbergesque mouse-trap. *Citizen Kane* is a classic Hollywood newspaper movie; *Touch of Evil* is the story of a dirty cop. *The Other Side of the Wind* is a Hollywood party. But Welles describes it to actress Jeanne Moreau as a joke: a film about two films, neither of which are Orson Welles films. It is essentially a masquerade (as in game of masks). Neville notes in *Dead* how Welles invariably wore a fake nose or some other disguise as an actor. *The Other Side of the Wind* is the ultimate fake nose, for it is the process of making the film itself that is the disguise for the film. If *Wind* is a fake nose of a film, is it an autobiography of Welles'

inability to get financing? This is what director Morgan Neville would have you think, and it is true in the sense that any personal statement is personal.

But to say that *Wind* describes Welles' life and situation is a red herring. Welles understood the difficulties in setting up any project, as did Huston or Capra, or any other film maker. Making a film is like building a house of cards in a wind storm, but that never daunted him. What Welles most feared was going stale. While there are over-arching themes and visual signatures to his films—the stuff that critics love to dwell upon—for Welles, each new project had to be *new*: something other than what he had done before. He could have simply come back by completing *The Deep*, but there, he would have done 'another thriller,' which was to offer up what people expected—essentially falling into self-parody.

Welles' great desire was to forge ahead, to chart new possibilities in what could be done with the medium at his disposal. But for anyone who needed reliability, he could be infuriating. He was not really profligate: most of his completed projects in fact came in reasonably on time and on budget; but he *was* exhausting and unpredictable, jumping from one idea to the next and never stopping. *Wind* obviously contradicts the first statement, as it took him five years to shoot, but overwhelming supports the second, as both documentaries attest.

Great producers however could bring out the best in Welles. Harry Cohn's revisions to the *Lady from Shanghai* make it the classic that it is. Welles in turn brings out the best in all those around him. *Citizen Kane* is Greg Toland's masterpiece and the best thing Herman Mankiewicz ever wrote. *The Other Side of the Wind* is John Huston's best role and taught Frank Marshall all he needed to know about producing. It is the central aspect that Morgan Neville did not explore.

But it explains the tireless devotion of all those around him.

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January 2 outdoor ice during the season

We can barely see the path but the night
soaks up vodka light from the panes
of glass pyramids full of white flowers, and splashes
the ice up the valley, our pockets of whiskey and sugar
and wrapped up tight we have the bright
idea to skate the ice tomorrow
Dice white noon comes rattling down the rink
the rigid skater's ankles shaking double tambourines
sketch and magnify scratched pictographs
while our white breath circles fierce, scattering in
the luxurious woolen debris of the season
and all the bright ideas

—Karen Wall

FILM REVIEW:

Spike Lee's *Four Little Girls*: Will History Be Repeated?

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SUNY
Cobleskill, New York

Addie Mae Collins. Denise McNair. Carole Robertson. Cynthia Wesley. Four little girls brutally murdered when Klu Klux Klan members bombed 16th Street Baptist Church (the movement's gathering place) in Birmingham, Alabama, on September 15, 1963. This horrific event in United States history will forever live in infamy, will perpetually be a reminder of how cruel human beings can be: innocent children killed just because they were Black. These events were captured in *4 Little Girls*, a 1997 documentary directed by Spike Lee[1] (b. 1957) and produced by HBO Documentary and 40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks. Lee's film reminds us of the importance of not forgetting about this day. This details the realities of racism, in a not so distant past. The director recognizes these four Black children as being icons of the Civil Rights movement, and chronicles them in this way throughout the film, incorporating interviews from family members and movement leaders who discuss racism under Jim Crow.

4 Little Girls begins with Joan Baez singing a haunting rendition of "Birmingham Sunday" while the camera fixates on the graves and, later, the memorial statue of Collins, McNair, Robertson and Wesley. Edited through these graveyard moments are videos and photos of Civil Rights protests and police attacks taking place around the state: a brief moment of reverence before we get into the story of their lives and the lives of their family members. The beginning of the film is about the four girls' parents and various family members, which provides both personal and historical context. What Lee attempts to do is to show how these girls were human beings with feelings, emotions, thoughts, quirks, idiosyncrasies, etc.; they were people, like any other people. The initial sequence has established they died, but Lee wants to also establish that they lived. Janet Maslin in her *New York Times* review aptly points out one scene of import that is an example of this destroyed normalcy: "One mother even displays her daughter's Girl Scout sash, adorned with merit badges. Nothing in the scouting credo could have helped this young girl prepare for what fate had in store."

While talking about their kids with loving retrospection and sweet anecdotes, the various family members and Civil Rights leaders, like Fred Shuttlesworth and other members of the SCLC, also speak about the segregation going on in the South while they (the family members) were growing up and during the time of bombing. It is established

1. Spike Lee is famous for his directing of such films as *Do the Right Thing* (1989), *Malcolm X* (1992), *Bamboozled* (2000), *BlacKKKlansman* (2018), and most recently *Da 5 Bloods* (2020) for Netflix. In his 30 year career, he directed close to 100 movies, documentaries, specials, and videos. Many of his films, which are highly stylistic in their construction—montage editing, bright colors, a masterful use of close-ups—speak to the Black experience in America.

very early on that Birmingham was a town of racial violence, despite such commentary from featured pundits like Circuit Court Judge Arthur Hanes Jr. who remarked that the town was a "wonderful place to live and raise a family." As Mia L. Mask states in her review for *Cineaste*, the film "poignantly captures the systemic institutional racism of elected public officials (and, by extension, society) who created a climate in which the Ku Klux Klan functioned as an extension of the state" (80). Images of KKK members walking the streets, lynching and random explosions are quite prevalent throughout the film—a stark contrast between contemporary Birmingham, where White members of the population believe all was and is fine in "The Magic City."

That was and is not the case, and what Lee (as well as Sam Pollard, his editor) smartly does is to use mass media imagery to give the viewers a clear indication of this point. One section of the film represents how it became front page news when The Freedom Riders came into town and were busted up by Alabama townsfolk. The viewer sees pictures of the flames and riots; a total lack of civility and tolerance in moments where people were trying to teach other people to love one another rather than hate others because of the color of their skin. The viewer is also made a privy, through news video and camerawork, to the commissioner of fire and safety, Eugene "Bull" Connor, arguably one of the most infamous and racist individuals in Birmingham in the 1960s—a man who got out the attack dogs and hosed people to submission. He is depicted as being the dark id of Birmingham, the physical embodiment of what was happening in Alabama during that time, and a crazy person filled with hate who had the backing of more powerful people, like that of Governor George Wallace. Although he would have disagreed, Wallace was an ardent racist himself and proof that systemic racism was and is prevalent in many of our towns, counties and states.

One of the shocking moments not only in the film, but (from this writer's perspective) in American cinematic documentary filmmaking, is Spike Lee's interview with an aging and incoherent George Wallace, "… a dynamic expression of the mentally deranged white people." Intertwined with recorded times of when he claimed that segregation should go on forever, Wallace attempts to present himself as a friend to the African-American population in his later years. As Roger Ebert, in his four-star review, puts it: "He wants to disassociate himself from the crime. So did others. Before long even Wallace was apologizing for his behavior and trying to define himself in a different light." He pulls out this man named Ed, an African-American gentleman, and claims that they are best friends. From the look on Ed's face, it is safe to assume that he does not feel the same way towards Wallace. The awkwardness of these moments is palpable and raw but absolutely necessary for viewers to get a full understanding of the story of the four little girls. The latter were representative of what Alabama was and was also fighting against: a racist state filled with evil bigoted White monsters that killed Black children just because they were riddled with hatred.

Lee makes a point to mention that children were more apt to march than the adults were, which is evident in the section on Kelly Ingram Park, where students were viciously shot with fire hoses and attacked by police dogs. The chaos that ensued is presented with raw intensity and it establishes how children became targets; they were the center of the movement, and they needed to be eradicated. It is here where the church bombing is presented in stark detail. To see those photos of the destroyed church, of the decimated bodies, and of the funeral services is disturbing and necessary; and, to hear the stories of

the survivors and the victims still sobbing over these children is very affecting. We know what the aftermath is of racism, we are made aware of the heart-ache and the panic that an event like this causes.

The film does go into the trial and conviction of Robert Chambliss ("Dynamite Bob") in 1977, but three other people were involved with the bombing—Herman Frank Cash (who died in 1994); Thomas Blanton, Jr. (convicted in 2001 after the case was reopened); and, Frank Cherry (convicted in 2002, once it was established that he was not mentally incompetent). These three other individuals were mentioned in *4 Little Girls*, but Chambliss was the only one brought to justice by the end of filming. With that being said, justice was served and the battle was won; but the war continues day in and day out, and we all must continue to fight on, like the families of those four little girls did and continue to do. With the civil unrest currently taking place in our nation, and with men and women of color still being regularly and consistently persecuted (and in some cases shot or lynched by law enforcement and American citizens alike) it is painfully obvious that history can repeat, and maybe is repeating, itself.

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January 7 bison in the snow

To breathe the air that tilts this day
would wire the spine to zero's crust
Break your tread toward the flickering horns
of woolen mountains crimson in the groves
against the rigid sunfall.
Dense monolithic guardians
of spindly aspens, like ourselves
feebly winding down the plains
balanced two limbed on feral roots
tethered to our need of this land
where stronger bark has long split
and vanished, where bandit footprints
closed in behind the marches of chiefs.
Find our vessel in the parking lot,
we cleave the herd with timid thunder
copper hooves perforate the horizon
pounding out messages we'll never hear

—Karen Wall

FILM REVIEW:

Licence to Thrill?: Documentary in the Service of Power in *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea*

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Ostensibly an investigation into European associations friendly with the official North Korean government, Mads Brügger's *The Mole: Undercover in North Korea* (2020) hails its own victory in spotlighting sanction-breaking by utilizing the same kind of false investor and hidden camera ruse developed by British journalist Mazher Mahmood in the 1990s. Brügger's stylish mélange, similar in tone to the meticulous and cinematic documentaries offered up by HBO Max (*The Jinx*) and Netflix (*Making a Murderer*, *Wormwood*), is a co-production between state broadcasters in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden,

and Norway.[1]

The narrative of *The Mole*—detailing the conversion of a Danish civilian, Ulrich Larsen, toward strong sympathies with the North Korean hierarchy—is certainly a fascinating one. As Larsen's self-doubt increases, he meets Brügger, who convinces him to continue masquerading as a broker in a long con in which the North Korean government are filmed offering deals to Western businessmen in direct contravention of numerous international sanctions. Bo Tao Michaëlis, writing in Ekko, considered the documentary to be similar to a "007 movie" in its tense conveyance of an espionage narrative in which citizens pose as interested buyers of weaponry from the North Korean regime. Interviews with the titular mole and the recruited actor (Jim Latrache-Qvortrup) are performed by former MI5 operative Annie Machon. Within the film these interviews perform the same function as the classical talking heads interview: recalling the narrative in their own words as the camera interrogates their posture and face for subtext. These interviews are brought closer to the theme of post-infiltration by rebranding them as 'debrief'—a full unburdening with a superior officer removed from the emotional investment that a director may impute in their subjects. At the film's conclusion, Machon praises her interview subjects for "the most impressive private intelligence operation," suggestive of her sympathy with and belief in their testimony, thus coercing ours.

Unwittingly, Michaëlis hits upon causes for concern couched in this shorthand praise. Firstly, much as in the classic James Bond film, the real victims detached and displaced and suffering in the games of international subterfuge are entirely hidden. Action is reduced to a handful of operatives with excess agency. Secondly, the film details a complex and convoluted revenge narrative by the West against a foreign power. In a fictional setting this scenario reaps no repercussions, but in this real setting it has placed fear of mortal danger on civilian subjects Larsen and Latrache-Qvortrup in perpetuity.

Thirdly, much as James Bond films reveal kinship with the halls of post-war Allied power and the necessity of personal danger to enact greater freedom, Brügger's work is not in the tradition of crusading journalism supporting a counter-narrative to official lines of thinking. Former United Nations co-ordinator Hugh Griffiths proclaimed *The Mole* "the most severe embarrassment to Chairman Kim Jong-un […] elements of the film really do correspond with what we already know" (Adams). Brügger's big reveal—that an economically-desperate North Korea was looking to friendly unsanctioned nations for trade and partnership was widely-known as early as 2006 (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 1)—is lauded as impressive within the film and in the client journalism released in concert with its promotion. However, aside from the fascinating story of infiltration, we learn nothing new about North Korea and merely confirm existing prejudice and suspicion.

In short, *The Mole* is a documentary (and, in a more abstract fashion, *documentary power*) in support of official narratives regarding North Korea and, more broadly-speaking, the project of Western liberalism. Brügger undertakes the same pairing of cultural sensibilities between a liberal 'us' and an illiberal 'other' undertaken by European directors such as Theo van Gogh (Islam) and Richard Dawkins (theism). Much as in the director's

1. *The Mole* is Brügger's fourth documentary film, and the fourth which utilizes meta-cinematic method and fictional Western characters in order to explore corrupt regimes in the global south. The documentary pairs naturally with *The Red Chapel* (2009), which compiles a 2006 television series made for Danish broadcaster DR2, as explorations of North Korea, whilst *The Ambassador* (2011) and *Cold Case Hammarskjöld* (2019) pair as explorations of corrupted post-liberation African nations (Liberia and South Africa respectively).

previous film *The Red Chapel* (2009), detailing a cultural exchange of Dutch comedians into North Korea, which saw its director permanently banned from the country, humor is derived from gentle comparison and subversion of national traits. As viewers, we are invited to laugh at the Spanish aristocrat-turned-mouthpiece for Pyongyang or the absence of humor and expression in the North Korean weapons dealers.[2] The comedic construction in these moments is decidedly akin to the use of humor in the service of mission in the films of Michael Moore, only here Brügger replaces Moore's quest for egalitarianism with affirmations of the liberal viewer as superior in temperament and politic.

The potent and successful cocktail of crusading journalism, celebrity, humor, testimony, manipulation and cinematic construction pioneered by Michael Moore in the 1980s and 1990s clearly holds influence over regions of documentary production in 2020. However, two key differences highlight the gap between Moore's earlier works and adherents of his cinematic schemata in following years. Firstly, the animating political sensibilities of Moore are broadly democratic-socialist, highlighting the plight of workers (*Roger and Me* [1989]) and the victims of gun legislation (*Bowling For Columbine* [2002]) and foreign policy (*Fahrenheit 9/11* [2004]). Secondly, there exists an understanding of historic documentary utilization as a weapon of counter-narrative which underpins specific film-making choices such as the interview method, the constructed comedic moments, and the cinematic interludes in order to heighten their impact. Upon realizing Moore (who himself built on the personal and anti-realist documentary legacies created by Errol Morris, Ross McElwee, and Werner Herzog) had created narrative and aesthetic template able to withstand the insertion of one's own worldview, a cadre of documentaries about Moore's own shortcomings made in the style of a Moore piece emerged,[3] followed by Moore-alike documentaries by far-right political figures such as Steve Bannon and Alex Jones.

Brügger appropriates Moore in a more sophisticated manner by limiting his own visible presence and welcoming affirming testimony from authority. Where Moore's works utilize several shooting styles, each ultimately confirming the thesis of the film, Brügger is more subtly manipulative, locking the viewer into a coherent narrative space by attempting to secure the invisibility of the filming device. Scenes of Larsen designed and arranged chronologically to convey his early entry into the world of North Korean associations are shot retrospectively and tonally-matched to appear as if they come from earlier in the narrative. In several of the surreptitiously filmed meetings with middlemen and brokers, there are cuts between two separate shots and audio feeds, as well as external cameras of higher quality filming the entrance and exit of key players from a distance. For Brügger, being North Korean is a state of incompatible alterity. We can only encounter North Koreans as others in a visibly lower-quality manner, signified by both the lower bit rate of the footage and the curious cultural differences that occur within them, such as the scene in which Larsen and Latrache-Qvortrup are serenaded by a troupe of bombastic musicians in a tiny conference space.

In the closing scenes, Larsen reveals to his wife that he has lived as a mole for

2. Michaëlis' review for *Ekko* dovetails the Bond imagery with the humour: "North Korea, with its stiff uniforms and huge military caps and notorious lack of humor, seems to be *Dr. No*'s childhood home. A parody of the European's prejudice about the yellow danger in Mao jackets, military exercises and Asian disgust."

3. *Michael and Me* (2004, dir: Larry Elder), *Celsius 41.11* (2004, dir: Kevin Knoblock) and *FahrenHYPE 9/11* (2004, dir: Alan Peterson).

ten years. Whilst potentially offering a self-reflexive and critical corrective to the single-mindedness of Brügger's own method, the trauma inherent in this moment is quickly moved past, cutting after the director's explanation of Larsen's bravery in a manner that suggests every danger crafted for the camera is ultimately worthwhile. At stake in *The Mole* are not significant gains of insight into regime and power but, as Brügger loiters in the back of Larsen's final testimony close-up, the simultaneous cleansing of the guilt of maker and his avatar-subject.

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journey home

We aren't live long enough for planting
do not live long for drowning in good sense
Ecstasy comes flagging us down, distractions
where we should expect rude action
galloping into clearly labelled stalls
On the roadway there are bandits
we yearn with coins hid in our pockets,
scraping sight with a dime the frosted window
The horses of my heart burl on
to be pastured into unnamed rows
And all the clothes of hours bind our limbs
don't twist a rigging for fresher winds
be worthy of the garden fraught with petals
the geometric country where I dismounted
every faucet a precious fountain

—Karen Wall

BOOK REVIEW:

A beautiful novel full of compassion and love....

Minae Mizumura, *Inheritance from Mother*, trans. Juliet Winters Carpenter. New York: Other Press, 2019.

"Pardon me for asking," says an elderly lady called Kaoru (a unisexual Japanese name meaning "perfume" or "fragrance") to the protagonist, Mitsuki Katsura, and another hotel guest, "but has either of you come here to commit suicide?" By the time readers get to this part of Minae Mizumura's book, they should have become quite well-acquainted with the psychological complexity of modern Japanese culture, which sometimes reverts back shockingly to an era when Kaoru's question would not have raised very many eyebrows. Like many novels written all over the world today, Mizumura's *Inheritance from Mother* deals with the relationship between an adult in the late forties or early fifties who has to cope with an ageing parent, but this is the Japanese version, therefore it contains paradoxical and sometimes puzzling (for Western readers) cultural situations. We often read about selfless and self-sacrificing Japanese mothers who are being looked after in their old age by selfless and self-sacrificing daughters who accord themselves resignedly to the conventions of custom, but here the daughter vacillates between waiting for her mother to just damn well die (for which she feels guilty) and leave her some money. "There must have been a time," she reflects, "when her death would have been a terrible blow." Now,

devotedly serving her mother's often unreasonable demands and whims, Mitsuki dreams of her eventual freedom. Oh, wait—she also has to deal with a cheating husband who has run off to Paris with his much younger girlfriend, and a wealthy sister with whom she has an ambiguous relationship, and who does little to help with their mother's care. Much of the plot is presented in flashback, in which we learn about Mitsuki's own past, her mother's romances, her father's lonely death and their family background.

Mizumura adopts an interesting technique to deal with all these plots and sub-plots. She purposely sets the book up rather like a nineteenth-century serial novel in a magazine or journal, the kind of novel written by Dickens, Thackeray or Elizabeth Gaskell. "This novel," she notes, is "an homage to the dying tradition of serial novels," and tells us that this is in fact what it is, as it appeared in the *Yomiuri Shinbun* from 2010 to 2011. This serial technique allows her to slowly and realistically develop her characters, and as we get to know them personally we also see them as symbols of a Japanese society still caught between its long-established traditions (Confucian filial obligations, family structure) and ideas learned from contact with Western culture (self-realisation, the unreality of romance, the desire to break out of the old ways). Mitsuki must come to terms with her mother as she is, dump the cheating husband and find out who she really is; at her age people would think it's a bit late, but to survive she must do these things, otherwise she will be absorbed into the ways of the past. What Mitsuki inherits from he mother isn't just money, but a divided and fractured view of the world, and no coping mechanism to help her deal with it; neither her philandering husband nor her emotionally inadequate sister is of any use to her, but paradoxically when she faces this, Mitsuki finds a way to discover who she is and, at the end of the book, she looks at the cherry blossoms as they come out and says to herself, "I'm happy," and at the same time "begged forgiveness of no-one in particular." She has got beyond the Japanese self-shaming culture and looks forward now to a real life of her own, financed, perhaps rather ironically, by the inheritance from mother.

Mizumura knows her western literature well, and readers can't fail to see shades of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (which is actually mentioned) or Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, where a female protagonist breaks free of convention. In the case of both women in these books the result is suicide; Emma ingests arsenic and Anna throws herself under a train. Mitsuki does neither, although Kaoru's question in the hotel raises the possibility. Mitsuki, unlike the other two, doesn't take a lover, and is perhaps more akin to Nora in Ibsen's *Doll's House*, although the door she slams at the end of the book is metaphorical rather than actual. However, another book, this one Japanese (and not well-known in the west), plays a significant part in Mizumura's narrative. This is *The Golden Demon* (1893) by Ozaki Koyo, which even has a chapter named after it, and, like Mizumura's novel, was serialised in the *Yomiuri Shinbun.* "Seldom did a novel change a human life in so tragicomical a fashion," the narrator comments about Koyo's book, and Mitsuki's grandmother was one person whose life was changed as she subsumed herself in O-Miya, the female protagonist, and begins to think that this romantic novel was actually about her. Her daughter, Mitsuki's mother, grew up in a world which was half romantic fantasy and half rather seamy reality, all of which need not be revisited here, but which of course has an impact on how Noriko, Mitsuki's mother, led her life. Unlike Koyo's book, however, *Inheritance from Mother* is not the least sentimental. I ended up wishing that there were an English translation of *The Golden Demon*, as it would have provided a key to some of the problems presented by Mizumura. Another Japanese novel given a chapter-heading is Junichiro Tanizaki's *The Makioka Sisters*, which was serialised from 1943 to 1948 and

which tells the story of a prominent family in decline. The four sisters meet together regularly, and try to sort out suitable marriages for each other, although one of them eventually elopes. Here, "having a Makioka sisters' day" meant "Mitsuki, [her sister] Natsuki, and their mother would go on an outing dressed in elegant kimono." To do this, Natsuki says "will seem like a totally middle-aged fashion statement." Mitsuki replies, "Of course it will," adding "Who cares? We *are* totally middle-aged, and then some." It's a kind of funny epiphany.

Like many Victorian serial novels, this one has its *longueurs*, but on the whole Minae Mizumura manages the complex plot beautifully. For anyone involved in a difficult mother-daughter relationship this novel will echo deeply and profoundly, and for readers who are interested in looking at the emotional impact cultural clashes between east and west may have on families it offers a sometimes disturbing view, although humour is never far from the surface. Mitsuki tries to be both a traditional caregiver dutifully following her Confucian obligations to her ageing mother but at the same time having to think about herself, a modern dilemma, on the road to middle-age with no real signposts to tell her which way to go. As far as her husband Tetsuo is concerned, she decides she will not play the patient, long-suffering Japanese wife and eventually arranges to divorce him. *Inheritance from Mother* is also, as are many serial novels, a family saga spanning three generations, and a *Bildungsroman* for an older woman. Mizumura handles the various layers of her story with ease and grace; her style is straightforward and direct even as she tackles difficult issues such as dealing with a dying parent and the desires of a middle-aged woman. Mitsuki must first discover who she is before she can branch out and find new love; unlike Emma Bovary and Anna Karenina she doesn't hook up with unsuitable men, and even when she meets the widowed Mr. Matsubara at the hotel, what readers expect simply doesn't happen. Mizumura gives us a beautiful novel full of compassion and love which examines commonplace issues and complex characters in a new light, written in a combination of everyday and poetic language, and which may well show some readers a way to cope with the important issues which it raises without shouting and pontificating. It will also help kill a few stereotypes.

—John Butler

Independent Scholar

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Airplane home

I am not yet translated, spell out the words
What is it that comes to chaff
Yeast of home in yearning mass
Soft maze bloated in the wrecks
of dried out fields, and boneslim jet
stabs down and pulls the needle
puny through the distance striped with wheatfields
the serpent river won't hold still, the arch of home
On the intercom I hear lithe sermons, blood relations
Angel-handled servants attend the court of airless blue
the shadeless god of all our shades
burns a careless cinder within a metal flue

—Karen Wall

BOOK REVIEW

Situating Tibet in the modern world...

Tsering Döndrup, *The Handsome Monk and Other Stories*, trans. Christopher Peacock. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019.

Ah, Tibet! This is the land of stupendous mountain vistas, prayer flags flapping in the breeze, monasteries perched precariously on hillsides and gentle orange-clad lamas chanting Buddhist prayers in incense-filled temples. And then, along comes Tsering Döndrup to spoil it all. Tibet, (the non-existent country of Tsezhung in these stories) as depicted in this fascinating collection, is a land of poverty, alcoholism, gambling, disease, political and religious corruption, crime, and hordes of Han Chinese imposing their way of life on the local culture, making the inhabitants a minority in their own country, and leaving them poised liminally between the traditional ways of the past and modernisation. The real Tibet is part of China now, of course, and living there is all about survival, as its ancient culture falls victim to the inexorable advance of the People's Republic and its way of life. In this collection of stories we meet people who are trying to do just that, and by the end of the book we should be roundly disabused of any romantic notions we might have had about Tibet. We may also be surprised to learn that in spite of the Chinese cultural incursions, Tibetan religious tradition and folkways still play a significant role in the lives of ordinary people.

Tsering Döndrup, who is actually from Malho, a Tibetan county in Chinese Mongolia, employs familiar Western-style narratives in some of the stories, but he also ventures into fantasy and a form of what is often termed "magic realism," genres which reflect the spiritual and religious aspects of Tibetan culture. Thus we have a starkly realist story like "Piss and Pride," in which an elderly man, unfamiliar with the city, attempts to maintain his dignity (and family honour) as he finds himself caught short in wet trousers with nowhere to go, or "A Show to Delight the Masses," in which Lozang Gyatso, a corrupt governor, finds himself summoned by the messengers of the Lord of Death and ultimately put on trial. Here Döndrup employs a mixture of verse and prose, which is an older form of narrative, although it's set in 1993 and contains familiar modern material. "Notes of a Volunteer AIDS Worker," in my view the weakest piece in the book, is a rather boring (yet tellingly relevant) first-person narrative based on an actual interview, whilst "The Story of the Moon," a short generational fable, is another conventionally second-rate story which takes place against a post-apocalyptic background, a genre that has rather outworn its novelty. However, even when the writing is not so accomplished these stories have a serious message which Döndrup needs to get out: there is an AIDS problem in Tibet, and the prospect of a post-apocalyptic world should be of concern to everybody, especially those concerned with the environment as well as the human race. These stories also situate Tibet in the modern world, sharing the fears that lurk within most societies these days.

Döndrup deploys a number of literary techniques in this collection; it shouldn't take readers long to notice, for example, that there's a preponderance of body-fluids in these stories. In "Ralo," for example, the eponymous protagonist is remembered by the narrator as having "thick yellow snot hanging from his nose," to which his mother reacts by saying "His brains are dripping out again." In the title story, Gendün Gyatso, the monk, he spends some time describing the "semen-smelling" room in which the protagonist occupies his time having sex with Lhatso. Döndrup has a wicked sense of humour, too; in "Black Fox Valley" the residents of a village are moved by the authorities to a place wonderfully-named "The Happy Ecological Resettlement Village," where their new house collapses, they have to drink fake milk, their property gets stolen and when supplied with a brand-new lavatory, they are reluctant to use the toilet, not knowing what it's for. "Pissing and crapping in a lovely basin like this?" Grandpa Jamyang exclaims, "We'd use up so much merit our assholes would close up!" It's just as well, in the end, because someone forgot to connect it to the plumbing. To add insult to injury, they get no compensation for the mishaps.

Another technique which Döndrup uses is recurring characters, something we see in, for instance, Joseph Conrad with his narrator Charles Marlow, who shows up in *Lord Jim* and *Chance* as well as *Heart of Darkness*, and whose attitudes and prejudices become well-understood by readers. Döndrup features a monk called Alak Drong, "whose unscrupulous ways," Christopher Peacock tells us in his very helpful introduction, "will quickly become all too familiar to the reader." Peacock informs us that his name means something like Reverend Wild Yak, and that he is "the foremost symbol of Tsering Döndrup's wide-ranging and unflinching critique of corruption and hypocrisy in the modern-day practice of Tibetan Buddhism." However, as Peacock warns us, we should not assume that Döndrup is merely on the attack against the religious community. In "The Handsome Monk" the protagonist may be a rather dodgy religious figure, but he is also a human being with all the inner conflicts that go along with that, and the narrative voice (or Döndrup himself) does not judge him harshly, which elevates the

story from invective into a more powerful and subtle satire. Döndrup writes similarly of corrupt officialdom and of tourists who think Tibet is a primitive land which has somehow escaped all the bad things about western civilisation and remains the "pure land." Finally, China itself, now seen by many as the occupying power, is always lurking in the background, part of the modernising of Tibet, but also the conveyer of much that has gone wrong in Tibetan society.

—John Butler

Independent Scholar

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Tracks

Sue Matheson

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John Butler was born in the UK and educated there and in Canada. He holds an MA from the University of Toronto and a PhD from the University of Manitoba. He has taught at the university level in Nigeria, Japan and Canada, and has published several books on Renaissance and seventeenth-century topics, including biographies of Richard Cromwell and Lord Herbert of Chirbury, a translation of Lord Herbert's De religione gentilium, and editions of works by Francis Godwin, Sir Thomas North (with Don Beecher and Carmine Di Biase), John Greaves and George Gascoigne (with Don Beecher). His latest book is Sir Jerome Horsey's Travels and Adventures in Russia and Eastern Europe (to be released 2019), and he has also written a book of essays on lesser-known travellers, *Off the Beaten Track*. he has also co-edited (with Sue Matheson) two volumes of papers on

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call for papers

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Hard copies of manuscripts should be sent to Sue Matheson at *the quint*, University College of the North, P.O. Box 3000, The Pas, Manitoba, Canada, R9A 1M7. We are happy to receive your artwork in digital format, PDF preferred. Email copies of manuscripts, Word or RTF preferred, should be sent to thequint@ucn.ca.

Essays should range between 15 and 25 pages of double-spaced text in Word, and all images (JPEG) and source citations. Longer and shorter submissions also will be considered. Bibliographic citation should be the standard disciplinary format.

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